United States v. Lashaun Nose , 636 F. App'x 431 ( 2016 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FEB 16 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 12-30326
    Plaintiff - Appellee,             D.C. No. 2:11-cr-02086-EFS-2
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    LASHAUN ROMAN NOSE,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Washington
    Edward F. Shea, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 2, 2016**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before:        KOZINSKI, O’SCANNLAIN and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
    1. Roman Nose signed a pretrial stipulation indicating that he was “an
    Indian as that term is used in 18 United States Code 1153.” Given that Roman
    Nose admitted he was an Indian as defined by the statute, a “rational trier of fact
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    page 2
    could have found the [Indian status] element[] of the crime beyond a reasonable
    doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979); see 18 U.S.C. §§
    113(a)(7), 1153 (charged offenses); see also United States v. Gwaltney, 
    790 F.2d 1378
    , 1386 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing stipulations in criminal trials). Roman
    Nose’s challenge to the sufficiency of the government’s evidence therefore fails.
    Accordingly, so too does his jurisdictional challenge. See United States v. Ratigan,
    
    351 F.3d 957
    , 963–64 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “the jurisdictional element
    of federal crimes does not present a pure question of the court’s subject-matter
    jurisdiction” but rather one of sufficiency of the government’s evidence).
    2. Roman Nose has presented no evidence that the stipulation was not freely
    or voluntarily given. We reject his argument that “the stipulation itself provides a
    sufficient record to establish its involuntariness.” In the absence of any facts
    suggesting that his admissions were coerced or involuntary, we cannot say that the
    introduction of the stipulation was erroneous. See United States v. Molina, 
    596 F.3d 1166
    , 1169 (9th Cir. 2010).
    3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the coat
    hangers and television wires as physical evidence. See United States v. Edwards,
    
    235 F.3d 1173
    , 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2000); Chavira Gonzales v. United States, 314
    page 
    3 F.2d 750
    , 752 (9th Cir. 1963). At trial, one witness testified that Roman Nose beat
    the victim with hangers and wires, and another witness testified that the beatings
    occurred in the back bedroom of the house. An FBI agent testified that she
    discovered the hangers and wires in that bedroom. This testimony was sufficient to
    lay foundation for the exhibits, establish their relevance and demonstrate their
    probative value.
    4. The district court did not err by declining to instruct the jury on the crime
    of “Assault by Striking, Beating, or Wounding.” This lesser offense is not
    included within the charged offense of “Assault Resulting in Substantial Bodily
    Injury” because it contains a conduct element that is not an element of the greater
    offense. See United States v. Johnson, 
    637 F.2d 1224
    , 1242 n.26 (9th Cir. 1980)
    (noting that “[a]ssault by striking, beating, or wounding . . . . contemplates some
    form of contact . . . which, strictly speaking, is not required of assault resulting in
    serious bodily injury”), abrogated on other grounds by Schmuck v. United States,
    
    489 U.S. 705
    (1989). For this reason, Roman Nose was not entitled to his
    proposed instruction on the lesser offense. See United States v. Rivera-Alonzo,
    
    584 F.3d 829
    , 832–33 (9th Cir. 2009).
    page 4
    5. The sentence imposed by the district court was substantively reasonable.
    See United States v. Valdavinos-Torres, 
    704 F.3d 679
    , 692 (9th Cir. 2012). The
    fact that Perez received a lesser sentence for the same crime is of no moment.
    Perez had a smaller role in the beatings and, unlike Roman Nose, she accepted
    responsibility for her conduct. Moreover, the district judge paid adequate attention
    to various factors that may have mitigated Roman Nose’s sentence. The district
    judge expressly acknowledged that Roman Nose had experienced a difficult
    childhood, but nonetheless concluded that the upward departure was justified by
    his abhorrent conduct in this case.
    AFFIRMED.