United States v. Chancey Fuller , 469 F. App'x 514 ( 2012 )

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                                                                            FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                FEB 24 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 09-50635
Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 2:08-cr-00240-JFW-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
CHANCEY TERREL FULLER, AKA
Chance, AKA Fat Boy,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 8, 2012
Pasadena, California
Before: D.W. NELSON, O’SCANNLAIN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Chancey Terrel Fuller appeals his jury conviction for conspiracy to traffic
marijuana, in violation of

21 U.S.C. §§ 846

, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A), and
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 841

(a)(1). We have jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1291

, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The district court did not err in denying Fuller’s motions to suppress the
wiretap evidence. The government’s reliance on an invalid delegation order in its
wiretap applications was a minor insufficiency that did not subvert the
congressional purpose of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968. See United States v. Callum,

410 F.3d 571

, 576 (9th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Swann,

526 F.2d 147

, 149 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). In
addition, the government’s failure to comply with the prescribed minimization
requirements does not warrant suppression because the government still “adopt[ed]
reasonable measures to reduce to a practical minimum the interception of
conversations unrelated to the criminal activity under investigation.” United States
v. McGuire,

307 F.3d 1192

, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002).
The district court also did not clearly err by finding that Fuller’s text
messages were obtained from an independent source. Murray v. United States,

487 U.S. 533

, 542 (1988).
In addition, Fuller failed to make a substantial preliminary showing to
warrant a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware,

438 U.S. 154

 (1978). See
United States v. Whitworth,

856 F.2d 1268

, 1280-82 (9th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Stanert,

762 F.2d 775

, 782 (9th Cir.), amended by,

769 F.2d 1410

 (9th Cir.
1985).
2
Further, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Fuller’s waiver of
counsel was unequivocal. See United States v. Mendez-Sanchez,

563 F.3d 935

,
944 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
permitting advisory counsel to withdraw and then declining to reappoint advisory
counsel. Cf. LaGrand v. Stewart,

133 F.3d 1253

, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Salemo,

81 F.3d 1453

, 1457 (9th Cir. 1996). Moreover, the withdrawal of
advisory counsel was not a substantial enough change in circumstances to require a
second hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California,

422 U.S. 806

 (1975). See United
States v. Hantzis,

625 F.3d 575

, 580-81 (9th Cir. 2010). The district court also did
not clearly err in concluding that Fuller requested counsel at sentencing in bad
faith. Cf. Robinson v. Ignacio,

360 F.3d 1044

, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004).
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fuller’s
motion to continue. United States v. Rivera-Guerrero,

426 F.3d 1130