Marc Endsley v. Edmund Brown, Jr. ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 19 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARC ANTHONY LOWELL ENDSLEY, No. 18-15737
AKA Marc Endsley,
D.C. No. 3:17-cv-05038-WHA
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
EDMUND G. BROWN, Jr.; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 12, 2019**
Before: LEAVY, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Civil detainee Marc Anthony Lowell Endsley, AKA Marc Endsley, appeals
pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
alleging due process and equal protection claims. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d
1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Endsley’s due process claim because
Endsley failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any defendant made a decision
that was “such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not
base the decision on such a judgment.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323
(1982).
The district court properly dismissed Endsley’s equal protection claim
because Endsley failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was treated
differently from similarly situated individuals. See Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d
1071, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003) (elements of equal protection claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant Endsley
leave to file an amended complaint. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp., 232 F.3d 719,
725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (providing standard of review and explaining that a “district
court acts within its discretion to deny leave to amend when amendment would be
futile . . .”).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
2 18-15737
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Endsley’s request for appointment of counsel, set forth in his opening brief,
is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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