Manuel Parejo v. Scott Frakes , 491 F. App'x 847 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              DEC 04 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MANUEL PAREJO,                                   No. 11-35374
    Petitioner-Appellant,              D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05764-RBL
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM *
    SCOTT FRAKES,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 6, 2012
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: W. FLETCHER and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and DEARIE, District
    Judge.**
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Raymond J. Dearie, United States District Judge for
    the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    Appellant Manuel Parejo appeals the district court’s order dismissing as
    time-barred his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    .
    Reviewing the order de novo, Redd v. McGrath, 
    343 F.3d 1077
    , 1080 (9th Cir.
    2003), we hold that the petition was timely and reverse.
    In determining that Parejo was aware of the “factual predicate” of his habeas
    claims as early as 1995, the district court misconstrued the applicable section of the
    habeas limitations statute, 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (d)(1)(D). Under this court’s decision
    in Shelby v. Bartlett, 
    391 F.3d 1061
     (9th Cir. 2004), which was based on Redd and
    reaffirmed in Mardesich v. Cate, 
    668 F.3d 1164
     (9th Cir. 2012), when, as here, a
    habeas petition challenges an administrative decision rather than the underlying
    judgment of conviction, the “factual predicate” under section 2244(d)(1)(D)
    triggering the one-year limitations period is ordinarily the administrative decision.
    See Mardesich, 668 F.3d at 1171-72; Shelby, 
    391 F.3d at 1062-66
    ; Redd, 
    343 F.3d at 1081-85
    . We find no reason for departing from that framework here.
    We further conclude that the administrative decision the petition challenges
    is the then-latest denial of parole, issued by the Indeterminate Sentence Review
    Board on December 27, 2007. Respondent conceded at oral argument and we now
    hold that so construed, the petition is timely under Redd and Shelby.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-35374

Citation Numbers: 491 F. App'x 847

Judges: Dearie, Fisher, Fletcher

Filed Date: 12/4/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2023