United States v. Lincoln ( 2005 )


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  •                     FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No. 04-30040
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                 D.C. No.
    CR-02-00208-RE
    JONATHAN JOSEPH LINCOLN,
    OPINION
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    James A. Redden, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    December 6, 2004—Portland, Oregon
    Filed April 8, 2005
    Before: Thomas G. Nelson, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,
    Circuit Judges, and William W Schwarzer,*
    Senior District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge Rawlinson
    *The Honorable William W Schwarzer, Senior United States District
    Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
    4095
    UNITED STATES v. LINCOLN                4097
    COUNSEL
    Michael R. Levine, Portland, Oregon, for defendant-appellant
    Jonathan Joseph Lincoln.
    Frank Noonan, Assistant United States Attorney, Portland,
    Oregon, for plaintiff-appellee United States of America.
    OPINION
    RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:
    Jonathan Joseph Lincoln (Lincoln) was convicted of know-
    ingly and willfully threatening the life of the President of the
    4098                   UNITED STATES v. LINCOLN
    United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871. The charge
    arose from statements made in a letter dated September 24,
    2001 that Lincoln attempted to mail while incarcerated at the
    Oregon State Penitentiary. The district court acknowledged
    that the letter itself was not a “true threat,” but determined
    that a true threat blossomed from the “context” in which the
    statements were made. Because we conclude that the contex-
    tual background did not transform Lincoln’s letter into a
    threat, we reverse Lincoln’s conviction.
    I.
    BACKGROUND
    During his incarceration, Lincoln participated in anger
    management classes. The classes included a requirement that
    Lincoln write in a workbook. In March of 2001, prison offi-
    cials contacted Special Agent Ronald Wampole and informed
    him that Lincoln had written statements in the workbook that
    threatened the life of President Bush.1 Approximately a month
    later, on April 4, 2001, Agent Wampole interviewed Lincoln
    at the prison.
    Agent Wampole testified that the purpose of the interview
    was to assess the degree of threat Lincoln posed to the Presi-
    dent. The interview took place in an attorney-client room
    within the prison. Lincoln was not compelled to remain in the
    room, although he could not leave unless he summoned a
    1
    On page 2 of the workbook, Lincoln wrote: “1. Kill people; 2. Kill
    Bush; 3. Kill Bush wife; 4. Kill the FBI.” On page 4, Lincoln wrote:
    “Something [sic] you have fun when you kill the President like Bush or
    Bill Cliton [sic] or his wife.” On page 5, Lincoln wrote: “Kill Bush, Kill
    Bush, Kill Bush” and “President shread [sic] his body up into little pieces
    Kill his wife famialy [sic].” On page 9, Lincoln wrote that he is going to
    shoot the President with a 30-06 rifle that would put a hole in the President
    3-1/2 inches wide. Lincoln was not prosecuted for the statements made in
    the workbook.
    UNITED STATES v. LINCOLN                  4099
    guard to let him out. Lincoln was not advised of his Miranda
    rights.
    Agent Wampole related that Lincoln was cooperative and
    spoke freely, explaining to Agent Wampole exactly what he
    had done, why he had done it, and what he was planning. Lin-
    coln stated that when he got out of prison, he was planning
    to get a group of people together from Seattle to travel to
    Washington, D.C., stake out the White House and shoot the
    President through an open limousine window. Agent Wam-
    pole recalled Lincoln stating that he did not really mean the
    threats, although, on cross-examination, Agent Wampole tes-
    tified to the contrary. Agent Wampole presented these state-
    ments to the United States Attorney for possible prosecution,
    but no charges were brought.
    About six months later, on September 24, 2001, Lincoln
    attempted to mail a letter to President Bush. The letter read:
    President Goerge [sic] W Bush
    you think cause [sic] you go over There and Blow
    Them up that The killing will Stop in you [sic]
    Dream They got over 275,800 or more since, Never
    mind that this is only the Beging [sic] of the Badass
    war To come Just think Their army is over here
    already hiding They have more Posion gas Then
    [sic] you know. ha ha. Too bad you don’t think Like
    Them. You will see a good Job Done agin [sic] may
    [sic] 2 week’s, [sic] maybe 2 months, 3, who know’s
    [sic]. You Will Die too George W Bush real Soon
    They Promissed [sic] That you would Long Live
    BIN LADEN.
    Prison officials forwarded the letter to Agent Wampole.
    Agent Wampole in turn transmitted a report to the United
    States Attorney. Lincoln was subsequently indicted for one
    4100                      UNITED STATES v. LINCOLN
    count of willfully and knowingly threatening the life of the
    President in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871.2
    After a one-day bench trial, the district court issued an
    order and opinion finding the defendant guilty of threatening
    the life of President George W. Bush, by depositing in the
    mail the September 24th letter containing such a threat, in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871. During trial, Lincoln sought to
    suppress the workbook writings and his statements to Agent
    Wampole. He also moved for an acquittal. The district court
    ruled that the statements in the workbook fell into the “dan-
    gerous patient” exception to the patient-psychotherapist privi-
    lege and could be considered as part of the context for
    Lincoln’s letter. The district court denied Lincoln’s motion to
    suppress the statements made to Agent Wampole because
    they constituted a “new crime.” Finally, the court determined
    that the letter, when considered in the context of the threats
    made in the workbook and the statements to Agent Wampole,
    constituted a “true threat.”
    Before Lincoln was sentenced, we decided United States v.
    Chase, 
    340 F.3d 978
    , 979 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), holding
    that there is no “dangerous patient” exception to the patient-
    psychotherapist privilege. As a result, Lincoln renewed his
    motion to suppress the workbook statements. The court
    granted the motion, concluding that Chase mandated a finding
    that the workbook statements were privileged. However, the
    court re-affirmed Lincoln’s conviction on the basis that Lin-
    coln’s statements to Agent Wampole provided adequate con-
    2
    This section states, in part:
    “Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in
    the mail or for a delivery from any post office or by any letter
    carrier any letter . . . containing any threat to take the life of, . . .
    or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States
    . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
    years, or both.”
    18 U.S.C. § 871(a).
    UNITED STATES v. LINCOLN                4101
    text to support a conclusion that the letter was a true threat.
    Lincoln appealed, claiming that the district court erred in
    denying his Rule 29 motion seeking acquittal for lack of suffi-
    cient evidence.
    II.
    STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    “The district court’s denial of a motion for a judgment of
    acquittal is reviewed de novo.” United States v. Rojas-Flores,
    
    384 F.3d 775
    , 778 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
    “[V]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    government, we must determine whether any rational trier of
    fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the requi-
    site elements of the offense charged.” United States v. Pear-
    son, 
    391 F.3d 1072
    , 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
    In speech cases, we “defer[ ] to the [factfinder’s] findings
    on all but the constitutional facts.” United States v. Hanna,
    
    293 F.3d 1080
    , 1088 (9th Cir. 2002). “Constitutional facts are
    facts-such as . . . whether a statement is a true threat-that
    determine the core issue of whether the challenged speech is
    protected by the First Amendment.” 
    Id. III. DISCUSSION
    [1] In Watts v. United States, 
    394 U.S. 705
    (1969), the
    Supreme Court stated that because 18 U.S.C. § 871 makes
    criminal certain forms of pure speech, “[w]hat is a threat must
    be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected
    speech.” 
    Id. at 707.
    Thus, “the statute initially requires the
    Government to prove a true ‘threat.’ ” 
    Id. at 708.
    We have
    defined a true threat under § 871 as:
    a statement, written or oral, [made] in a context or
    under such circumstances wherein a reasonable per-
    4102               UNITED STATES v. LINCOLN
    son would foresee that the statement would be inter-
    preted by those to whom the maker communicates
    the statement as a serious expression of an intention
    to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of the
    President.
    
    Hanna, 293 F.3d at 1084
    (citation and alteration omitted).
    A.   The letter itself is not a true threat
    [2] The district court acknowledged that the letter, standing
    alone, could not support a conviction under § 871. As the dis-
    trict court stated:
    Defendant’s letter states that President Bush will die
    soon because an unidentified “they” promised he
    would. The “they” appears from the context of the
    letter to refer to Bin Laden followers (the Taliban, Al
    Queda [sic], or the like). The letter does not state or
    even suggest that the President should be killed.
    Rather, the letter expresses the opinion that “they”
    will kill him. Further, defendant may have been try-
    ing to disassociate himself from any violent action to
    which he referred by twice crossing out the words
    “us” and “we” and substituting the words “they” and
    “them.”
    (emphasis in the original). Even considered in the light most
    favorable to the government, no reasonable person could fore-
    see that this letter would be perceived by its recipient as a
    serious threat to the life of the President.
    B.   The letter is not a true threat even when
    considering the context referenced by the district
    court
    The district court held that Lincoln’s statements to Agent
    Wampole were a proper part of the “context” for Lincoln’s
    UNITED STATES v. LINCOLN                       4103
    letter, and in that context, the letter constituted a “true threat.”
    Although it was appropriate for the district court to consider
    the statements to Agent Wampole as part of the “entire factual
    context,” 
    Hanna, 293 F.3d at 1087
    (citation omitted), the dis-
    trict court nevertheless erred in holding that the letter consti-
    tuted a true threat. This case is markedly different from
    Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists,
    
    290 F.3d 1058
    (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), on which the district
    court relied. In Planned Parenthood, we found that the plac-
    ing of pictures of abortion doctors on “wanted” posters consti-
    tuted a true threat,3 although the posters themselves were not
    threatening. 
    Id. at 1085-86.
    It was in the context of the “poster
    pattern” that the threatening nature of the posters became evi-
    dent. 
    Id. Three doctors
    who appeared on similar posters were
    subsequently murdered. 
    Id. In addition,
    at least some of the
    defendants were aware that, because of the previous murders,
    the posters invoked fear in the doctors who appeared on them.
    
    Id. at 1065-66.
    Thus, the posters were true threats because,
    “like Ryder trucks4 or burning crosses, they connote some-
    thing they do not literally say, yet both the actor and the recip-
    ient get the message.” 
    Id. at 1085.
    [3] Lincoln’s letter does not connote anything that it does
    not literally say. To the contrary, it literally says what it
    means, that President Bush will die because “they” said he
    will. The fact that Lincoln stated six months earlier that he
    planned to shoot the President does not give new meaning to
    Lincoln’s statement that Bin Laden or Al Qaeda will kill the
    President. Any holding to the contrary conflicts with the dis-
    3
    Although Planned Parenthood was a civil case brought under the Free-
    dom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act (FACE), 18 U.S.C. § 248, we
    used “true threat” analysis to define a “threat of force” under FACE.
    Planned 
    Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1062-63
    , 1068.
    4
    This reference is to an Eighth Circuit case holding that the parking of
    Ryder trucks in the driveway of an abortion clinic by a known anti-
    abortion activist was a true threat because Ryder trucks were used in the
    Oklahoma City bombing. Planned 
    Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1078-79
    (cit-
    ing United States v. Hart, 
    212 F.3d 1067
    (8th Cir. 2000)).
    4104                  UNITED STATES v. LINCOLN
    trict court’s express finding that Lincoln disassociated himself
    from any violent action “by twice crossing out the words ‘us’
    and ‘we’ and substituting the words ‘they’ and ‘them.’ ”
    Lincoln’s letter differs from the “wanted” posters in
    Planned Parenthood because in that case there was a clear
    pattern of appearance on a poster followed by murder. It was
    this “poster pattern” that gave the otherwise innocuous posters
    their threatening portent. Planned 
    Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1085-86
    . In this case, there is no pattern of letters written by
    Lincoln, followed by murder or any other act. There was only
    one letter written by Lincoln. Unlike the single letter in this
    case, the “wanted” posters were publicly posted on the inter-
    net, and thus could be reasonably interpreted as a signal to
    unknown third parties to target those who appeared on the
    posters. In contrast, Lincoln’s letter was to be sent only to
    President Bush. In no way could the letter be reasonably
    viewed as a signal to Al Qaeda or anyone else to carry out an
    attack upon President Bush.
    [4] Because § 871 criminalizes a form of pure speech, it
    “must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amend-
    ment clearly in mind.” 
    Watts, 394 U.S. at 707
    . So interpreted,
    the letter in this case was Lincoln’s crude and offensive
    method of stating political opposition to the President, and
    such political hyperbole does not constitute a “threat” under
    § 871. See 
    id. at 708.
    Although the language used was disturb-
    ing, Lincoln was exercising his constitutional right to endorse
    the violent actions of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, which is pro-
    tected speech. See Planned 
    Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1072
    (“If
    [defendants] had merely endorsed or encouraged the violent
    actions of others, [their] speech would be protected.”). Lin-
    coln’s letter was more akin to the protected statement made
    by the defendant in Watts5 than to the wanted posters at issue
    in Planned Parenthood.
    5
    In Watts, the defendant stated: “If they ever make me carry a rifle the
    first man I want to get in my sights is [President] L.B.J.” 
    Watts, 394 U.S. at 706
    . The United States Supreme Court reversed Watts’ conviction,
    holding that his statement was “a kind of very crude offensive method of
    stating a political opposition to the President.” 
    Id. at 708.
                       UNITED STATES v. LINCOLN               4105
    IV.
    CONCLUSION
    [5] There was insufficient evidence to support Lincoln’s
    conviction. The context of Lincoln’s statements did not give
    new meaning to what his letter plainly stated. Even viewed in
    the light most favorable to the government, the letter did not
    constitute a true threat, and cannot support a conviction under
    § 871.
    REVERSED.