Shepard, Gregory M. v. State Auto Mutual Co ( 2006 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 05-3567
    GREGORY M. SHEPARD and
    AMERICAN UNION INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    STATE AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL INSURANCE
    COMPANY and STATE AUTO FINANCIAL CORPORATION,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
    No. 01-C-1103—David F. Hamilton, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED APRIL 11, 2006—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 14, 2006
    ____________
    Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and SYKES,
    Circuit Judges.
    WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs-appellants sued
    the defendants, claiming that the defendants breached
    a confidentiality agreement by relying upon the plain-
    tiffs’ confidential disclosures to acquire Meridian Insurance
    Group, Inc. Because the plaintiffs cannot establish either
    causation or damages, we affirm the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment to the defendants.
    2                                               No. 05-3567
    I. BACKGROUND
    This case centers around the efforts of plaintiff-appellant
    Gregory Shepard and the defendants to acquire Meridian
    Insurance Group, Inc. and its affiliated companies (collec-
    tively, “Meridian”). Shepard is chairman and president
    of co-plaintiff-appellant American Union Insurance Com-
    pany, a company which has been in his family for three
    generations and which Shepard now essentially owns. He
    was the largest shareholder (20.26% shareholder) in rival
    Meridian, and, after several failed courtship attempts
    directly with Meridian, Shepard approached another
    rival, the defendants-appellees, State Automobile Mutual
    Insurance Company and State Auto Financial Corporation
    (collectively, “State Auto”), to discuss a joint effort to
    acquire Meridian, perhaps by hostile takeover. Like
    Shepard, State Auto had been attempting to purchase
    Meridian for several years and, unbeknownst to Shepard,
    was in the midst of a new round of negotiations with
    Meridian when Shepard approached State Auto with his
    business proposal.
    On September 27, 2000, Shepard spoke with State Auto’s
    Chairman and CEO, Bob Bailey, and proposed a meeting to
    discuss a potential joint effort to acquire Meridian. That
    same day (or shortly thereafter), Bailey signed a confidenti-
    ality agreement that prevented State Auto (and its officers)
    from disclosing any non-public information discussed during
    the meeting or trading any securities in Meridian as a
    result of any information disclosed to State Auto during the
    meeting.
    On October 2, 2000, Shepard and Bailey, and various
    other officers and attorneys from both companies, met at
    State Auto for approximately two hours. During this
    meeting, Shepard presented three exhibits that illus-
    trated his proposed valuation of Meridian and included
    some strategic issues to consider in the purchase of Merid-
    No. 05-3567                                               3
    ian, including, among other things, certain con-
    cerns regarding the correct pricing of Meridian’s stock
    options (issues that State Auto’s Chief Financial Officer
    (CFO) apparently had failed to consider). Several of
    Shepard’s analyses contained significant mathematic
    and analytic errors, including a $114 million double-
    counting error. At the end of the meeting, Bailey in-
    formed Shepard that he would not go along with Shepard’s
    proposal and the two parted ways.
    According to Shepard, although State Auto refused his
    business offer, it nonetheless impermissibly relied upon his
    analyses and suggestions in a subsequent meeting
    with Meridian, where the State Auto-Meridian merger
    was consummated. On October 5, 2000, just three days after
    the confidential meeting with Shepard, State Auto’s CFO
    revised his financial analysis pertaining to the potential
    Meridian acquisition. State Auto’s analyses
    now included—for the first time—certain financial informa-
    tion that had been presented by Shepard at the confidential
    meeting, including the proper consideration and valuation
    of outstanding Meridian stock options. The next day, on
    October 6, 2000, Bailey met with Meridian’s CEO and CFO
    to discuss State Auto’s proposed purchase of Meridian.
    Meridian’s CEO, Norma Oman, testified that Bailey
    informed her at the very outset of the meeting that he had
    just had confidential discussions with Shepard, although
    both Bailey and Oman contend that the substance of those
    discussions was not revealed by Bailey. Oman also testified
    that Bailey had told her that Shepard was “aware of every
    element of the September 7th letter” that Bailey had
    written to Oman. This letter outlined an initial offer and
    stated that Shepard “expected to be paid more than other
    shareholders.” In addition, Oman’s notes from the meeting
    with Bailey included several references to Shepard, includ-
    ing such entries as “Shepard mtg on 10/2 with Bailey” and
    “will have litigation from Shepard.”
    4                                                No. 05-3567
    By the end of this meeting, Bailey and Oman agreed to
    the key terms of State Auto’s acquisition of Meridian. The
    deal was announced publicly approximately two-and-a-half
    weeks later, on October 25, 2000. State Auto’s acquisition of
    Meridian required Shepard (along with all other public
    shareholders) to tender his shares to the new corporation in
    exchange for a $30 per share price. At the time of the
    transaction, Shepard owned approximately 1.5 million
    shares. The Meridian acquisition closed on May 31, 2001.
    Shepard sued State Auto, alleging that it had breached
    their confidentiality agreement both by revealing pro-
    tected confidential information to Meridian personnel and
    trading in Meridian stock as a result of such confidential
    information. The district court granted the defendants’
    motion for summary judgment, holding that Shepard
    could not establish any of the elements of his breach of
    contract action. Shepard now appeals.
    II. ANALYSIS
    Shepard’s claims fail because the undisputed facts show
    that he cannot establish either causation or damages as a
    matter of law. Under Indiana law (which controls in this
    diversity action), causation is an essential element of
    liability in a breach of contract claim. Parke State Bank v.
    Akers, 
    659 N.E.2d 1031
    , 1035 (Ind. 1995). “As in tort law, so
    in contract law, causation is an essential element of liabil-
    ity.” Wisc. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 
    781 F.2d 1280
    , 1289 (7th Cir. 1986). Thus, a plaintiff must prove that
    the alleged breach of contract was a cause in fact of his loss,
    which requires a showing that the breach was a “substan-
    tial factor” in bringing about the plaintiff’s damages. See
    generally Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. NCR Corp., 
    772 F.2d 315
    , 320 (7th Cir. 1985). Although causation is normally a
    question of fact for the jury, see INS Investigations Bureau
    v. Lee, 
    784 N.E.2d 566
    , 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), summary
    No. 05-3567                                                5
    judgment is appropriate when the undisputed facts estab-
    lish that a plaintiff cannot show the requisite causation as
    a matter of law. See Buckner v. Sam’s Club, Inc., 
    75 F.3d 290
    , 293 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment
    because the plaintiff could not establish the “critical
    element of causation”); Harris v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
    Corp., 
    102 F.3d 1429
    , 1433 (7th Cir. 1996) (same).
    Under Indiana law, a plaintiff carries the burden to plead
    and prove damages. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 
    772 F.2d at 320
    . Importantly, “[a] mere showing of a breach of contract
    does not necessarily entitle a plaintiff to damages.” 
    Id.
    Instead, a plaintiff is limited to recovering only the losses
    actually suffered from the breach, and an injured party may
    not be placed in a better position than he would have
    enjoyed if the breach had not occurred. Fowler v. Campbell,
    
    612 N.E.2d 596
    , 603 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). Moreover,
    damages cannot be based on mere speculation and conjec-
    ture. Rather, a plaintiff must have adequate evidence to
    allow a jury to determine with sufficient certainty that
    damages in fact occurred, and, if so, to quantify such
    damages with some degree of precision. See id.; Turbines v.
    Thompson, 
    684 N.E.2d 254
    , 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997);
    Fowler, 
    612 N.E.2d at 603
    . Thus, “[a] damage award must
    be referenced to some fairly defined standard, such as cost
    of repair, market value, established experience, rental
    value, loss of use, loss of profits or direct inference from
    known circumstances.” Fowler, 
    612 N.E.2d at 603
    .
    Although the parties separate the issues of causation and
    damages, these two issues are inextricably linked in this
    case. See Wisc. Knife Works, 
    781 F.2d at 1289
     (noting that
    the arguments that a party “sustained no damage from the
    alleged breach of contract” or that “the alleged breach was
    not causally related to that damage” amount to “the same
    thing”). That is, they both boil down to the predicate issue
    of whether Shepard can present sufficient evidence to
    establish that State Auto’s purported misuse of his pro-
    6                                                  No. 05-3567
    tected disclosures1 was a substantial factor in Shepard
    receiving what he contends to be the inade-
    quate consideration of $30 per share cash-out. In the
    district court, Shepard advanced two theories of causation
    and damages. First, he advanced a “lost business opportu-
    nity” theory, in which he claimed State Auto’s breach
    precluded him from purchasing Meridian directly. He
    wisely abandoned that theory on appeal in light of the
    undisputed evidence that Meridian’s Board of Directors had
    an unmitigated dislike of Shepard and, as a result, was
    extremely unlikely to have approved any tender offer by
    him. In fact, the board had rejected his two prior offers: an
    August 30, 2000 initial offer of $20 per share (rejected on
    September 8, 2000), and then an amended offer on Septem-
    ber 18, 2000 of $27 per share (rejected on September 21,
    2000), both of which directly preceded State Auto’s $30 per
    share offer. Shepard’s second theory rests on the contention
    that Meridian shares were worth as much as $45 per share
    and therefore Shepard’s forced cash-out at $30 per share
    was a substantial loss. Shepard owned approximately 1.5
    million shares, which would translate to a loss approximat-
    ing $22 million—and we use the term “loss” loosely here, as
    there is no dispute that Shepard profited handsomely from
    the $30 per share price; the sole issue is whether he was
    entitled to even great profit.
    Under Shepard’s theory, State Auto relied upon his
    confidential disclosures pertaining to both the “true” value
    of Meridian and his purported bidding strategy to alter
    materially its subsequent offer to acquire Meridian. Specifi-
    1
    The district court determined that Shepard’s disclosures
    were not protected because they were either misrepresenta-
    tions, inaccuracies, or information in the public domain. We will
    assume, for the sake of argument, that Shepard’s disclosures were
    protected and that he could establish that State Auto breached
    the contract.
    No. 05-3567                                                7
    cally, Shepard contends that after his presentation, State
    Auto colluded with Meridian to create a $25 million break-
    up fee that effectively detracted any would-be suitors from
    coming forward with higher competing offers. Shepard also
    claims that State Auto boosted its offer price from $27 to
    $30 per share (knowing that Shepard had informed Merid-
    ian that he would not bid higher than $27 per share).
    Shepard argues:
    It is undisputed that Defendants’ acquisition of Merid-
    ian resulted in the forced sale of Shepard’s MIGI
    [Meridian] shares to Defendants, over Shepard’s
    objection. Given that, if a reasonable jury could con-
    clude that Defendants breached the Agreement by
    “trad(ing) in” MIGI stock, and could conclude that
    Shepard’s shares were worth more than $30 per share,
    then the jury not only could conclude that Defendants
    caused the resulting loss to Shepard, but would con-
    clude that. In other words, Defendants’ “trad[ing] in”
    MIGI stock was undeniably the cause of Shepard’s loss
    of his MIGI shares.
    Pls. Br. at 54. But this argument misses the mark: it is not
    enough for Shepard to show merely that State Auto
    breached its confidentiality agreement with Shepard and
    that Shepard’s shares were arguably worth more than $30
    per share. Even if both of those allegations were true,
    Shepard must still show that there is the requisite nexus
    between State Auto’s breach and Shepard’s subsequent
    damages. See, e.g., Parke State Bank, 659 N.E.2d at 1034.
    That is, State Auto’s breach must be a cause-in-fact (i.e., a
    “substantial factor”) of Shepard receiving the allegedly
    inadequate consideration for his shares. See id.
    When the causation issue is properly framed, Shepard’s
    argument converts to what appears to be a concession
    that he does not have much—if any—evidence to estab-
    lish causation: “Whether Defendants’ disclosures to Merid-
    8                                                  No. 05-3567
    ian of the substance or existence of the [confidentiality]
    Agreement, or of Plaintiffs’ other confidential information,
    was a cause of Plaintiffs’ damages is less clear, but it is still
    a matter that a reasonable jury could easily resolve in
    Plaintiffs’ favor.” Pls. Br. at 54. Aside from this conclusory
    statement, Shepard does not explain how “a reasonable jury
    could easily resolve” this matter in his favor. Indeed, he
    faces a steep uphill climb here because the undisputed facts
    show that during the entire courtship history for Meridian
    (which spanned many months), no one—including
    Shepard—offered to pay more than $30 per share to acquire
    Meridian. Thus, the undisputed facts tend to show that
    Shepard received a premium over the open-market price for
    Meridian. In other words, how can Shepard establish that
    State Auto’s breach was a substantial factor in his receiving
    “only” $30 per share remuneration when no one else in the
    marketplace was willing to pay more?
    To circumvent this thorny issue, Shepard provides two
    circuitous arguments. First, he contends that State Auto
    created a $25 million dollar break-up fee that sup-
    pressed other entities from coming forth with higher bids.
    According to Shepard’s expert, this unusually high break-up
    fee could have prevented other would-be suitors from
    entering into the bidding for Meridian. Essentially, Shepard
    contends that State Auto requested this restrictive provi-
    sion to prevent other would-be-bidders from coming out of
    the woodwork with higher bids, and, importantly, did so
    based upon Shepard’s confidential disclosure that he
    personally valued Meridian to be worth more than $30 per
    share. But both Shepard and his expert conceded that they
    could not identify any other company that was willing to
    pay more than $30 per share for Meridian. Indeed, no
    company came forward with an offer higher than $20 or $27
    per share in the two-month period between Shepard’s initial
    public offer of $20 per share, his subsequent amended offer
    of $27 per share, and State Auto’s final bid. Moreover,
    No. 05-3567                                                9
    despite his proclamations that Meridian was worth as high
    as $45 per share, Shepard himself never made an offer
    greater than $27 per share. Thus, Shepard is pointing to
    nothing more than a discrepancy between a company’s
    hypothetical value on paper and its value in the open
    marketplace. As any disappointed seller can document,
    market forces do not always map one-to-one with theoreti-
    cal valuations.
    Shepard also contends that State Auto wrongfully
    increased its bid from $27 to $30 per share, relying on his
    confidential (but admittedly inaccurate) information that he
    would not bid higher than $27 for Meridian. But this is a
    curious argument because State Auto’s bid was an increase
    in price above what Shepard was willing to offer, and, in
    any event, was the highest bid received by Meridian.
    Shepard seems to be suggesting—although he does
    not develop this precise argument—that State Auto inter-
    nally valued Meridian at more than $30 per share, and may
    have calibrated its bid to just exceed Shepard’s bid, and yet
    still remain below what its “true” bid would have been but-
    for the misuse of Shepard’s confidential information. Under
    this view, the Meridian deal closed at a lower price than
    what would have been the “real” price without Shepard’s
    revelations. The record does contain State Auto documents
    suggesting that State Auto initially valued Meridian at
    approximately $35 per share (with some variations). As a
    result, perhaps a jury could infer that State Auto lowered
    its offer price to $30 per share, purportedly because it knew
    that Shepard would not raise his $27 per share offer. Yet
    there is nothing in the record to establish that Meridian
    intended to begin its offer at $35 per share, much less
    intended to continue bidding against itself. To the contrary,
    if State Auto hoped to end the bidding at $35 per share, it
    certainly would not start its offer at that number—and,
    indeed, as shown below, it started its bidding at the
    lower amount of $27 per share. As a result, the fact that the
    10                                              No. 05-3567
    deal closed at a favorable price to State Auto (but nonethe-
    less not a fire-sale price under anyone’s terms—recall that
    Shepard was pitching $20 and $27 per share as very
    favorable valuation for the shareholders) may speak more
    to Meridian’s eagerness to avoid a hostile takeover by
    Shepard.
    This argument may be the closest that Shepard comes
    to a triable issue of fact, but, again, we are carrying much
    of the weight here, since Shepard does not develop it.
    Nonetheless, it still is not enough for at least two reasons.
    First, it is undisputed that on September 7, 2000, approxi-
    mately one month before its confidential meeting with
    Shepard (and thus before it could have possibly betrayed
    Shepard’s confidences), State Auto tendered a $27 per share
    private offer to Meridian. Thus, $27 was State Auto’s
    starting point and there is nothing in the record to
    indicate that State Auto was likely to ratchet any sub-
    sequent offer above the $30 per share price (despite its
    private valuation estimates pertaining to the final potential
    bid price), particularly when there was no other
    suitor offering anything higher than $27 per share. And
    Shepard withdrew his claim of a lost business opportunity.
    Therefore, he cannot claim that State Auto’s increased price
    deprived him of the Meridian acquisition. As a result,
    Shepard’s argument still requires the jury to engage in
    rampant speculation and conjecture as to what State Auto
    would have bid in the absence of the breach, which, for the
    reasons noted above, is simply too tenuous a thread to
    support the number and nature of inferences that Shepard
    seeks to invoke. Without more, Shepard cannot estab-
    lish that State Auto artificially altered its bidding in
    reliance on his disclosures.
    Finally, although Shepard does not articulate this theory
    in these precise terms, his argument could be read as
    suggesting that State Auto’s increase to $30 per share
    increased the likelihood of the deal being consummated.
    No. 05-3567                                                 11
    Therefore, but-for Shepard’s disclosures the deal would
    not have gone through at all, and Shepard’s shares presum-
    ably could have been redeemed at a higher price somewhere
    down the road. But there is nothing in the record pertaining
    to the likelihood of another potential suitor, nor any
    evidence tending to show that Shepard could have consum-
    mated the deal himself, much less that market conditions
    made it inevitable that Meridian’s share price would
    subsequently rise. As a result, we once again return to the
    fundamentally speculative nature of Shepard’s causation
    argument. And although Shepard is correct in maintaining
    that, in the normal course, the issue of causation is one for
    the jury, that is only the case where there is sufficient
    evidence to allow a jury to reach a factual conclusion
    without engaging in undue speculation. See Luigino’s, Inc.
    v. Peterson, 
    317 F.3d 909
    , 911-12 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming
    summary judgment because plaintiff could not establish a
    causal link between defendant’s misuse of confidential
    information and damages); Buckner, 
    75 F.3d at 293-94
    (affirming summary judgment because the plaintiff could
    not establish the “critical element of causation”).
    The same fundamental problems noted above apply to the
    issue of damages. Indiana law requires a sufficient degree
    of certainty to support damage awards. The typical recovery
    for breach of contract is a party’s expectation interest (i.e.,
    the benefit of the bargain). Fowler, 
    612 N.E.2d at 603
    . But
    here, Shepard’s contract was a confidentiality agreement
    (without a liquidated damages provision)—not a contract
    for the sale of Meridian. The absence of any other would-be
    suitor willing to pay more than $30 per share renders any
    damages above that amount inherently speculative, and,
    importantly, would result in a windfall to Shepard. Again,
    when a plaintiff cannot establish damages with sufficient
    certainty to avoid speculation or conjecture by the jury, the
    defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See,
    e.g., A.V. Consultants, Inc. v. Barnes, 
    978 F.2d 996
    , 1001
    12                                              No. 05-3567
    (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming summary judgment because
    “[a]ppellant presented nothing outside the pleadings that
    allowed any inference of damage”); see also Mid-America
    Tablewares, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co., Ltd., 
    100 F.3d 1353
    ,
    1363 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that where a party could not
    prove its lost profits with reasonable certainty, summary
    judgment or judgment as a matter of law may be appro-
    priate).
    Indeed, in light of the comments above, it does not appear
    that Shepard has suffered any actual or consequential
    damages here—aside from the indignity of having his
    confidences betrayed. A minor complication (which neither
    party mentions) arises from the fact that Indiana recognizes
    nominal damages in breach of contract actions. See Am.
    Fletcher Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick, 
    252 N.E.2d 839
    ,
    846 (Ind. Ct. App. 1969) (“The law presumes that at least
    nominal damages result from a harm.”); Smith v. Bruning
    Enterprises, Inc., 
    424 N.E.2d 1035
    , 1037 (Ind. Ct. App.
    1981) (holding that nominal damages award was appropri-
    ate where “the evidence supporting the damages was
    speculative”). Thus, notwithstanding the policy consider-
    ations that would mitigate against the costs and resources
    expended on a trial where only nominal damages were
    available from the outset, Shepard may nonetheless be
    entitled to try this case in some form under those terms
    (provided he had sufficient evidence to establish a breach of
    the contract—an issue that we do not reach). But we need
    not decide whether Indiana law supports such an odd result
    because Shepard cannot establish the requisite causation in
    this case.
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
    No. 05-3567                                         13
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—9-14-06