Bibiji Kaur Puri v. Sopurkh Kaur Khalsa ( 2019 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DEC 23 2019
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BIBIJI INDERJIT KAUR PURI; RANBIR No. 18-35479
SINGH BHAI; KAMALJIT KAUR
KOHLI; KULBIR SINGH PURI, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-01532-MO
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
SOPURKH KAUR KHALSA; PERAIM
KAUR KHALSA; SIRI RAM KAUR
KHALSA; KARTAR SINGH KHALSA;
KARAM SINGH KHALSA; UNTO
INFINITY, LLC, an Oregon Limited
Liability Company; SIRI SINGH SAHIB
CORPORATION, an Oregon non-profit
corporation; SIRI KARM KAUR
KHALSA; LANE POWELL PC, an
Oregon Professional Corporation; LEWIS
M. HOROWITZ; GURUDHAN SINGH
KHALSA; GURU HARI SINGH
KHASLSA; EWTC MANAGEMENT,
LLC; AJEET SINGH KHALSA,
Defendants-Appellees.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
BIBIJI INDERJIT KAUR PURI; RANBIR No. 18-35658
SINGH BHAI; KAMALJIT KAUR
KOHLI; KULBIR SINGH PURI, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-01532-MO
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SOPURKH KAUR KHALSA; PERAIM
KAUR KHALSA; SIRI RAM KAUR
KHALSA; SIRI KARM KAUR
KHALSA; KARTAR SINGH KHALSA;
KARAM SINGH KHALSA; LEWIS M.
HOROWITZ; LANE POWELL PC, an
Oregon Professional Corporation; UNTO
INFINITY, LLC, an Oregon Limited
Liability Company; SIRI SINGH SAHIB
CORPORATION, an Oregon non-profit
corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael W. Mosman, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 8, 2019
Portland, Oregon
Before: GILMAN,** PAEZ, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
**
The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
2
Appellants challenge the district court’s order granting summary judgment,
in favor of Appellees. Appellants also take issue with the district court’s award of
$46,164.53 in costs to Appellees. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291and review de novo the district court’s summary judgment order. See Weber v.
Allergan, Inc., 940 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2019). The district court’s award of
costs is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Draper v. Rosario, 836 F.3d 1072,
1087 (9th Cir. 2016). This court may affirm on any basis supported by the record.
See United States v. Mixon, 930 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 2019).
1. Rather than venture into the thicket of the ministerial exception to
judicial review of business decisions made by religious organizations, or the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, we affirm on the alternative basis that the claims
are time-barred. Appellants brought claims for declaratory relief, fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and
claims under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
Act and the Oregon RICO statute (ORICO).1 Declaratory relief claims are subject
to the statute of limitations that applies to the underlying claim. See Doyle v. City
of Medford, 351 P.3d 768, 771 (Or. Ct. App. 2015). Therefore, if the underlying
1
Appellants voluntarily dismissed their ORICO claim.
3
claims are barred by the limitations period, so is the claim for declaratory relief.
See Brooks v. Dierker, 552 P.2d 533, 535 (Or. 1976).
Oregon law provides that claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and
tortious interference must generally be commenced within two years. See Or. Rev.
Stat. § 12.110(1); see also Spirit Partners, LP v. Stoel Rives LLP, 157 P.3d 1194,
1201 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (fraud and negligent misrepresentation); Butcher v.
McClain, 260 P.3d 611, 614 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (tortious interference). “The
statute of limitations for RICO is four years . . .” Scott v. Boos, 215 F.3d 940, 950
(9th Cir. 2000). The statute incorporates a discovery rule, whereby the claims
accrue “when the plaintiff has discovered facts or, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have discovered facts that would alert a reasonable person to the
existence of . . . the alleged fraud.” Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 284 P.3d 524, 528
(Or. Ct. App. 2012).
The record reflects that Appellants knew, or should have known, of the
alleged acts giving rise to their claims by 2004. Bibiji confirmed in her deposition
that she knew that she should have occupied a board seat shortly after her
husband’s death in 2004. Kamaljit and Kulbir testified to similar knowledge. And
the family obtained a lawyer in 2004 to represent their interests in obtaining the
board positions.
4
Appellants protest that they could not obtain specific evidence of Appellees’
actions until the Multnomah County case was initiated in 2009. But Appellants’
exclusion from the boards, along with their belief that Yogi Bhajan had appointed
them to the positions, was enough to demonstrate that “key material facts were not
as they had been represented.” Oregon Life & Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Inter-
Reg’l Fin. Grp., Inc., 967 P.2d 880, 885 (OR. Ct. App. 1998). There is no reason
Appellants could not have filed an action long before 2010 to obtain internal
governance documents identifying board appointments. Accordingly, their claims
were properly determined to be time-barred.
2. The district court acted within its discretion in awarding costs to
Appellees. Appellees’ 80-page spreadsheet described the services performed and
expenses incurred with sufficient “specificity, particularity, and clarity.” In re
Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 914, 928 (9th Cir. 2015); see also
Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2003)
(discussing the presumption in favor of awarding costs).
AFFIRMED.
5