United States v. Natalie Caudel , 586 F. App'x 339 ( 2014 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 2 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-50625
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:11-cr-03320-JAH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NATALIE AMANDA CAUDEL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 18, 2014**
Before: LEAVY, FISHER, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Natalie Amanda Caudel appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 18-month sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Caudel first contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to
explain the sentence adequately and to address her mitigating arguments. Contrary
to Caudel’s argument, we review these claims for plain error, see United States v.
Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010), but even under a de
novo standard, Caudel’s claims fail. The record reflects that the district court
considered Caudel’s arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence, but did not find
them persuasive; to the contrary, the court concluded that a high-end sentence was
warranted because Caudel violated supervised release despite the court’s previous
acts of leniency. This explanation, while brief, was legally sufficient. See Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358-59 (2007).
Caudel next contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Caudel’s sentence. See
United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The sentence
is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors
and the totality of circumstances, including Caudel’s significant breach of the
court’s trust. See id.; United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006)
(at a revocation sentencing, the court may sanction the violator for her breach of
trust.)
AFFIRMED.
2 13-50625