William Salzwedel v. State of California ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 19 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM A. SALZWEDEL, on behalf of No. 18-55574
himself, and all others adversely affected by
similar state action, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-03156-AB-RAO
Plaintiff-Appellant,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Andre Birotte, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 12, 2019**
Before: LEAVY, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
William A. Salzwedel appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various claims stemming from his
dual role as attorney and trustee in a California probate court. We have jurisdiction
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d
1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal under Rooker–Feldman doctrine); Canatella
v. California, 304 F.3d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissal for lack of standing).
We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed for lack of standing Salzwedel’s claims
asserted on behalf of third parties. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-61 (1992) (constitutional standing requires an “injury in fact,” causation, and
redressability); Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, & Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d
1153, 1163 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth third-party standing requirements).
The district court properly dismissed as barred by the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine Salzwedel’s first and second claims because they are a de facto appeal of
decisions of the California probate and appellate courts and are inextricably
intertwined with those state court decisions. See Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1139(“Rooker–Feldman prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.”); see
also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that Rooker–
Feldman doctrine bars “inextricably intertwined” claim where federal adjudication
“would impermissibly undercut the state ruling on the same issues” (citation and
2 18-55574
internal quotation marks omitted)).
Salzwedel’s requests for judicial notice, set forth in his opening brief, and
his motion for judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 18) are granted.
AFFIRMED.
3 18-55574