Erik Benham V. , 678 F. App'x 474 ( 2017 )


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  •                                  NOT FOR PUBLICATION                     FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     JAN 30 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    In re: ERIK BENHAM,                              No. 12-57203
    Debtor,                       D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01279-VBF
    ------------------------------
    MEMORANDUM*
    ERIK BENHAM,
    Appellant,
    v.
    DAVID R. HAGEN, Chapter 7 Trustee,
    Appellee.
    In re: MARIA VISTA ESTATES,                      No. 14-56441
    Debtor,                             D.C. No. 2:13-cv-05286-VBF
    ______________________________
    ERIK BENHAM,
    Appellant,
    v.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    JERRY NAMBA, Chapter 7 Trustee; DON
    FIFE, CPA,
    Appellees.
    In re: ERIK BENHAM,                            No. 14-56705
    Debtor,                           D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00205-VBF
    ______________________________
    ERIK BENHAM,
    Appellant,
    v.
    SEQUOIA EQUITIES, INC.; et al.,
    Appellees.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Valerie Baker Fairbank, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted January 18, 2017**
    Before:      TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
    Erik Benham appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment and orders
    dismissing for lack of standing Benham’s appeals from bankruptcy court orders.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2                 12-57203, 14-56441, & 14-56705
    The bankruptcy court dismissed his challenges related to the administration of his
    bankruptcy estate and the bankruptcy estate of a company he co-owned. We have
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review for clear error the factual
    finding of whether an appellant is a person aggrieved. Duckor Spradling &
    Metzger v. Baum Trust (In re P.R.T.C., Inc.), 
    177 F.3d 774
    , 777 (9th Cir. 1999).
    We review the bankruptcy court’s decision independently, Allred v. Kennerley (In
    re Kennerley), 
    995 F.2d 145
    , 146 (9th Cir. 1993), and may affirm on any basis
    supported by the record, Schneider v. Vennard (In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig.),
    
    886 F.2d 1109
    , 1112 (9th Cir. 1989). We affirm.
    In appeal number 12-57203, the bankruptcy court correctly determined that
    Benham lacked standing to object to the motion seeking approval of a sales
    agreement to sell assets of Benham’s bankruptcy estate because Benham was not a
    “person aggrieved” by the order. See Fondiller v. Robertson (In re Fondiller), 
    707 F.2d 441
    , 442-43 (9th Cir. 1983) (a debtor carries the burden to “demonstrate that
    [he] was directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the order of the bankruptcy
    court,” and “a hopelessly insolvent debtor does not have standing to appeal orders
    affecting the size of the estate”).
    In appeal number 14-56441, the bankruptcy court correctly determined that
    3                 12-57203, 14-56441, & 14-56705
    Benham lacked standing to object to the trustee’s final report and fee application in
    Maria Vista Estates’ bankruptcy proceedings because Benham failed to
    demonstrate that he was directly and adversely affected by that order. See 
    id. In appeal
    number 14-56705, dismissal of Benham’s adversary proceeding
    for lack of standing was proper because Benham failed to object to defendants’
    motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, or appear at the bankruptcy court
    hearing to resolve those motions, despite being given proper notice of the hearing
    and an opportunity to object. See Brady v. Andrew (In re Commercial W. Fin.
    Corp.), 
    761 F.2d 1329
    , 1334-35 (9th Cir. 1985) (explaining that attendance and
    objection are prerequisites to fulfilling the “person aggrieved” standard where the
    party was given proper notice of the hearing and an opportunity to object).
    Further, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by denying Benham’s
    untimely request for an extension of time because Benham failed to establish
    excusable neglect. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1); see also In re Dix, 
    95 B.R. 134
    , 136-39 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) (standard of review and discussing what
    constitutes excusable neglect).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    4                  12-57203, 14-56441, & 14-56705
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    Benham’s motions to file a late reply brief and to file an oversized reply
    brief, filed on July 8, 2016, are granted. The Clerk shall file the consolidated reply
    brief submitted on July 8, 2016.
    All other pending motions are denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    5                  12-57203, 14-56441, & 14-56705