Carol Stent v. Bank of America , 594 F. App'x 411 ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 27 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CAROL A. STENT; DAVID Y. No. 12-15657
NAKAHARA,
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-00770-KJD-
Plaintiffs - Appellants, CWH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
BANK OF AMERICA, NA; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Kent J. Dawson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 17, 2015**
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and FERNANDEZ
Carol A. Stent and David Y. Nakahara, an attorney, appeal pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing their action arising from foreclosure proceedings.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Cervantes v.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011), and we
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Stent’s claim for fraudulent foreclosure
under Nevada’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act because Stent failed to allege facts
showing that any foreclosure had occurred. See Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las
Vegas, 181 P.3d 670, 674 (Nev. 2008) (dismissing claim based on speculative
future act).
The district court properly dismissed Stent’s claim for intentional
interference because Stent failed to allege facts showing that defendants were
aware of the prospective contractual relationship that she had with the potential
buyer. See Wichinsky v. Mosa, 847 P.2d 727, 729-30 (Nev. 1993) (explaining the
elements of an intentional interference with prospective economic advantage
claim).
Dismissal of Stent’s negligence claim was proper because Nevada’s
economic loss doctrine bars a party from recovering for purely monetary harm in
negligence cases. See Giles v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 494 F.3d 865, 879
(9th Cir. 2007) (explaining economic harm doctrine).
The district court properly dismissed Nakahara’s loss of consortium claim
because it is contingent on Stent’s success on one of the other three claims. See
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Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, LLC, 180 P.3d 1172, 1178 & n.31 (Nev. 2008)
(explaining that a husband’s loss of consortium claim failed because his wife’s
claim failed). The district court properly dismissed Nakahara’s remaining claims
because Nakahara failed to show that he had any legally protected interest in the
property, the mortgage note, or the deed of trust. See Tourgeman v. Collins Fin.
Servs., 755 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining standing doctrine and
injury requirement).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the action
without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See
Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1041 (setting forth standard of review).
We reject appellants’ contention that the district court erred in failing to sua
sponte remand this action to state court.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
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