Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bambi Gicana ( 2019 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       NOV 13 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE                     No.    18-55785
    COMPANY,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiff,                      2:16-cv-08317-RSWL-RAO
    BAMBI GICANA
    MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-cross-claimant-
    Appellee.
    v.
    ARACELI MALONEY
    Defendant-cross-defendant-
    Appellant,
    METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE                     No.    18-55989
    COMPANY,                                               18-56174
    Plaintiff,                      D.C. No.
    2:16-cv-08317-RSWL-RAO
    and
    ARACELI MALONEY,
    Defendant-cross-defendant-
    Appellant,
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    v.
    BAMBI GICANA,
    Defendant-cross-claimant-
    Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Ronald S.W. Lew, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 4, 2019
    Pasadena, California
    Before: FARRIS, McKEOWN, and PARKER,** Circuit Judges.
    Appellant Araceli Maloney appeals three orders of the United States District
    Court for the Central District of California. The first order imposed an equitable
    lien on behalf of the Efren Molina Martinez Living Trust (“Trust”). The second
    order awarded attorneys’ fees to Appellee Bambi Gicana, and the third order
    awarded her costs.
    This case was initiated as an interpleader action by Metropolitan Life to
    determine the beneficiary of life insurance proceeds of Efren Molina Martinez,
    who died on March 16, 2016. Maloney, his sister, and Gicana, his widow, were
    both named as Defendants-in-Interpleader, and the parties stipulated to the
    **
    The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr., United States Circuit Judge
    for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
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    dismissal of Metropolitan Life. In the course of reviewing Gicana’s claims that
    Maloney had breached her fiduciary duty to the Trust, additional funds that were in
    the Decedent’s 401(k) entered the dispute before the District Court. The parties
    agreed that these funds were assets of the Trust. However, they dispute the
    identities of the beneficiaries of the Trust. That dispute is the subject of a separate
    state court probate proceeding.
    The District Court concluded that Maloney had violated her fiduciary duties
    by diverting Trust assets—the 401(k) funds—into her own retirement account. The
    evidence also established that Maloney had used those funds for unauthorized
    personal expenditures. Accordingly, the District Court imposed an equitable lien in
    favor of the Trust on Maloney’s personal IRA and required her to provide the Trust
    with an accounting and to restore improperly disbursed funds.
    On appeal, Maloney argues that she is the sole beneficiary of the Trust, and
    that, in any event, her IRA is an exempt asset that cannot be the subject of an
    equitable lien. We see no merit to these contentions. It is not disputed that both the
    insurance proceeds and the 401(k) funds are governed by ERISA. A court may
    hold a fiduciary personally responsible for a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA
    and impose appropriate equitable remedies. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 
    508 U.S. 248
    , 252 (1993) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)). Because Gicana traced the 401(k)
    3
    funds to Maloney’s personal IRA, the District Court correctly imposed the lien
    against that account.
    Maloney argues that her personal IRA is an exempt asset. She contends this
    result is compelled by Rousey v. Jacoway, 
    544 U.S. 320
    , 326 (2005), and Cal.
    Code Civ. Proc. Section 704.115. We disagree. Rousey involved exemptions from
    bankruptcy estates, and the statute Maloney cites concerns exemptions from money
    judgments, not immunity from equitable liens. Maloney also misreads the District
    Court’s summary judgment order, incorrectly arguing that the order named her as
    the sole beneficiary of the Trust. The District Court made no such finding. It
    explicitly noted it made no determinations as to the validity of the Trust’s
    amendments.
    Maloney also appeals the District Court’s grant of attorneys’ fees and costs
    to Gicana. She contends that because the equitable lien was granted on behalf of
    the Trust, Gicana did not prevail before the District Court and therefore is not
    entitled to fees and costs. Again, we disagree. In an ERISA action, the District
    Court has the discretion to award attorneys’ fees and costs to either party. Elliot v.
    Benefits Ins. Co., 
    337 F.3d 1138
    , 1148 (9th Cir. 2003); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).
    This Court reviews the District Court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs for abuse
    of discretion. Micha v. Sun Life Assurance of Can., Inc., 
    874 F.3d 1052
    , 1057 (9th
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    Cir. 2017); Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 
    214 F.3d 1041
    , 1045 (9th Cir.
    2000).
    To be awarded attorneys’ fees, the movant need only show “some degree of
    success on the merits.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 
    560 U.S. 242
    , 255
    (2010). In the District Court, Gicana obtained an equitable lien that halted
    Maloney’s violation of the terms of the trust—in particular her misuse of Trust
    assets for personal benefit. In addition, Maloney was required to furnish an
    accounting and to return funds improperly taken from the Trust. We agree with the
    District Court that this relief satisfies the “some degree of success” standard. This
    Court has required, as a condition of awarding attorneys’ fees, that district courts
    consider the factors outlined in Hummel v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 
    634 F.2d 446
    , 453
    (9th Cir. 1980). The court below considered each of those factors and determined
    that, on balance, they supported Gicana’s request for attorneys’ fees. That analysis
    was appropriate, and we see no abuse of discretion in either the award of attorneys’
    fees and costs, or in the amounts granted.
    We have considered the remainder of Maloney’s arguments and find them to
    be without merit. Thus, the judgment and orders of the District Court are
    AFFIRMED.
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