Robert Meakin v. Cfi Pension Trust ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 5 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT MEAKIN, No. 18-15216
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
5:16-cv-07195-EJD
v.
CALIFORNIA FIELD IRONWORKERS MEMORANDUM*
PENSION TRUST; BOARD OF
TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA FIELD
IRONWORKERS PENSION TRUST,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 13, 2019
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and BASTIAN, ** District
Judge.
Robert Meakin appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the California Field Ironworkers Pension Trust on Meakin’s action for
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Stanley Allen Bastian, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
recovery of benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
29 U.S.C § 1001, et seq. (“ERISA”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we review the grant of summary judgment de novo. A.G. v. Paradise Valley
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 815 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2016).
At issue is whether the Trust’s Board of Trustees (“Trustees”) abused their
discretion by reinterpreting Article VIII, § 8(a)(iii) of the Field Pension Trust
(“Plan”) as requiring an actual separation from employment, and thus finding
Meakin ineligible for an early pension.
Despite not yet obtaining Normal Retirement Age, Meakin has met the
service and age requirements to be potentially eligible for a Golden 85 pension,
found in Article III § 15 of the Plan. To be eligible for a Golden 85 pension,
Meakin must “ha[ve] retired.” Under Article VIII § 8(a)(iii)of the Plan, Meakin
was retired only if he “withdr[ew] completely and refrain[ed] from any
employment or activity in the building and construction industry.”
If a putative early-retirement pensioner resumes work in the building and
construction industry, the pensioner’s entitlement to benefits is suspended under
Article VIII § 9 until her industry employment ends. However, Article VIII §
8(a)(iv) provides a limited exemption allowing for employment in certain
construction positions. To receive such an exemption, an early-retirement
petitioner must submit a retiree work application to the Trustees for approval. If
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the Trustees approve the retiree work application, the early retirement pensioner
may continue to work while receiving benefits under the Plan. All retiree work
applications are reviewed by the Trustees on an annual basis for compliance with
the Plan.
Meakin, then working for C.E. Toland & Son as a Superintendent, applied
for a Golden 85 pension on July 18, 2008, and listed his effective retirement date
as August 1, 2008. On August 1, 2008, he began working for C.E. Toland & Son
as a Safety Director and Estimator. The Trustees approved Meakin’s Golden 85
pension application on August 25, 2008. In September 2008, Meakin submitted a
retiree work application, which the Trustees approved.
In 2011, the Trustees began to review their interpretation of the Plan in light
of recently released IRS guidance regarding in-service distributions. The Trustees
entered a voluntary compliance plan with the IRS, disclosing that Article VIII
§ 8(a)(iv) had been improperly administered. As part of the voluntary compliance
plan, the Trustees were required to adopt administrative procedures that would
cease improper distributions to putative retirees who never actually retired.
On February 7, 2014, Meakin received a notice informing him that he would
cease receiving his pension beginning April 1, 2014. The notice explained that
the Trustees had determined that some plan participants, including Meakin, “were
approved to receive their pensions . . . even though they had not actually severed
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their employment as required by federal law and the Pension Plan.” The notice
informed Meakin that he could appeal this determination or reapply for retiree
work approval based upon a new alleged severance from employment. Meakin
unsuccessfully appealed and then filed suit in the district court.
The Trustees’ denial of benefits “must be upheld ‘if it [wa]s based upon a
reasonable interpretation of the plan’s terms and if it was made in good faith.’”
Moyle v. Liberty Mut. Ret. Ben. Plan, 823 F.3d 948, 957-58 (9th Cir. 2016)
(quoting McDaniel v. Chevron Corp., 203 F.3d 1099, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000)).
The analysis does not hinge on which interpretation of the Plan is most
persuasive, but on whether the Trustees’ interpretation is unreasonable. Id. A
plan administrator’s decision is unreasonable if it is “(1) illogical, (2)
implausible, or (3) without support in inferences that may be drawn from the
facts in the record.” Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d
666, 676 (9th Cir. 2011).
The Trustees’ denial of Meakin’s pension was based upon the Plan’s
definition of “retired.” The notice explained that “[t]o be considered retired and
entitled to a pension under this Plan before he has attained Normal Retirement
Age, a Pensioner must withdraw completely and refrain from any employment
or activity in the construction industry.”
Meakin does not argue that the reinterpretation was made in bad faith.
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Nor does he dispute that his employment as a Safety Director and Estimator
constitutes “work in the building and construction trade.” Instead, he argues
that the Trustees’ initial grant of approval and practice of annually approving
his retiree work application renders the Trustees’ decision unlawful, either
because it renders the new interpretation unreasonable because it was an
impermissible cutback of an accrued benefit under Central Laborers’ Pension
Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 744–45 (2004), or because equitable estoppel
should bar the Trustees from applying the reinterpretation to him.
First, the Trustees’ change in position did not render the new
interpretation unreasonable. Plan administrators are not shackled to original
interpretations. See, e.g., Oster v. Barco of Calif. Emps.’ Ret. Plan, 869 F.2d
1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 1988). When administrators are granted discretion in
interpreting plan provisions, their first interpretation is not set in amber, nor do
they lose their discretion after misconstruing the provision once. See, e.g.,
Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 513 (2010).
Nor is Central Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Heinz controlling here. In
Heinz, the Supreme Court addressed whether a retroactive amendment to a plan
could limit the types of post-retirement work that a pensioner could perform
while receiving early retirement benefits. Id. at 743. The Court in Heinz found
that the bargained-for retirement benefit that the plaintiff was accruing as he
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earned credits included the right “to supplement retirement income by certain
employment,” and that the challenged amendment reduced that benefit, in
violation of ERISA’s anti-cutback rule. Id. at 744-45.
In this case, the benefit that Meakin was accruing as he earned service
credits included the right to apply for a Golden 85 pension, provided that he
first “withdr[e]w completely and refrain[ed] from any employment or activity
in the building and construction industry.” That condition had always been
present even if the Trustees had not enforced it. Thus, this was not, as in Heinz,
an “addition of a suspension condition,” but rather, “the actual suspension of a
benefit” under an “existing suspension provision.” Heinz, 541 U.S. at 750 n.6.
Finally, the Trustees cannot be equitably estopped from enforcing their
new interpretation because Meakin has not established "extraordinary
circumstances" necessary for such relief in the ERISA context. See Gabriel v.
Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 773 F.3d 945, 956 (9th Cir. 2014). Such relief
would contradict written plan provisions. Id. Because Meakin never “retired,”
as that term is defined in the Plan, any relief requiring the Trustees to continue
paying his pension would contradict the written terms of the Plan.
Because the Trustees’ reinterpretation of the Plan was not an abuse of
discretion, the district court properly granted summary judgment in their favor.
AFFIRMED.
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