Tom Brown v. Eric H. Holder Jr. , 365 F. App'x 817 ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 16 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MULTI-DENOMINATIONAL No. 08-16083
MINISTRY OF CANNABIS AND
RASTAFARI, INC.; et al., D.C. No. 3:06-CV-04264-VRW
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
MEMORANDUM *
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Vaughn R. Walker, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 19, 2009**
Before: HUG, SKOPIL and BEEZER, Circuit Judges.
Members of the Multi-Denominational Ministry of Cannabis and Rastafari,
Inc. (MDMCR) appeal pro se the dismissal of their action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief to prevent further seizures of their marijuana. The action was filed
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
after local, state and federal law enforcement officials confiscated over 40,000
marijuana plants from property owned by MDMCR members. The district court
rejected the members’ contentions that such seizures violate any constitutional or
statutory rights. We review de novo, see Stoner v. Santa Clara County Office of
Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2007), and we affirm.
DISCUSSION
1. Dismissal of MDMCR
The district court dismissed MDMCR as a plaintiff because it was not
represented by counsel. We also dismissed MDMCR as a party to this appeal
because it was unrepresented by counsel. The law is clear that incorporated
entities must be represented by counsel in court. See Licht v. American West
Airlines, 40 F.3d 1058, 1059 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Corporations . . . must appear in
court through an attorney.”); see also Church of the New Testament v. United
States, 783 F.2d 771, 773 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting church must appear in court
through an attorney).
2. First Amendment
The district court properly dismissed the members’ First Amendment claims
against federal and state defendants because they were sued only in their official
capacities. See Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Sec., 538 F.3d 1250, 1257
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(9th Cir. 2008) (noting “no Bivens-like cause of action is available against . . .
federal agents sued in their official capacities”); Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816,
825 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting “state officials sued in their official capacities . . . are
not ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983 and are therefore generally entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity”). Although the members sought to cure the
deficiency by amending their complaint to name those defendants in their personal
capacities, such an amendment would have been futile because the First
Amendment does not prohibit the government from burdening religious practices
through generally applicable laws. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 878-79 (1990)).
For that same reason, the district court did not err by dismissing the First
Amendment claims against the local defendants. We recently reaffirmed that
“[t]he right to freely exercise one’s religion . . . does not relieve an individual of
the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes conduct that his religion prescribes.” Stormans, Inc.
v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and
parentheticals omitted). Because drug laws are both neutral and generally
applicable, they may be enforced “even if doing so substantially burdens [one’s]
religion.” Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2002).
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3. RLUIPA
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000cc - 2000cc-5, does not apply to actions taken by the federal
defendants. Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1077 (9th
Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009). Although the statute
does apply to local and state officials, its application is limited “to government
land-use regulations . . . such as zoning laws.” Id. Here, members sought
exemption from drug laws that do not purport to regulate the use of private
property and thus RLUIPA is not implicated.
4. RFRA
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb -
2000bb-4, “prohibits the Federal Government from substantially burdening a
person’s exercise of religion, unless the Government demonstrates that application
of the burden to the person represents the least restrictive means of advancing a
compelling interest.” See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423 (2006). Even assuming the members established a
prima facie violation of RFRA by demonstrating their use and distribution of
marijuana is an “exercise of religion” that is “substantially burdened” by the
enforcement of drug laws, we agree with the district court that the Government met
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its burden of demonstrating a compelling interest in preventing the diversion of
thousands of marijuana plants to non-members. We have clearly indicated that
RFRA does not permit the unlimited production or distribution of marijuana.
Guerrero, 290 F.3d at 1222-23; United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1559 (9th
Cir. 1996).
5. Evidentiary Hearing
Finally, the district court was not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing
before dismissing the action. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d
951, 955 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting review for failure to state a claim is generally
limited to the contents of the complaint); see also Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445,
448 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting limitations on district court’s examination of materials
outside the complaint).
AFFIRMED.
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