Patricia Blackburn v. Wa Dept of Social & Health Svc , 611 F. App'x 416 ( 2015 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     JUL 27 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICIA BLACKBURN; et al.,                         No. 13-35920
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,                D.C. No. 3:11-cv-05385-RBL
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND
    HEALTH SERVICES; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted July 10, 2015
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: NGUYEN and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges and ZOUHARY,** District
    Judge.
    Nine employees of a state mental hospital in Washington (“Plaintiffs”)
    appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment against them. We affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Jack Zouhary, District Judge for the U.S. District
    Court for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
    Following entry of summary judgment, Plaintiffs brought suit in state court
    challenging the same race-based staffing practice at issue here. After a bench trial,
    the state court concluded that the duration of the staffing practice was limited to a
    single weekend. We give preclusive effect to that determination. See Christensen
    v. Grant Cty. Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 
    96 P.3d 957
    , 960-961 (Wash. 2004).
    The individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to
    Plaintiffs’ equal protection claims under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     because, at the time they
    acted, it would not have been clear to a reasonable official that avoiding the
    assignment of African-American employees to care for a particular violent patient,
    when done temporarily in response to an imminent safety threat posed by the
    patient to African-American staff, violated the Equal Protection Clause. See
    Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 
    131 S. Ct. 2074
    , 2083-85 (2011); Johnson v. California, 
    543 U.S. 499
    , 515 (2005); Wittmer v. Peters, 
    87 F.3d 916
    , 918-21 (7th Cir. 1996).1
    Under the specific facts of this case, Plaintiffs’ claims under 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1985
    and 1986 also fail. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 
    403 U.S. 88
    , 102 (1971); Sanchez
    v. City of Santa Ana, 
    936 F.2d 1027
    , 1040 (9th Cir. 1991).
    1
    To the extent any individual defendant misunderstood whether the patient’s threat
    pertained to all African-American staff instead of one particular staff member, the
    mistake was a reasonable one. See Rudebusch v. Hughes, 
    313 F.3d 506
    , 514 (9th
    Cir. 2002) (explaining that the qualified immunity standard “allows ample room
    for reasonable error on the part of the official,” including “mistakes of fact and
    mistakes of law” (brackets omitted)).
    2
    Plaintiffs’ Title VII claim based on racial discrimination fails because a de
    minimis change in work assignments does not constitute an adverse employment
    action. See Robino v. Iranon, 
    145 F.3d 1109
    , 1110 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs have
    not demonstrated an entitlement to permanent injunctive relief because they have
    not shown an “immediate threat of substantial injury.” See Midgett v. Tri-Cty.
    Metro. Transp. Dist. of Or., 
    254 F.3d 846
    , 850 (9th Cir. 2001).
    Plaintiff Blackburn’s retaliation claims under Title VII and the First
    Amendment fail because she did not suffer an adverse employment action. See
    Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 
    217 F.3d 1104
    , 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2000); Thomas v.
    City of Beaverton, 
    379 F.3d 802
    , 807, 811 (9th Cir. 2004). Any challenge to the
    district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim for retaliation under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
    is waived due to Plaintiffs’ failure to address that claim in their appellate briefing.
    See, e.g., Dennis v. BEH-1 LLC, 
    520 F.3d 1066
    , 1069 (9th Cir. 2008).
    Plaintiff Dau’s hostile work environment claim fails because the hospital
    took “remedial measures reasonably calculated to end the harassment.” McGinest
    v. GTE Serv. Corp., 
    360 F.3d 1103
    , 1120 (9th Cir. 2004).2
    2
    Plaintiffs’ Motion to Correct the Record is DENIED because the document at
    issue was not before the district court. Defendants’ Motion to Strike is GRANTED
    with respect to the reply brief’s references to depositions in the state-court action,
    but DENIED in all other respects. Defendants’ Motion for Judicial Notice is
    GRANTED with respect to the state-court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
    and the state-court judgment. We DENY the remainder of Defendants’ request for
    judicial notice, as well as Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice, because additional
    3
    AFFIRMED.
    state-court documents are not necessary to the determination of this case. See
    Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 
    450 F.3d 1022
    , 1025 n.2
    (9th Cir. 2006). Moreover, the documents proffered by plaintiffs are not judicially
    noticeable for the facts asserted therein because those facts are “subject to
    reasonable dispute,” and such disputes were resolved by the state court. See Fed.
    R. Evid. 201. Because we affirm on the merits, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the
    Appeal is DENIED as moot.
    4