Alberto Cadena v. Michael Astrue , 365 F. App'x 777 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              FEB 11 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ALBERTO CADENA,                                  No. 09-35136
    Plaintiff - Appellant,              D.C. No. 3:07-cv-01741-BR
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner
    Social Security Administration,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted February 4, 2010
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: RYMER, GOULD and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    Alberto Cadena appeals the district court’s affirmance of the Commissioner
    of Social Security’s denial of his application for Disability Insurance Benefits and
    Supplemental Security Income payments under Titles II and XVI of the Social
    Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and we affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Cadena first argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of Dr. Bert,
    one of Cadena’s treating physicians.1 Dr. Bert’s residual functional capacity (RFC)
    questionnaire contained limitations on walking, sitting, standing, and lifting,
    which, when combined with Cadena’s need to miss work and take unscheduled
    breaks, would prevent Cadena from engaging in full-time work. The ALJ accepted
    Dr. Nolan’s less-restrictive medical testimony, instead of Dr. Bert’s more-
    restrictive medical opinion. This resulted in an RFC without all of the limitations
    to which Dr. Bert had opined. This decision of the ALJ was supported by
    substantial evidence. See Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    574 F.3d 685
    , 690 (9th
    Cir. 2009). Dr. Bert’s medical opinion was inconsistent with Cadena’s reported
    level of activity and evidence of improvement in Cadena’s more-recent treatment
    notes, as well as with Dr. Nolan’s opinion. The ALJ also found it significant that
    Dr. Bert’s surgery recommendation conflicted with another examining physician’s
    recommendation against surgery in favor of nonoperative therapies such as weight
    loss, physical therapy, and exercise. The ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Bert’s
    medical opinion.
    1
    The parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of this case
    and we do not recount that history in detail here.
    2
    Cadena’s second claim of error is that the ALJ improperly found Cadena not
    fully credible about the intensity and duration of his back and leg pain. The ALJ,
    however, gave several reasons for finding Cadena not entirely credible. First,
    Cadena’s reported daily activities included cooking, cleaning, and gardening,
    which were inconsistent with pain at a level of intensity that would be disabling.
    Second, Cadena’s treatment notes, which included signs of improvement and a
    lack of objective medical evidence showing disabling pain, undermined Cadena’s
    credibility. Finally, Dr. Nolan observed that Cadena exaggerated his symptoms by
    voluntarily twitching his leg and describing his pain as an “11” on a scale of 1 to
    10.2 See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 
    242 F.3d 1144
    , 1148 (9th Cir. 2001) (a “tendency
    to exaggerate” is a proper credibility consideration). In our view, the reasons cited
    by the ALJ constitute “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for declining to
    fully credit Cadena’s subjective pain testimony and, as a result, the ALJ did not err
    by rejecting Cadena’s testimony in part. See Vasquez v. Astrue, 
    572 F.3d 586
    , 592
    (9th Cir. 2009).
    2
    We express no opinion on the continuing evidentiary value of so-called
    “Waddell’s tests.” Although the ALJ discussed Dr. Nolan’s administration of
    Waddell’s axial load test in his decision, the ALJ relied on substantial evidence
    apart from the axial load test in finding Cadena not credible.
    3
    Cadena’s third claim is that the ALJ improperly rejected the lay witness
    statements submitted by Wendy Deriso and Dorothy Stevens. The ALJ considered
    the statements, but determined that they described Cadena as “considerably more
    limited than medical findings would support.” The ALJ cited the medical
    evidence, including treatment notes that described Cadena’s daily activities, and
    determined that the lay witness statements conflicted with the medical evidence.
    See Lewis v. Apfel, 
    236 F.3d 503
    , 511 (9th Cir. 2001) (“One reason for which an
    ALJ may discount lay testimony is that it conflicts with medical evidence.”). The
    reason given by the ALJ was “germane” to both Deriso’s and Steven’s statements,
    see Bruce v. Astrue, 
    557 F.3d 1113
    , 1115 (9th Cir. 2009), so the ALJ did not err in
    declining to fully credit the statements.
    We agree with Cadena’s fourth claim that the ALJ posed an improper
    hypothetical to the vocational expert. Dr. Nolan’s medical views, to which the
    ALJ gave controlling weight, suggested that Cadena had limitations on pushing
    and pulling with his lower extremities. Nonetheless, the ALJ did not include the
    push/pull limitation in the hypothetical to the vocational expert and the expert
    testified Cadena could work as a delivery driver. The vocational expert’s
    testimony on cross examination showed that Cadena likely could not perform
    delivery-driver work if he had a lower-extremity limitation, so the ALJ’s step four
    4
    ruling did not reflect all of Cadena’s limitations and thus was not supported by
    substantial evidence. See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 
    240 F.3d 1157
    , 1164–65 (9th Cir.
    2001).
    However, the ALJ’s alternative ruling at step five—that Cadena could
    perform light, unskilled work that existed in significant numbers in the national
    economy—renders the step four error harmless. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 
    533 F.3d 1035
    , 1042 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Although the ALJ’s step four determination
    constitutes error, it is harmless error in light of the ALJ’s alternative finding at step
    five.”). Cadena argues that the ALJ erred in finding at step five that Cadena could
    perform the position of merchandise marker, because that position involves the use
    of fine-motor skills such as frequent fingering. But none of the three physicians
    that completed an evaluation pertinent to determining the RFC for Cadena
    concluded that he suffered limitations on the use of his hands. Moreover, Cadena
    testified at the administrative hearing that he had no difficulty reaching, handling,
    or grasping things. It was not error for the ALJ to find Cadena capable of working
    as a merchandise marker because substantial evidence supported the premise that
    Cadena was able to perform fine-motor tasks with his hands.
    AFFIRMED.
    5