Kristanalea Dyroff v. the Ultimate Software Group , 934 F.3d 1093 ( 2019 )


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  •                  FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    KRISTANALEA DYROFF, individually          No. 18-15175
    and on behalf of the estate of Wesley
    Greer, deceased,                            D.C. No.
    Plaintiff-Appellant,   3:17-cv-05359-
    LB
    v.
    THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP,               OPINION
    INC.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Laurel D. Beeler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted June 4, 2019
    Seattle, Washington
    Filed August 20, 2019
    Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,
    and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge D.W. Nelson
    2       DYROFF V. THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP
    SUMMARY *
    Communications Decency Act
    The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal, based
    on The Ultimate Software Group’s immunity from liability
    under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, of
    an action alleging claims concerning Ultimate Software’s
    role in the death of plaintiff’s son.
    Ultimate Software was the operator of the Experience
    Project website, which allegedly facilitated illegal drug
    sales. Plaintiff’s son died of a drug overdose after buying
    drugs from a fellow Experience Project user.
    The panel held that Ultimate Software satisfied all three
    prongs of the test for immunity under Section 230 of the
    Communications Decency Act. Specifically, the panel held
    that Ultimate Software was an interactive computer service
    because it did not create or publish its own content under the
    plain language of the statute. The panel also held that
    plaintiff’s son treated Ultimate Software as a publisher or
    speaker of other’s information or content. Finally, the panel
    held that Ultimate Software published information/content
    provided by another information content provider where the
    content at issue was created by plaintiff’s son and his drug
    dealer. The panel rejected plaintiff’s argument that a website
    develops content if it manipulates the content in a unique
    way through content-neutral tools.
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    DYROFF V. THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP                  3
    The panel held that plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts
    to show that Ultimate Software colluded with drug dealers
    on Experience Project. The panel held that plaintiff’s
    allegation that user anonymity equaled promoting drug
    transactions was not plausible. The panel concluded that the
    district court was right to dismiss all claims related to this
    supposed theory of liability because Ultimate Software was
    immune under Section 230 of the Communications Decency
    Act.
    The panel held that Ultimate Software did not owe a duty
    of care to plaintiff’s son because Experience Project’s
    features amounted to content-neutral functions that did not
    create a risk of harm. The panel rejected plaintiff’s claim
    that misfeasance by Ultimate Software created a duty to
    plaintiff’s son.
    COUNSEL
    David F. Slade (argued), Carney Bates & Pulliam PLLC,
    Little Rock, Arkansas; Sin-Ting Mary Liu, Aylstock Witkin
    Kreis & Overholtz PLLC, Alameda, California; for Plaintiff-
    Appellant.
    Jeffry A. Miller (argued) and Scott M. Schoenwald, Lewis
    Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, San Diego, California;
    Shawn A. Tolliver, David E. Russo, and Justin S. Kim,
    Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, San Diego,
    California; for Defendant-Appellee.
    4      DYROFF V. THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP
    OPINION
    D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judge:
    Plaintiff Kristanalea Dyroff appeals the district court’s
    dismissal of her claims against Defendant The Ultimate
    Software Group (“Ultimate Software”), operator of the
    Experience Project website, for its alleged role in the death
    of her son, Wesley Greer. While the circumstances and facts
    of this case are no doubt tragic, we find that Ultimate
    Software is immune from liability under Section 230 of the
    Communications Decency Act. We therefore affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    This being an appeal from a motion to dismiss, we
    describe the case as Plaintiff presents it. We take her
    plausible allegations as true and draw all reasonable
    inferences in her favor.
    Experience Project was a social networking website
    made up of various online communities or groups where
    users anonymously shared their first-person experiences,
    posted and answered questions, and interacted with other
    users about different topics. The site did not limit or promote
    the types of experiences users shared. The site’s “blank box”
    approach to user content resulted in an array of topics and
    forums ranging from “I like dogs” and “I am going to
    Stanford” to “I have lung cancer” and “I Love Heroin.”
    Users registered with the site anonymously; in other
    words, the site did not collect users’ identifying information,
    including name, phone number, or mailing address. The
    site’s operator, Ultimate Software, believed that anonymity
    would promote users to share more personal and authentic
    experiences without inhibition.          Experience Project’s
    DYROFF V. THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP                 5
    founder stated, “We don’t want to know [users’] real name,
    their phone number, what town they’re from.” 
    Id. “The impetus
    behind this policy [of anonymity] was to encourage
    users to share experiences with the least amount of inhibition
    possible. The greater the anonymity, the more ‘honest’ the
    post . . . .”
    Experience Project was live from 2007 until March
    2016, during which its users shared 67 million experiences,
    made 15 million connections, and asked 5 million questions.
    Users could join groups and the site also recommended
    groups for users to join, based on the content of their posts
    and other attributes, using machine-learning algorithms.
    When a user posted content to a group, the site would send
    an email notification to the other users active in that group.
    The site generated revenue through advertisements and the
    sale of tokens that users used to post questions to other users
    in their groups.
    Some of the site’s functions, including user anonymity
    and grouping, facilitated illegal drug sales. Wesley Geer
    was involved in one such transaction, which turned fatal.
    Wesley suffered from drug addiction, which began when a
    doctor overprescribed him opioid pain killers after a serious
    sports-related injury.        After several unsuccessful
    rehabilitation attempts, Wesley bought what he believed to
    be heroin from a fellow Experience Project user. Wesley
    posted in a heroin-related group, “where can i [sic] score
    heroin in jacksonville, fl.” The site sent him an email
    notification when another user, Hugo Margenat-Castro or
    “Potheadjuice,” an Orlando-based drug dealer, posted in the
    same group. Wesley and Margenat-Castro connected off the
    site and Wesley bought heroin from Margenat-Castro on
    August 18, 2015.
    6      DYROFF V. THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP
    Wesley died the next day from fentanyl toxicity. He did
    not know that the heroin Margenat-Castro sold him was
    laced with fentanyl. Margenat-Castro was ultimately
    arrested and prosecuted. He pleaded guilty in March 2017
    admitting that he sold heroin laced with fentanyl while active
    on Experience Project.
    In March 2016, Experience Project announced, in an
    open letter to its users, that it was shutting down. The letter
    expressed concern for the future of online privacy because
    of government overreach. It stated that the site always
    supported proper law enforcement efforts but recognized
    that it did not have the resources to respond to increased
    government information requests. The site shut down on
    April 21, 2016.
    Plaintiff Kristanalea Dyroff, Wesley Greer’s mother,
    filed a complaint in San Francisco Superior Court. She
    alleges that Ultimate Software: (1) allowed users to traffic
    anonymously in illegal, deadly narcotics and to create
    groups dedicated to their sale and use; (2) steered users to
    additional groups dedicated to the sale and use of narcotics;
    (3) sent users alerts to posts within groups that were
    dedicated to the sale and use of narcotics; (4) permitted users
    to remain active accountholders despite evidence that they
    openly engaged in drug trafficking and that law enforcement
    had undertaken related investigations; and (5) demonstrated
    antipathy toward law enforcement efforts to stop illegal
    activity on Experience Project.
    Ultimate Software removed the action from state court
    based on diversity jurisdiction and filed a motion to dismiss
    all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
    The district court granted the motion without prejudice.
    Dyroff filed a notice stating that she would not file an
    DYROFF V. THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP                7
    amended complaint and asked the district court to enter
    judgement. Dyroff timely appealed the judgment.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review de novo both a district court order dismissing
    a plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(b)(6) and questions of statutory interpretation.
    Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 
    881 F.3d 739
    , 743 (9th Cir. 2018).
    The Court must “accept all factual allegations in the
    complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most
    favorable to the nonmoving party.” Rowe v. Educ. Credit
    Mgmt. Corp., 
    559 F.3d 1028
    , 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2009). Only
    a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief may
    survive a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    ,
    678 (2009). Plausibility exists when a court may “draw the
    reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
    misconduct alleged.” 
    Id. DISCUSSION Plaintiff
    argues that in granting the motion to dismiss,
    the district court made three errors. First, she argues, the
    district court erred when it held that Communications
    Decency Act (CDA) Section 230 immunizes Defendant
    Ultimate Software. Plaintiff reasons that Ultimate Software,
    as the operator of the Experience Project website, was an
    information content provider, as defined by the statute,
    because its recommendation and notification functions were
    “specifically designed to make subjective, editorial
    decisions about users based on their posts.” Second,
    according to Plaintiff, the district court erred when it found
    that her allegations of collusion between Ultimate Software
    and drug dealers using Experience Project were not
    plausible. Her third argument is that the district court erred
    in finding that Ultimate Software owed no duty of care to her
    8      DYROFF V. THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP
    son, Wesley Greer, an Experience Project user. We affirm
    because the district court did not err in any of these respects.
    I. CDA Section 230 Immunizes Ultimate Software from
    Plaintiff’s Claims
    The CDA provides that website operators are immune
    from liability for third-party information (or content, like the
    posts on Experience Project) unless the website operator “is
    responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
    development of [the] information.” 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1)
    & (f)(3). Ultimate Software did not create content on
    Experience Project, in whole or in part. Accordingly,
    Ultimate Software, as the operator of Experience Project, is
    immune from liability under the CDA because its functions,
    including recommendations and notifications, were content-
    neutral tools used to facilitate communications. See Fair
    Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,
    
    521 F.3d 1157
    , 1167–69 (9th Cir 2008) (en banc).
    A. Scope of CDA Section 230 Immunity
    The CDA instructs us that “[n]o provider or user of an
    interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
    or speaker of any information provided by another
    information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)
    (emphasis added). The CDA defines an “interactive
    computer service” as
    [A]ny information service, system, or access
    software provider that provides or enables
    computer access by multiple users to a
    computer server, including specifically a
    service or system that provides access to the
    Internet and such systems operated or
    DYROFF V. THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP                 9
    services offered by libraries or educational
    institutions.
    47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
    On the other hand, an “information content provider” is
    [A]ny person or entity that is responsible, in
    whole or in part, for the creation or
    development of information provided
    through the Internet or any other interactive
    computer service.
    47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
    “The prototypical service qualifying for [CDA]
    immunity is an online messaging board (or bulletin board)
    on which Internet subscribers post comments and respond to
    comments posted by others.” Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 
    836 F.3d 1263
    , 1266 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). In
    other words, a website like Experience Project. Taking the
    relevant statutory definitions and case law in account, it
    becomes clear that, in general, Section 230(c)(1) “protects
    websites from liability [under state or local law] for material
    posted on the[ir] website[s] by someone else.” Doe v.
    Internet Brands, Inc., 
    824 F.3d 846
    , 850 (9th Cir. 2016); see
    also 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
    Combining the above principles, in Barnes v. Yahoo!,
    Inc., we created three-prong test for Section 230 immunity.
    
    570 F.3d 1096
    , 1100 (9th Cir. 2009). Immunity from liability
    exists for “(1) a provider or user of an interactive computer
    service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law
    cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information
    provided by another information content provider.” 
    Id. at 1100–01.
    When a plaintiff cannot allege enough facts to
    10     DYROFF V. THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP
    overcome Section 230 immunity, a plaintiff’s claims should
    be dismissed. See 
    Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1268
    –71. Ultimate
    Software satisfies all three prongs of the test.
    B. Section 230 Immunity—The Barnes test
    1. Defendant is an Interactive Computer Service
    We interpret the term “interactive computer service”
    expansively. 
    Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1268
    . Ultimate Software
    was an interactive computer service because it did not create
    or publish its own content under the plain language of the
    statute. Rather, Ultimate Software published Experience
    Project users’ posts and did not materially contribute to its
    users’ posts.
    Millions of users, including Plaintiff’s son, Wesley
    Greer, set up accounts on Experience Project, a website, to
    communicate with each other. Websites are the most
    common interactive computer services. 
    Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1268
    ; see also 
    Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162
    n.6
    (“[t]oday, the most common interactive computer services
    are websites”).
    No binding legal authority supports Plaintiff’s
    contention that Ultimate Software became an information
    content provider, losing its Section 230 immunity, by
    facilitating communication on Experience Project through
    content-neutral       website      functions like   group
    recommendations and post notifications. Ultimate Software,
    therefore, satisfies the first prong.
    DYROFF V. THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP                11
    2. Plaintiff Treats Ultimate Software as a
    Publisher    or   Speaker   of    Other’s
    Information/Content
    An interactive computer service, like Ultimate Software,
    can also be an information content provider, but that is only
    relevant, for the purposes of Section 230 immunity, if the
    website it operates creates or develops the specific content
    at issue. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 
    339 F.3d 1119
    ,
    1124 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, Ultimate Software was not an
    information content provider because it did not create or
    develop information (or content). 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
    Rather, it published information created or developed by
    third parties. Specifically, Experience Project did not create
    or develop the posts that led to Greer’s death. Rather, it was
    Greer, himself, who posted “where can i [sic] score heroin
    in jacksonville, fl” on Experience Project. And it was the
    drug dealer, Margenat-Castro, who posted in response to
    Greer’s post.
    It is true that Ultimate Software used features and
    functions, including algorithms, to analyze user posts on
    Experience Project and recommended other user groups.
    This includes the heroin-related discussion group to which
    Greer posted and (through its emails and push notifications)
    to the drug dealer who sold him the fentanyl-laced heroin.
    Plaintiff, however, cannot plead around Section 230
    immunity by framing these website features as content. We
    have held that what matters is whether the claims “inherently
    require[] the court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or
    speaker’ of content provided by another.” 
    Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102
    . If they do, then Section 230(c)(1) provides
    immunity from liability. 
    Id. By recommending
    user groups and sending email
    notifications, Ultimate Software, through its Experience
    12      DYROFF V. THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP
    Project website, was acting as a publisher of others’ content.
    These functions—recommendations and notifications—are
    tools meant to facilitate the communication and content of
    others. They are not content in and of themselves.
    Our recent decision, HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of
    Santa Monica, 
    918 F.3d 676
    (9th Cir. 2019) is of no help to
    Plaintiff. There, the City of Santa Monica required short-
    term vacation rentals to be licensed and imposed liability on
    vacation rental hosting platforms—HomeAway.com and
    Airbnb—that facilitated unlicensed short-term vacation
    rentals. 
    Id. at 680.
    The platforms sued, alleging, among other
    things, that Section 230 immunized them from liability. 
    Id. We found
    that HomeAway.com and Airbnb did not meet the
    second prong of the Barnes test because the Santa Monica
    ordinance did not “proscribe, mandate, or even discuss the
    content of the [website] listings” and required only that the
    website’s transactions involve licensed properties. 
    Id. at 683.
    In other words, the vacation rental platforms did not face
    liability for the content of their listings; rather liability arose
    from facilitating unlicensed booking transactions.
    Ultimate Software, therefore, satisfies the second prong
    of the Barnes test.
    3. Ultimate        Software       Published
    Information/Content Provided by Another
    Information Content Provider
    The third prong is also met because, as stated previously
    and as detailed in Plaintiff’s complaint, the content at issue
    was created and developed by Greer and his drug dealer.
    Plaintiff’s content “manipulation” theory is without support
    in the statute and case law. First, Plaintiff misreads
    Roommates.com when she argues it holds that a website
    DYROFF V. THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP                  13
    develops content if it manipulates the content in a unique
    way through content-neutral tools.
    The question in Roommates.com was whether Section
    230 immunized a website, which matched people renting
    rooms with people looking for somewhere to live, from
    claims that it violated federal and state housing anti-
    discrimination laws by requiring subscribers to disclose,
    using dropdown menus and checkboxes, their sex, sexual
    orientation, and family status. See 
    Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1161
    –2, 1165.
    We answered “no” to this question. We rested our
    decision, however, on the fact that Roommates.com
    affirmatively required users to disclose information related
    to protected classes through discriminatory questions and
    answer choices. As a result, this information, especially
    information related to a user’s protected class, served as the
    focus of the registration process and, ultimately, became the
    cornerstone of each user’s online profile. Moreover, the
    website designed its search function to guide users through
    the required discriminatory criteria. 
    Id. at 1164,
    1167. Under
    these set of facts, the website in Roommates.com was clearly
    the developer of the discriminatory content at issue. 
    Id. at 1170.
    In Roommates.com, we also identified the type of
    conduct that does not constitute the “development” of
    content under Section 230. 
    Id. at 1169.
    For example, a
    housing website that lets users create their own criteria for
    identifying and choosing potential roommates (including
    criteria based on protected classes like race or sex) in a blank
    text box, does not become a developer of content if it does
    not require the use of that discriminatory criteria. 
    Id. In other
    words, a website does not become a developer of content
    when it provides neutral tools that a user exploits to create a
    14     DYROFF V. THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP
    profile or perform a search using criteria that constitutes a
    protected class. 
    Id. We, furthermore,
    concluded that
    “[w]here it is very clear that the website directly participates
    in developing the alleged illegality—as it is clear here with
    respect to [Roommates.com’s] questions, answers and the
    resulting profile pages—immunity will be lost.” However,
    “in cases of enhancement by… inference—such as with
    respect     to     the     ‘Additional     Comments’         [on
    Rommates.com]—[S]ection 230 must be interpreted to
    protect websites not merely from ultimate liability, but from
    having to fight costly and protracted legal battles.” 
    Id. at 1174–75.
    Here, Ultimate Software’s functions on Experience
    Project most resemble the “Additional Comments” features
    in Roommates.com in that Experience Project users,
    including Wesley Greer, were not required to disclose that
    they were looking for heroin or other illegal drugs. Rather,
    users were given something along the lines of blank text
    boxes in which they could post and share experiences,
    questions, and answers. The recommendation and
    notification functions helped facilitate this user-to-user
    communication, but it did not materially contribute, as
    Plaintiff argues, to the alleged unlawfulness of the content.
    
    Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1175
    ; see also 
    Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1269
    n.4 (the material contribution test makes a
    “‘crucial distinction between, on the one hand, taking actions
    (traditional to publishers) that are necessary to the display of
    unwelcome and actionable content and, on the other hand,
    responsibility for what makes the displayed content illegal
    or actionable.’”).
    In summary, Plaintiff is unable to allege that Ultimate
    Software materially contributed to the content posted on
    Experience Project that led to Greer’s death. Plaintiff cannot
    DYROFF V. THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP                 15
    and does not plead that Ultimate Software required users to
    post specific content, made suggestions regarding the
    content of potential user posts, or contributed to making
    unlawful or objectionable user posts. Ultimate Software is
    entitled to immunity under the plain terms of Section 230
    and our case law as a publisher of third-party content.
    II. Plaintiff Does Not Plead Sufficient Facts to Show that
    Ultimate Software Colluded with Drug Dealers on
    Experience Project
    The complaint’s allegations as it relates to Plaintiff’s
    “collusion” with bad actors does not establish an
    independent theory of liability. Rather, Plaintiff tries, again,
    to circumvent Section 230 immunity by alleging that
    Ultimate Software knew or should have known that users
    sold drugs on Experience Project, and it supported and
    protected these drug dealers through its anonymity policies.
    The district court characterized this claim well, stating “The
    idea is that Ultimate Software is less Match.com and more
    Silk Road (a notorious online platform for criminal
    activities, including selling illegal drugs).”
    To advance this collusion and inducement theory,
    Plaintiff relies on a Washington Supreme Court decision,
    J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 
    184 Wash. 2d 95
    (2015) (en banc). In Village Voice Media, plaintiffs, minors
    featured in advertisements for sexual services, sued the
    operators of the website Backpage.com alleging, among
    other things, violations of state laws prohibiting the sexual
    exploitation of children. 
    Id. at 98.
    The court held that
    plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the website operators
    helped develop the illegal content and therefore were not
    immune from liability under Section 230. 
    Id. at 103.
    16     DYROFF V. THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP
    Specifically, the court pointed to allegations that
    Backpage.com required users to disclose certain information
    within its “escorts” section that encouraged the sexual
    exploitation of children. 
    Id. at 102.
    One such allegation is
    that Backpage.com’s “content requirements [were]
    specifically designed to control the nature and context of
    [escort] advertisements so that pimps can continue to use
    Backpage.com to traffic in sex, including the trafficking of
    children.” 
    Id. at 102–03.
    In other words, the court found that
    the plaintiffs alleged enough facts such that it was plausible
    to infer that Backpage.com’s content requirements—within
    the website’s escort section—were designed to facilitate the
    prostitution of children.
    Here, Ultimate Software’s anonymity features along
    with its public statements expressing concern for internet
    privacy and detailing the burden of law enforcement
    information requests are not facts whose inferences, viewed
    in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, plausibly allege
    collusion with drug dealers or other bad actors. Today,
    online privacy is a ubiquitous public concern for both users
    and technology companies. These statements do not
    establish, on the part of Ultimate Software, antipathy to law
    enforcement, especially given the corresponding statements
    about always supporting “proper law enforcement requests.”
    Unlike the plaintiffs in Village Voice Media, Plaintiff
    here did not allege that Experience Project had a section for
    drug-related experiences on its website with specific content
    posting requirements that facilitated illegal drug
    transactions. Plaintiff’s allegation that user anonymity
    equals promoting drug transactions is not plausible. 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
    . The district court was right to dismiss all
    claims related to this supposed theory of liability because
    DYROFF V. THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP                  17
    Ultimate Software is, as reasoned above, immune under
    Section 230.
    III.    Ultimate Software Did Not Owe a Duty to
    Plaintiff’s Son
    Ultimate Software owed Greer no duty of care because
    Experience Project’s features amounted to content-neutral
    functions that did not create a risk of harm. Plaintiff rests her
    “failure to warn claim” on a misguided premise that
    misfeasance by Ultimate Software created a duty to Greer.
    When analyzing a duty of care in the context of third-
    party acts, California courts distinguish between
    “misfeasance” and “nonfeasance.” Melton v. Boustred,
    
    183 Cal. App. 4th 521
    , 531 (2010). Misfeasance is when a
    defendant makes the plaintiff’s position worse while
    nonfeasance is when a defendant does not help a plaintiff.
    Lugtu v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 
    26 Cal. 4th 703
    , 716 (2001).
    Misfeasance, unlike nonfeasance, creates an ordinary duty
    of care where none may have existed before. See 
    id. Ultimate Software
    did not make Plaintiff’s son, Greer,
    worse off because the functions Plaintiff references—
    recommendations and notifications—were used regardless
    of the groups in which a user participated. No website could
    function if a duty of care was created when a website
    facilitates communication, in a content-neutral fashion, of its
    users’ content. See e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 
    753 F.3d 1354
    , 1359–60 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (no special relationship
    between Facebook and its users). We decline to create such
    a relationship. Accordingly, the district was correct to
    dismiss Plaintiff’s duty to warn claim.
    18    DYROFF V. THE ULTIMATE SOFTWARE GROUP
    CONCLUSION
    For the preceding reasons, we AFFIRM the district
    court’s order granting Defendant Ultimate Software’s
    motion to dismiss.