Glenn Hartley v. Carolyn Colvin , 672 F. App'x 743 ( 2017 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JAN 04 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GLENN R. HARTLEY, No. 15-15523
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-01863-AC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Allison Claire, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 30, 2016**
Before: PREGERSON, LEAVY, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Glenn R. Hartley appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his applications for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo, Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014), and we affirm.
The administrative law judge (ALJ) did not err in finding, at step five of the
sequential evaluation process, that Hartley had acquired skills from his past
relevant work that were transferable to other occupations with specific jobs
existing in substantial numbers in the national economy. See Rounds v. Comm’r
Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015). The ALJ made sufficient
findings, supported by substantial evidence, by identifying the work skills that
Hartley had acquired and the specific occupations to which they were transferable.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1568(d), 416.968(d); Social Security Ruling 82-41; Bray v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2009). The ALJ
was not required to follow the steps set forth in a provision of the Commissioner’s
Program Operations Manual System (POMS), a non-binding internal manual. See
POMS DI 25015.017 (effective Oct. 6, 2014). POMS may be entitled to some
deference “to the extent it provides a persuasive interpretation of an ambiguous
regulation, but it does not impose judicially enforceable duties on either this court
or the ALJ.” Carillo-Yeras v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 731, 735 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). Hartley fails to identify any ambiguity in
the applicable regulations, and further fails to show that the vocational expert’s
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(VE) testimony conflicted with the regulations or the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles (DOT). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(d)(3) (“A complete similarity of all three
factors [under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(d)(2)] is not necessary for transferability.”).
Accordingly, there were no unexplained inconsistencies, and the ALJ’s failure to
ask the VE about potential conflicts with the DOT constituted harmless error. See
Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1154 n.19 (9th Cir. 2007).
AFFIRMED.
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