Fairfield-Suisun Usd v. Edu-Ca , 780 F.3d 968 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FAIRFIELD-SUISUN UNIFIED SCHOOL           No. 12-16665
    DISTRICT,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,        D.C. No.
    2:11-cv-02796-
    v.                        LKK-GGH
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT
    OF EDUCATION,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Lawrence K. Karlton, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    YOLO COUNTY OFFICE OF                     No. 12-16818
    EDUCATION,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,          D.C. No.
    2:11-cv-03224-
    v.                        MCE-JFM
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT
    OF EDUCATION,                               OPINION
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Morrison C. England, Jr., Chief District Judge, Presiding
    2       FAIRFIELD-SUISUN USD V. CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC.
    Argued and Submitted
    October 9, 2014—San Francisco, California
    Filed March 16, 2015
    Before: William A. Fletcher and Paul J. Watford, Circuit
    Judges, and Kevin Thomas Duffy, District Judge.*
    Opinion by Judge Watford
    SUMMARY**
    Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
    Affirming the dismissal of two lawsuits brought against
    the California Department of Education, the panel held that
    two local educational agencies, a school district and a county
    office of supervision, lacked a statutory right of action to seek
    declaratory and injunctive relief regarding alleged violations
    of certain procedural requirements of the Individuals with
    Disabilities Education Act and its implementing regulations
    regarding complaint resolution proceedings.
    *
    The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, District Judge for the U.S.
    District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by
    designation.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    FAIRFIELD-SUISUN USD V. CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC.            3
    COUNSEL
    Kimberly A. Smith (argued), Roy A. Combs, Jan E. Tomsky,
    and Emily E. Sugrue, Fagen Friedman & Fulfrost, Oakland,
    California, for Plaintiff-Appellant Fairfield-Suisun Unified
    School District.
    Kimberly A. Smith (argued), Roy A. Combs, Elizabeth B.
    Mori, and Christopher J. Fernandes, Fagen Friedman &
    Fulfrost, Oakland, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant Yolo
    County Office of Education.
    Leonard Garfinkel (argued), Deputy General Counsel; Amy
    Bisson Holloway, General Counsel; and Edmundo Aguilar,
    Assistant General Counsel, California Department of
    Education, Sacramento, California, for Defendant-Appellee.
    OPINION
    WATFORD, Circuit Judge:
    The plaintiffs in these consolidated appeals are local
    educational agencies in California—one a school district, the
    other a county office of education. (For ease of reference, we
    will refer to both of them as school districts.) In separate,
    unrelated actions, they sued the California Department of
    Education in federal court. They allege that, in resolving
    disputes between parents and school districts, such as the
    disputes that led to these actions, the Department routinely
    violates certain procedural requirements imposed by the
    Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and its
    implementing regulations. The school districts seek a
    declaration that the challenged practices are unlawful and an
    4    FAIRFIELD-SUISUN USD V. CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC.
    injunction forbidding their use in resolving future disputes.
    In both cases, the district courts dismissed the actions with
    prejudice on the ground that Congress did not grant school
    districts the right to sue state agencies for violating
    procedural requirements imposed by the IDEA.
    The details underlying each lawsuit are not important for
    our purposes, so we provide just a brief description here. In
    both cases, the parents of a disabled student filed a complaint
    against the school district with the California Department of
    Education. The complaints charged the school districts with
    violating the IDEA by failing to provide appropriate services
    to the students in question. The parents pursued their
    complaints through what’s known as a “complaint resolution
    proceeding,” one of two dispute-resolution mechanisms
    States are required to maintain as a condition of receiving
    federal funds under the IDEA. 
    34 C.F.R. § 300.151
    (a). A
    complaint resolution proceeding may be initiated by parents
    to remedy a public agency’s violation of any requirement
    imposed by certain provisions of the IDEA and its
    implementing regulations. § 300.153(b)(1). In California,
    complaint resolution proceedings are resolved by the
    Department of Education, which, after conducting an on-site
    investigation if necessary, must issue a written decision
    addressing each allegation in the complaint. § 300.152(a)(1),
    (5).    Neither the IDEA nor the federal regulations
    implementing it specify whether a party dissatisfied with the
    outcome of a complaint resolution proceeding may obtain
    further review.
    The other dispute-resolution mechanism required as a
    condition of funding—not involved here but relevant by way
    of background—is a “due process hearing.” Either parents or
    school districts may initiate a due process hearing, but those
    FAIRFIELD-SUISUN USD V. CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC.               5
    hearings are limited to “any matter relating to the
    identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the
    child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education
    to such child.” 
    20 U.S.C. § 1415
    (b)(6)(A). In California, due
    process hearings are conducted by the Office of
    Administrative Hearings, a state agency independent of the
    Department of Education. M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist.,
    
    681 F.3d 1082
    , 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2012). A party
    dissatisfied with the outcome of a due process hearing may
    obtain further review by filing a civil action in state or federal
    court. 
    20 U.S.C. § 1415
    (i)(2)(A).
    In both of the cases before us, the complaint resolution
    proceedings ended with the Department of Education issuing
    a written decision in the parents’ favor. The school districts
    were dissatisfied not only with the outcome of the
    proceedings but also with some of the procedures the
    Department followed in resolving the underlying
    disputes—procedures that the school districts contend violate
    the IDEA and its implementing regulations.                More
    specifically, in one of the two proceedings, the Department
    issued a decision in the parents’ favor, then issued a decision
    in the school district’s favor on reconsideration, and then,
    after reconsidering the matter a second time, issued a final
    decision in the parents’ favor. The school district alleges that
    the Department’s practice of allowing more than one
    reconsideration conflicts with state regulations implementing
    the IDEA. See 
    Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 4665
    . (We will
    assume for purposes of this opinion that the school district
    could, if given an opportunity, tie the violation of this state
    regulation to a violation of federal law.) The school district
    also alleges that the Department has a practice, which it
    followed here, of considering conduct outside the 1-year
    statute of limitations imposed by 
    34 C.F.R. § 300.153
    (c). In
    6       FAIRFIELD-SUISUN USD V. CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC.
    the second proceeding, the school district contends the
    Department imposed the burden of proof on the school
    district when it should have been imposed on the parents, also
    allegedly in violation of the IDEA.
    Rather than pursue whatever relief might have been
    available in state court, the school districts sued the
    California Department of Education in federal court. The
    school districts allege that the challenged procedural
    violations are standard practice and will be repeated in future
    complaint resolution proceedings unless the injunctive relief
    they seek is granted.1
    A plaintiff suing in federal court must establish not only
    a source of subject matter jurisdiction, provided here by
    
    20 U.S.C. § 1415
    (i)(3)(A), but also the existence of a right of
    action authorizing the court to grant the requested relief.
    Because the school districts are suing to enforce a federal
    statute—namely, the IDEA—they must show that the IDEA
    creates a right of action authorizing them to sue the
    Department of Education for the relief they seek. See Lake
    Wash. Sch. Dist. No. 414 v. Office of Superintendent of Pub.
    Instruction, 
    634 F.3d 1065
    , 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2011). The
    only provision of the IDEA that could conceivably do that is
    
    20 U.S.C. § 1415
    (i)(2)(A), which provides as follows:
    1
    For that reason, we disagree with the Department of Education’s
    suggestion that the suits are moot, notwithstanding the fact that in one case
    the Department agreed not to enforce its decision, and in the other the
    school district has already complied with the Department’s decision. The
    claims alleged by the school districts “fall within the ‘capable of
    repetition, yet evading review’ exception to the mootness doctrine.”
    Porter v. Jones, 
    319 F.3d 483
    , 489 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Rosemere
    Neighborhood Ass’n v. EPA, 
    581 F.3d 1169
    , 1174–75 (9th Cir. 2009).
    FAIRFIELD-SUISUN USD V. CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC.              7
    (2) Right to bring civil action
    (A) In general
    Any party aggrieved by the findings and
    decision made under subsection (f) or (k) who
    does not have the right to an appeal under
    subsection (g), and any party aggrieved by the
    findings and decision made under this
    subsection, shall have the right to bring a civil
    action with respect to the complaint presented
    pursuant to this section, which action may be
    brought in any State court of competent
    jurisdiction or in a district court of the United
    States, without regard to the amount in
    controversy.
    The school districts concede that this provision does not
    grant them an express right of action to pursue the claims
    they have alleged. That concession is correct because these
    cases originated in complaint resolution proceedings, which
    are not proceedings under any of the subsections expressly
    mentioned in § 1415(i)(2)(A).
    Lacking an express right of action under § 1415, the
    school districts ask us to glean from the terms of the statute
    an implied right of action. That request is foreclosed by our
    decision in Lake Washington. There, we confronted the same
    issue presented here: “whether the IDEA confers upon a
    school district the right to sue a state agency for its alleged
    noncompliance with IDEA procedures.” 
    634 F.3d at 1067
    .
    In that case, a school district alleged that a state educational
    agency routinely failed to adjudicate due process hearings
    within the time limit set by 
    34 C.F.R. § 300.515
    (a)(1). After
    8    FAIRFIELD-SUISUN USD V. CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC.
    first concluding that the school district’s claim did not fall
    within the express right of action created by 
    20 U.S.C. § 1415
    (i)(2)(A), we held that the school district had no
    implied right of action either. Lake Wash., 
    634 F.3d at 1068
    .
    We observed that the IDEA’s procedural protections are
    “intended to safeguard the rights of disabled children and
    their parents,” and that Congress has “excluded local
    educational agencies from enforcing state compliance with
    the IDEA’s statutory provisions.” 
    Id. at 1069
    . We therefore
    joined several other circuits in holding that local educational
    agencies have “no express or implied private right of civil
    action under the IDEA to litigate any question aside from the
    issues raised in the complaint filed by the parents on behalf
    of their child.” 
    Id.
     That meant the school district in that case
    had no implied right of action “to challenge the State of
    Washington’s compliance with the IDEA’s procedural
    protections.” 
    Id.
    Our holding in Lake Washington controls the outcome
    here, for the school districts in this case stand on even weaker
    footing than did their counterpart in Lake Washington. The
    IDEA provides school districts with an express right of action
    to obtain judicial review of decisions rendered in due process
    hearings (albeit one limited to contesting the issues raised in
    the parents’ complaint). The case for recognizing an implied
    right of action to contest alleged procedural violations in
    connection with due process hearings is surely stronger than
    the case for doing so with respect to complaint resolution
    proceedings, since the IDEA makes no provision for judicial
    review of those proceedings at all. If school districts lack an
    implied right of action to challenge a State’s non-compliance
    with the IDEA’s procedural protections in the context of due
    process hearings, they also lack such an implied right of
    action in the context of complaint resolution proceedings.
    FAIRFIELD-SUISUN USD V. CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC.          9
    Whether parents have an implied right of action to sue
    state educational agencies for violating the IDEA in the
    context of complaint resolution proceedings is a question we
    need not and do not decide.
    AFFIRMED.