in the Matter of John Paul Rodriguez ( 2003 )


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  •                                        NO. 07-01-0439-CV
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL E
    JANUARY 14, 2003
    ______________________________
    IN THE MATTER OF J.P.R.
    ______________________________
    FROM THE 237TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
    NO. 2001-759,444; HON. MARK C. HALL, PRESIDING
    _______________________________
    Opinion
    _______________________________
    Before JOHNSON, CJ., QUINN, J., and BOYD, SJ.1
    Appellant J.P.R. contests a disposition order committing him to the Texas Youth
    Commission for an indeterminate period of time not to exceed his 21st birthday. He asserts
    that 1) the trial court erred in failing to present a specific statement of reasons for his
    commitment as required by statute, and 2) the evidence was factually insufficient to
    support the disposition ordered. We affirm the order of the trial court.
    Background
    Multiple cases were presented against appellant, a 16 year old, by the South Plains
    Auto Theft Task Force. At an adjudication hearing on July 9, 2001, appellant entered
    1
    John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. TEX.
    GOV’T CODE ANN. §75.002(a)(1) (Vernon 1998).
    pleas of true to multiple charges of delinquent conduct. Those charges included the
    unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, burglary of a motor vehicle, credit card abuse, and
    possession of an inhalant. Appellant was then adjudicated a delinquent. Thereafter, the
    trial court held a disposition hearing and remanded him to the care, custody, and control
    of the Texas Youth Commission.
    Issue One - Failure to Present Statement of Reasons
    In his first issue, appellant complains that the trial court failed to present a specific
    statement of the reasons for his commitment as required by §54.04(f) of the Family Code.
    We overrule the issue.
    Section 54.04(f) requires that the court “shall state specifically in the order its
    reasons for the disposition. . . .” TEX . FAM . CODE ANN . §54.04(f) (Vernon 2002). In
    assessing whether this requirement has been satisfied, we may consider the entire order,
    that is, we may read it as a whole. See In re J.T.H., 
    779 S.W.2d 954
    , 959 (Tex.
    App.–Austin 1989, no writ) (so doing). We need not simply restrict ourselves to perusing
    the items which the court denominated “reasons.” While it may not be enough to simply
    state that the child is in need of rehabilitation and the community needs protection (to
    justify commitment to a youth center), In re N.S.D., 
    555 S.W.2d 807
    , 809 (Tex. Civ.
    App.–El Paso 1977, no writ), it has been held that identifying the offense, concluding that
    public safety warrants detention, stating that rehabilitation is needed, describing the nature
    of the misconduct involved, and addressing the stability of the child and his home
    environment does comply with the statute. In re J.D., 
    773 S.W.2d 604
    , 606 (Tex.
    App.–Texarkana 1989, writ dism’d w.o.j.). So too has it been held that the court complied
    2
    with the statute when it concluded that the crime was sufficiently serious to warrant
    commitment, mentioned the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime,
    concluded that public protection was warranted, and described the crime involved. In re
    J.H.T., 779 S.W.2d at 959. Similarly, the requirements were deemed satisfied In re M.H.,
    
    662 S.W.2d 764
     (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1983, no writ), when the trial court briefly
    alluded to the history (if any) of the child’s delinquent conduct, the prior use of alternative
    means of discipline, and the age of the child, id. at 767, and in F.L.J. v. State, 
    577 S.W.2d 532
     (Tex. Civ. App.–Waco 1979, no writ), when it stated that the child had violated a
    specific penal law, had a history of attacking others both verbally and physically, needed
    a strict environment which could be supplied by the Texas Youth Council, and would
    receive individual counseling and group therapy at the Texas Youth Council. Id. at 533.
    In looking at the order at bar as a whole, we find more than mere conclusions
    mentioning the need for rehabilitation and public protection. The trial court stated that 1)
    the child required structured supervision in a secure setting, 2) the Texas Youth
    Commission could best provide for the child’s educational, emotional, and physical needs
    and address his antisocial behavior, 3) suitable supervision, care, or protection were not
    being provided for or accepted by appellant, 4) appellant had been adjudicated for multiple
    felony grade offenses and may be a danger to himself or others, 5) appellant had three
    prior referrals by law enforcement agencies to the Juvenile Probation Department, 6) due
    to his age, the number and nature of the offenses involved, and the need to protect the
    public, appellant needed to be placed in a secure setting, 7) appellant had been released
    previously and did not comply with the conditions of the release order, 8) appellant needed
    3
    structured care and supervision not available in his home, 9) the seriousness and number
    of the offenses involved made return to his home unadvisable at the time, and 10) the child
    was in need of programs provided by the Texas Youth Commission which needs could not
    be met in any other long term or alternative placement. In short, the foregoing allude to
    the history of the child’s conduct, the availability of supervision in his home setting, his
    compliance with prior orders and restrictions, the seriousness of the offenses, and his own
    needs and where those needs can best be met. As such, they supply the specificity
    required by the statute.
    Issue Two - Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Finally, appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the
    findings that 1) it was in his best interest to be placed outside the home and 2) he could
    not be provided the quality of care and supervision necessary to meet the conditions of
    probation outside of commitment. We overrule the issue upon reviewing the record.
    In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support the disposition ordered,
    we apply a civil standard of review. In re C.J.H., 
    79 S.W.3d 698
    ,703 (Tex. App.–Fort
    Worth 2002, no pet.); In re T.K.E., 
    5 S.W.3d 782
    , 785 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1999, no
    pet); In re A.S., 
    954 S.W.2d 855
    , 861 (Tex. App.–El Paso 1997, no pet); but see In re M.S.,
    
    940 S.W.2d 789
    , 792 n.2 (Tex. App.–Austin 1997, no writ) (holding that the court would
    apply the criminal standard of review to a legal sufficiency challenge of a disposition
    order). Furthermore, the civil standard of review used in assessing issues of factual
    sufficiency is explained in Garza v. Alviar, 
    395 S.W.2d 821
    , 823 (Tex. 1965), and we will
    therefore not repeat it.
    4
    The record contains evidence that 1) appellant cooperated and followed directives
    when in detention, but after being released and returned to his mother (who at that
    particular time was living with her parents), he made a terroristic threat, 2) he was removed
    from school for being verbally abusive to a teacher, 3) he had been counseled before
    without success, 4) he associated with persons he was prohibited from associating with
    by his release order, 5) he was involved with a gang, 6) he was found asleep at his father’s
    house with evidence that he and others had been inhaling paint, 7) his maternal
    grandfather had given him permission to go to his father’s house while his father was
    having problems with the law and possibly drugs, 8) his mother knew he had gone to his
    father’s house, 9) he was involved in multiple crimes, 10) he does better in a structured or
    supervised environment, 11) he refuses to assume responsibility for his acts, 12) he has
    been involved with marijuana, 13) he was found in possession of brass knuckles, 14) he
    has numerous referrals for criminal misconduct, 15) he failed to show remorse for his
    actions, 16) he would benefit from the socialization in the Texas Youth Commission, 17)
    he behaved while previously committed, 18) the Commission had drug treatment facilities,
    and 19) the Commission has programs to meet his educational needs. And, though there
    was evidence from appellant’s relatives that they could provide him with the requisite
    supervision and care, it does not illustrate that the ultimate decision of the trial court was
    so against the great weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.              So, the
    determination that commitment would be in his best interests and that the quality of care
    and supervision needed to meet the requirements of probation were unavailable outside
    of commitment is not factually insufficient.
    5
    Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed.
    Brian Quinn
    Justice
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-01-00439-CV

Filed Date: 1/14/2003

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/7/2015