in the Interest of L. J. S., a Child ( 2003 )


Menu:
  •                                             NO. 07-02-0274-CV
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL E
    JANUARY 17, 2003
    ______________________________
    IN THE INTEREST OF L.J.S.
    _________________________________
    FROM THE 72ND DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
    NO. 2001-513,802; HON. BLAIR CHERRY, JR., PRESIDING
    _______________________________
    Before JOHNSON, C.J., QUINN, J. and BOYD, S.J.1
    Roy and Janis Simmons (the Simmons) appeal from an order terminating their
    parental rights to L.J.S. Via one issue, they assert that the trial court was required to
    dismiss the second petition for termination because it failed to allege new facts that were
    not alleged in the first petition for termination. We affirm.
    Background
    On November 10, 1999, the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory
    Services (TDPRS) removed L.J.S., a child, from the Simmons’ home. Upon removal,
    L.J.S. was placed in an emergency shelter and on November 12, 1999, the TDPRS filed
    its Original Petition for Protection of Child, for Conservatorship and for Termination in
    cause number 92-539,677 in the 72nd District Court of Lubbock County (the first suit). By
    1
    John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. T EX . G OVT . C ODE
    A N N . §75.002(a)(1) (Ve rnon Sup p. 2002).
    its suit, the TDPRS sought to terminate the parent-child relationship between Simmons and
    L.J.S.
    The TDPRS was appointed temporary managing conservator of L.J.S. Pursuant to
    the Texas Family Code, if there was no final judgment, the dismissal date for the first suit
    was November 13, 2000. See TEX . FAM . CODE ANN . §263.401. However, the dismissal
    date was extended to May 9, 2001, as permitted by statute. Id. at §263.401(b). On May
    3, 2001, a hearing on the TDPRS’ termination petition commenced. However, it was
    continued due to the fact that one of the parties’ attorney had an emergency requiring him
    to leave the trial. On May 6, 2001, the TDPRS filed a motion for non-suit. The trial court
    signed an order granting the non-suit without prejudice on May 7, 2001. On the same day,
    the trial court also signed an Order for Protection of a Child in an Emergency and Notice
    of Hearing in cause number 2001-513,802 in the 72nd District Court (the second suit). The
    trial court appointed the TDPRS as temporary managing conservator of L.J.S. Following
    a full adversary hearing in the second suit, a family relative was appointed temporary
    managing conservator of L.J.S. The dismissal date for the second suit was extended, and
    a termination hearing was set for June 24, 2002. A pre-trial motion was filed requesting
    the trial court to dismiss the suit because the second suit failed to allege any new facts
    from the first suit. The motion was overruled and the hearing proceeded. Following the
    hearing, the parent-child relationship between the Simmons and L.J.S. was terminated.
    Analysis
    Assuming arguendo that the TDPRS may be free to non-suit and reinitiate
    proceedings, they cannot do so in a manner that violates statute or public policy. The
    public policy here involved is encapsulated in §263.401(a) of the Texas Family Code. TEX .
    2
    FAM . CODE ANN . §263.401(a) (Vernon 2002). That statute exists to facilitate permanence
    and stability in the lives of children subjected to TDPRS involvement by limiting the time
    within which the TDPRS can prosecute actions to terminate parental rights or have it
    designated conservator. See In re T.M., 
    33 S.W.3d 341
    , 346 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2000,
    no pet.). And, that time is 12 months with, generally, no more than an extension of 180
    days. TEX . FAM . CODE ANN . §263.401(a) & (b); In re T.M., 33 S.W.3d at 346.
    Now, to allow the statutory time period to be exceeded through legal maneuvering
    of the TDPRS or any other party would undoubtedly run afoul of the public policy
    underlying the provision. Indeed, the time limit must be heeded despite the desires and
    machinations of the parties, In re T.M., 33 S.W.3d at 346-47, and, we are not free to
    disregard or avoid the limitation. In re L.L., 
    65 S.W.3d 194
    , 197 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2001,
    no pet.). And, it is for this reason that the Simmons believe the trial court erred in refusing
    to dismiss the second suit initiated by the TDPRS shortly after non-suiting the first. Indeed,
    one can only wonder about the effect wrought upon the public policy underlying §263.401
    if the TDPRS is free to non-suit on the eve of the §263.401 deadline and then re-file a like
    suit immediately thereafter. That surely is not an effort to bring stability to the lives of
    children. Nor does it resolve the suit in a timely manner as contemplated by the legislature.
    Nevertheless, we need not address whether the acts of the TDPRS constitute some
    machination to thwart legislative edict. This is so because authority clearly allows it to
    reinitiate the proceeding if new facts are alleged justifying relief on the same grounds
    averred in the first action. In re T.M., 33 S.W.3d at 347; In re Ruiz, 
    16 S.W.3d 921
    , 927
    (Tex. App.–Waco 2000, no pet.). Here, the TDPRS purported to aver such new facts in
    its second suit, as evinced by the affidavit accompanying the petition. Additionally, those
    3
    new facts purportedly arose after the first suit was filed (though some involved a
    continuation of the conduct precipitating the first suit) and allegedly justified termination of
    the parental rights of the Simmons. More importantly, neither of the Simmons tendered
    argument or supporting authority in their appellate brief addressing all of these new facts
    and explaining why none of them were truly new or why none independently warranted the
    relief sought by the TDPRS in the second suit. Nor did they discuss the evidence
    presented at the trial of the second action.         Instead, the Simmons discussed the
    background of this case, mentioned evidence presented to the associate judge at the
    hearing to determine whether the child should be temporarily removed, mentioned legal
    authority interpreting §263.401 and the need to dismiss when the pertinent time limitation
    is exceeded, and then opined that dismissal was appropriate because the second suit
    “involved the same child, and . . . the [TDPRS] sought the same relief.” Yet, whether the
    same parties are involved or relief sought is not determinative. Again, we and other courts
    have recognized that a second suit can be initiated if new facts exist. And, if another suit
    to terminate is filed, it is rather certain that the same parties and relief will be involved.
    In short, 1) the TDPRS purported to allege new facts warranting termination and 2)
    the Simmons did not establish on appeal that the facts presented at the trial of the second
    suit and upon which the judgment at bar was founded were none other than those
    underlying the first suit. So, we cannot conclude that the TDPRS failed to allege and prove
    new facts as contemplated by In re T.M. and In re Ruiz and that the trial court should have
    dismissed the second suit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Brian Quinn
    Johnson, C.J., concurs.                              Justice
    4
    NO. 07-02-0274-CV
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL E
    JANUARY 17, 2003
    ______________________________
    IN THE INTEREST OF L.J.S.
    _________________________________
    FROM THE 72ND DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
    NO. 2001-513,802; HONORABLE BLAIR CHERRY, JR., JUDGE
    _______________________________
    Before JOHNSON, C.J., QUINN, J. and BOYD, S.J.2
    CONCURRING OPINION
    At the beginning of the termination hearing in June, 2002, Roy Simmons moved to
    dismiss the second suit on the basis that the TDPRS alleged no new facts when it filed the
    second suit and that at the time the suit was filed on May 8, 2001, it was “the same case
    it has always been . . . there were no new grounds to justify removal at the time the Petition
    was filed, and this case should be dismissed because there wasn’t [sic] grounds to
    continue it at that time.”
    2
    John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by
    assignment.
    The relevant provisions of Section 263.401 provide that
    (a) Unless the court has rendered a final order or granted an
    extension under Subsection (b), on the first Monday after the first
    anniversary of the date the court rendered a temporary order appointing the
    department as temporary managing conservator, the court shall dismiss the
    suit affecting the parent-child relationship filed by the department that
    requests termination of the parent-child relationship or requests that the
    department be named conservator of the child.
    . . . . .
    (c) If the court grants an extension, the court shall render a final order
    or dismiss the suit on or before the date specified in the extension order and
    may not grant an additional extension.
    In construing a statute, we first look at the statute’s plain and common meaning, and
    we presume that the Legislature intended the plain meaning of its words. See National
    Liab. and Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 
    15 S.W.3d 525
    , 527 (Tex. 2000); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
    Garrison Contractors, Inc., 
    966 S.W.2d 482
    , 484 (Tex. 1998). If possible, we must
    ascertain the Legislature’s intent from the language it used in the statute and not look to
    extraneous matters for an intent the statute does not state. See Helena Chem. Co. v.
    Wilkins, 
    47 S.W.3d 486
    , 493 (Tex. 2001); Allen, 15 S.W.3d at 527.
    The language of Sections 263.401(a) and (c), which is the relevant language in this
    matter, does not negate the general grant of authority extended to TDPRS to file an
    original suit affecting the parent-child relationship. See Section 102.003(a)(5),(6); In re
    L.L., 
    65 S.W.3d 194
    , 196 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (standing of TDPRS to bring
    or maintain suit for protection of a child or to terminate parental rights is prescribed by the
    Legislature); In re T.M., 
    33 S.W.3d 341
    , 347 n.5 (Tex.App.--Amarillo, 2000, no pet.) (in
    creating the suit contemplated by Section 263.401 the Legislature had the authority to
    6
    determine its parameters). Nor does the plain language of Section 263.401 preclude the
    TDPRS from dismissing a suit without prejudice.
    The Legislature has set out detailed standards and procedures for suits involving
    protection of children and families. See, e.g., Family Code Chapters 262 and 263. If the
    collective will of the Legislature had been to preclude the TDPRS from dismissing and then
    re-filing suit as was done in this instance, it could have easily so provided. For example,
    among the many choices which the Legislature could have made in limiting the general
    authority of the TDPRS to dismiss and file suits, it could have provided in Section 263.401
    that (1) the trial court shall dismiss the suit with prejudice; or (2) the suit and any other suit
    based on the same facts and grounds shall be dismissed; or (3) following dismissal of a
    first suit, no subsequent suit could be filed or maintained absent allegations of facts which
    support removal of the child, and which facts occurred after filing [or dismissal of, or the
    adversary hearing in] the first suit. The Legislature did not do so. Compare, e.g., TEX . REV.
    CIV. STAT . ANN . art. 4590i § 13.01(e)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2003) (health care liability action
    to be dismissed “with prejudice to the claim’s refiling” if claimant does not either timely file
    expert report or voluntarily non-suit the action).
    In determining that TDPRS’ second suit did not have to be dismissed because new
    facts were alleged in the second suit, the majority opinion references language of In re
    T.M., 33 S.W.3d at 347 and In re Ruiz, 
    16 S.W.3d 921
    , 927 (Tex. App.--Waco 2000, no
    pet.). However, the Simmons are not complaining that TDPRS improperly maintained
    possession of L.J.S. via the emergency order signed on May 7th. Nor do they urge that
    TDPRS’ possession of L.J.S. throughout the proceedings was improper because TDPRS’
    7
    possession of L.J.S. was based on the same facts and grounds as the first suit. See In re
    T.M., 33 S.W.3d at 347; In re Ruiz, 
    16 S.W.3d at 927
    .
    Section 263.401 does not require trial courts to determine that a subsequent suit is
    based on “new facts” of some timing and character, or to otherwise dismiss the suit.
    Regardless of whether new facts were pled and regardless of the nature of any new facts
    pled, the plain language of Section 263.401 neither precluded TDPRS from filing the
    second suit seeking to terminate the Simmons’ parent-child relationship with L.J.S., nor
    mandated dismissal of the second suit. Thus, I concur in the result reached by the
    majority.
    Phil Johnson
    Chief Justice
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-02-00274-CV

Filed Date: 1/17/2003

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/7/2015