Aaron Hahn v. Doug Waddington ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 21 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AARON HAHN, No. 18-35819
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-05047-RJB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DOUG WADDINGTON; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 15, 2019**
Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Washington state prisoner Aaron Hahn appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference to his health and safety. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants
Waddington and Russell because Hahn failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether these defendants personally participated in the alleged
constitutional deprivation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011)
(a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he was personally involved in the
constitutional deprivation or there was “a sufficient causal connection between the
supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Martin
because Hahn failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
Martin was deliberately indifferent to Hahn’s health or safety regarding Hahn’s
placement at Washington State Penitentiary. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837 (1994) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he “knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hahn’s motion to
compel because Hahn failed to demonstrate that the denial of discovery resulted in
actual and substantial prejudice to him. See Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,
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342 F.3d 1080, 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that a district court’s “decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed
except upon the clearest showing that the denial of discovery results in actual and
substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hahn’s request to
continue summary judgment because Hahn failed to comply with the requirements
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). See Tatum v. City & County of San
Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1100-1101 (9th Cir. 2006) (standard of review); see
also Stevens v. Corelogic, Inc., 899 F.3d 666, 678 (9th Cir. 2018) (requirements of
Rule 56(d)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hahn’s motion for
default judgment because Hahn did not obtain entry of default and defendants did
not fail to plead or otherwise defend. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471
(9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth standard of review and two-step process required for
entry of default judgment); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (permitting entry of
default when a defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hahn’s motion for
leave to amend his complaint because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes
v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting
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forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied when
amendment would be futile).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hahn’s motion to
strike and considering defendants’ late-filed response to his motion for leave to
amend his complaint. See Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973
(9th Cir. 2010) (standard of review for motions to strike pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(f)); Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1258,
1261 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and equitable analysis to
determine whether a party’s failure to meet a deadline constitutes excusable
neglect).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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