United States v. Robert Kaialau, III ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              FEB 24 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 09-10042
    Plaintiff - Appellee,               D. Ct. No. 1:07-cr-00108-DAE-1
    v.
    ROBERT KAIALAU, III,                             MEMORANDUM *
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Hawaii
    David A. Ezra, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted February 11, 2010
    Honolulu, Hawaii
    Before: FARRIS, D.W. NELSON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
    Appellant Robert Kaialau III (“Kaialau”) appeals his conviction on four
    counts of committing violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity (“VICAR”), in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1959
    (a)(3) and 2. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    I.
    We first reject Kaialau’s argument that the actions of his security
    organization were insufficient to constitute racketeering activity. “We review de
    novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Tran, 
    568 F.3d 1156
    , 1163 (9th Cir. 2009). “Viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the government, we must determine whether any rational jury could
    have found the defendant guilty of each element of the crime beyond a reasonable
    doubt.” Id. at 1613-14 (quotation marks omitted).
    “Racketeering activity” includes any act indictable under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1955
    ,
    which makes it a crime to “conduct[], finance[], manage[], supervise[], direct[], or
    own[] all or part of an illegal gambling business.” § 1955 (emphasis added).
    Providing security services to an illegal gambling business is indictable under §
    1955. See Sanabria v. United States, 
    437 U.S. 54
    , 70 n.26 (1978) (“Numerous
    cases have recognized that 
    18 U.S.C. § 1955
     (1976 ed.) proscribes any degree of
    participation in an illegal gambling business, except participation as a mere
    bettor.”); see also Untied States v. Rieger, 
    942 F.2d 230
    , 234 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[W]e
    conclude that those who acted as doormen or ‘cut men’ were not mere bettors, but
    were participants within the purview of [§ 1955](b)(1)(ii).”); United States v.
    Follin, 
    979 F.2d 369
    , 373 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming conviction under § 1955 of
    2
    defendant who “served drinks, cooked steaks for those in attendance, and cleaned
    the kitchen on occasion”).
    The record contains ample evidence that Kaialau’s security organization
    provided security services to several illegal gambling businesses. Thus, we hold
    that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a rational
    jury could have found that Kaialau’s security organization conducted, financed,
    managed, supervised, directed, or owned part of an illegal gambling business.
    II.
    We next reject Kaialau’s argument that the district court erred in several
    respects when it instructed the jury and answered questions the jury submitted
    during deliberations. Though we generally “review de novo the legal sufficiency
    of jury instructions,” United States v. Smith, 
    561 F.3d 934
    , 938 (9th Cir. 2009),
    “[w]hen a party does not lodge a specific objection in the district court, yet asserts
    error on appeal, we review under our familiar plain error standard,” United States
    v. Santiago, 
    466 F.3d 801
    , 803 (9th Cir. 2006). Under plain error review, “reversal
    is discretionary and will be granted only if the error seriously affects the fairness,
    integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Tran, 
    568 F.3d 1156
    , 1163 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
    3
    A.
    The district court did not plainly err in Instruction No. 25, which stated:
    The second element which the Government must prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt as to Counts 1 through 4 is that the
    enterprise was engaged in racketeering activity on or around the time
    of the violent crime charged in the Indictment. Section 1959(b)(1) . . .
    defines that [sic.] the term “racketeering activity” as the commission
    of certain state and federal crimes including violations of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1955
    , which relates to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses.
    The elements for a violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1955
     are as
    follows:
    1) the defendant conducted, financed, managed,
    supervised, directed, or owned an illegal gambling business . . . ;
    2) the business involved five or more persons who
    conducted, financed, managed, supervised, directed, or owned all or
    part of the business; and
    3) the business had been in substantially continuous
    operation by five or more persons for more than thirty days or had a
    gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day . . . .
    Kaialau argues for the first time on appeal that this instruction improperly
    instructed the jury to determine whether “the defendant,” i.e., Kaialau himself,
    rather than “the enterprise,” engaged in racketeering activity.
    Kaialau’s argument fails because it asks us to view the words “the
    defendant” in the first element listed in Instruction No. 25 in isolation, rather than
    in context of the instruction as a whole. As a whole, Instruction No. 25 instructs
    the jury to determine whether “the enterprise” required by a § 1959 VICAR
    offense engaged in “racketeering activity” by conducting all or part of an illegal
    4
    gambling business in violation of § 1955. The first paragraph of Instruction No. 25
    states this expressly: “The second element which the Government must prove . . .
    is that the enterprise was engaged in racketeering activity.”
    Kaialau is correct that the jury submitted a note to the court seeking
    clarification on Instruction No. 25. But, in its response to the jury’s note, the
    district court again linked Instruction No. 25 to the “enterprise” element of the §
    1959 VICAR offense and instructed the jury to apply the elements listed in
    Instruction No. 25 to the “enterprise,” stating: “To prove that the enterprise
    engaged in racketeering activity, the Government must prove that the enterprise
    violated 
    18 U.S.C. § 1955
    . The elements of that crime are set forth in Instruction
    Number 25.” Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not commit plain
    error in Instruction No. 25.
    B.
    The district court likewise did not err in its response to this same jury note
    by including a re-instruction that the jury must determine whether Kaialau
    committed an assault in exchange for compensation from the enterprise or to
    secure his position in the enterprise. At trial, Kaialau conceded that the district
    court’s response was “a correct statement of the law,” but objected that re-
    instruction on assault was “not responsive to any question” the jury asked. The
    5
    district court overruled Kaialau’s objection, stating that it believed the jury had
    implicitly asked the court to clarify what acts “the enterprise” had to commit and
    what acts “the defendant” had to commit to support a conviction. We hold that the
    district court’s response provided appropriate clarification on the distinction
    between “the enterprise” and “the defendant” and thus did not constitute error, let
    alone plain error.
    C.
    The district court also did not err when it stated in response to another note
    from the jury that “[t]he Government does not need to prove that the Defendant
    ‘personally conduct, manage or direct the whole illegal gambling business’ or was
    a leader of the enterprise, if you find one existed.” This response was perfectly
    accurate. As addressed above, under § 1955 it is a crime to conduct, finance,
    manage, supervise, direct, or own “all or part of an illegal gambling business.” §
    1955 (emphasis added). Kaialau’s argument has no merit.
    III.
    Further, we reject Kaialau’s argument that the district court erred by failing
    to exclude the testimony of two witnesses, Joon Woo Lee and Frank Balasi, as
    unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Though we generally
    review the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion, United States v. Allen,
    6
    
    341 F.3d 870
    , 886 (9th Cir. 2003), where “a party does not lodge a specific
    objection in the district court, yet asserts error on appeal, we review under our
    familiar plain error standard,” Santiago, 466 F.3d at 803.
    We hold that the district court did not commit plain error by permitting Lee
    and Balasi to testify about events that occurred after the charged assaults of July 30
    and August 3, 2003. Their testimony was relevant to contradict and rebut
    Kaialau’s claim that he barely knew Lee and that he never touched Balasi. Neither
    Lee’s nor Balasi’s testimony had “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
    improper basis,” F ED. R. E VID. 403 advisory committee’s note, because both
    testified about incidents that paled in comparison to the charged assaults.
    Accordingly, Kaialau cannot show that the introduction of this evidence was
    unfairly prejudicial, let alone that its prejudicial impact substantially outweighed
    its probative value for impeachment purposes and for proving that Kaialau
    committed the charged assaults to aid an enterprise engaged in racketeering
    activity.
    IV.
    Finally, we reject Kaialau’s argument that the district court plainly erred by
    admitting into evidence a chart titled “Robert Kaialau Organization” that included
    the faces and names of seventeen individuals associated with Kaialau’s security
    7
    organization and Wang’s illegal gambling business.
    Kaialau argues for the first time on appeal that the district court plainly erred
    by admitting the chart into evidence, rather than simply allowing the Government
    to use it as a pedagogical device under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006. However,
    this court has affirmed the admission of summary charts into evidence in several
    cases, citing district courts’ broad discretion to regulate presentation of evidence
    under Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a). See United States v. Poschwatta, 
    829 F.2d 1477
    , 1481 (9th Cir. 1987) (overruled on other grounds); United States v. Gardner,
    
    611 F.2d 770
    , 776 (9th Cir. 1980).
    As the Government correctly points out, this case involved numerous
    individuals, many of whom have similar-sounding names and many of whom are
    referred to by aliases. In fact, Kaialau’s counsel himself used the chart on a
    number of occasions at trial. Given the factual complexity of this case, the chart
    very likely contributed to the clarity of the presentation of evidence to the jury, and
    therefore, we hold that the district court’s failure to exclude the chart from
    evidence did not constitute plain error.
    AFFIRMED.
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