John Wasson v. United States ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 20 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN M. WASSON, No. 18-35489
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01279-SU
v.
MEMORANDUM *
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 12, 2019**
Before: LEAVY, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
John M. Wasson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in his action brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”), alleging claims relating to his unpatented mining site in the Umatilla
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
National Forest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo. Nolan v. Heald Coll., 551 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wasson’s Fourth
Amendment claim against defendant Helberg because Wasson failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy relating to the photography of his trailer through an unobstructed window.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (setting forth two-part test for
determining whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the
Fourth Amendment).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wasson’s due
process claims against defendants Johnson, Mayte, and Reid because Wasson
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was deprived of a
constitutionally protected liberty interest or adequate procedural protections. See
United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2012) (identifying
requirements for substantive and procedural due process claims).
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters
not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We treat Wasson’s filing (Docket Entry No. 17) as a motion to file a late
reply brief, and grant the motion. The Clerk shall file the reply brief submitted at
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Docket Entry No. 16.
AFFIRMED.
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