Denzoal E. Sanders v. Jo Anne Barnhart , 176 F. App'x 948 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                            [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                    FILED
    ________________________         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    April 18, 2006
    No. 05-14493                  THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                 CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 03-00154-CV-1-MP-AK
    DENZOAL E. SANDERS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
    Commissioner of the Social Security
    Administration,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (April 18, 2006)
    Before BLACK, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Denzoal Sanders appeals the district court’s order affirming the
    Commissioner’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits, 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g), and supplemental security income, 
    42 U.S.C. § 1393
    (c)(3), for the
    period before July 1, 1998. Sanders asserts he presented the ALJ with credible
    testimony and sufficient medical evidence that he was disabled before July 1998.
    We review a social security case to determine whether the Commissioner’s
    decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal
    standards were applied. See Lewis v. Callahan, 
    125 F.3d 1436
    , 1439 (11th Cir.
    1997). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
    might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Falge v. Apfel, 
    150 F.3d 1320
    ,
    1322 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
    We have explained our review of a claim of disability based on pain in this
    way:
    This Court has established a three part “pain standard” that applies
    when a claimant attempts to establish disability through his or her
    own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms. The pain
    standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and
    either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the
    alleged pain arising from the condition or (3) that the objectively
    determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can be
    reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.
    Holt v. Sullivan, 
    921 F.2d 1221
    , 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). “[A] claimant’s subjective
    testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies the standard is itself
    2
    sufficient to support a finding of disability.” 
    Id.
     Credibility determinations with
    respect to the subjective testimony are generally reserved to the ALJ. See Johns v.
    Bowen, 
    821 F.2d 551
    , 557 (11th Cir. 1987). However, “[i]f the ALJ decides not to
    credit such testimony, he must articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing
    so.” Holt, 
    921 F.2d at 1223
    .
    The ALJ concluded Sanders’ subjective testimony regarding the level and
    duration of pain he experienced before July 1, 1998 was not credible, and this
    credibility assessment is reserved to the ALJ. See Johns, 
    821 F.2d at 557
    . The
    ALJ articulated explicit and adequate reasons for making this assessment about
    Sanders’ condition before July 1, 1998, and these stated reasons are supported by
    the record. In 1995, Sanders’ treating physician concluded Sanders could walk, get
    in and out of a chair, and lay down without difficulty. He also concluded Sanders
    did not have severe back spasms or root nerve damage. In addition, when another
    physician treated Sanders in 1997, he concluded Sanders’ pain was “subjective”
    and that it was unlikely he had any severe nerve-root pain. Furthermore, before
    July 1, 1998, Sanders worked with a hammer and chisel and with solder and steel,
    which contradicted his testimony that he was in too much pain to work during this
    period. He also helped his wife selling items at flea markets on Saturdays and
    Sundays until 1998. Thus, it is reasonable to infer Sanders’ pain was not as severe
    3
    as he alleged regarding the period before July 1, 1998. Substantial evidence
    supports the ALJ’s determination that Sanders was not disabled before July 1,
    1998.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-14493; D.C. Docket 03-00154-CV-1-MP-AK

Citation Numbers: 176 F. App'x 948

Judges: Black, Marcus, Per Curiam, Wilson

Filed Date: 4/18/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023