Transwestern Pipeline Company v. 46.78 Acres of Permanent Easem ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                              JUN 08 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    TRANSWESTERN PIPELINE                            No. 11-15558
    COMPANY LLC, a Delaware limited
    liability company,                               D.C. No. 2:07-cv-02312-JWS
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    46.78 ACRES OF PERMANENT
    EASEMENT LOCATED IN MARICOPA
    COUNTY, more or less; et al.,
    Defendants,
    and
    FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
    COMPANY, a California corporation, as
    Trustee under Trust 8435 and Trust 8436,
    also referred to at Trusts 3435 and 3436
    and W.V.S.V. HOLDINGS LLC, an
    Arizona limited liability company,
    Defendants - Appellants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    John W. Sedwick, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 17, 2012
    San Francisco, California
    Before: THOMAS, McKEOWN, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
    WVSV Holdings, LLC and First American Title Insurance Company, as
    trustee for the benefit of WVSV Holdings, LLC (collectively, “WVSV”) appeal the
    district court’s grant of summary judgment and exclusion of four expert witnesses.
    We affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the history of this case, we need
    not recount it here.
    I
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony.
    United States v. Redlightning, 
    624 F.3d 1090
    , 1110 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
    
    131 S. Ct. 2944
     (2011) (citation omitted) (citing standard). The district court has
    broad discretion to “conclude that there [was] simply too great an analytical gap
    between the [factual support for an opinion] and the opinion proffered.” Gen. Elec.
    Co. v. Joiner, 
    522 U.S. 136
    , 146 (1997).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that experts
    Dowdy and Wolf were not qualified to offer opinions on market perceptions,
    particularly in light of the fact that their opinions were not based on any market
    -2-
    data. United States v. 87.98 Acres of Land, 
    530 F.3d 899
    , 905 (9th Cir. 2008);
    United States v. 760.807 Acres of Land, 
    731 F.2d 1443
    , 1448 (9th Cir. 1984).
    Similarly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found the
    testimony and report of James Chalmers partially unreliable.1 Given the lack of
    foundation for his opinion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    excluding his testimony on whether a setback was needed, the appropriate distance
    for a setback, the hypothetical effect of the setback on a buyer, and his estimate of
    severance damages.
    Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Johnson’s
    testimony on the basis that Johnson was not qualified to testify as an owner’s
    representative and that his testimony was derivative of Chalmers’s excluded
    testimony.
    The exclusion of expert testimony left WVSV without evidence to oppose a
    summary judgment motion; however, that result alone is not a basis for reversing
    the district court. Joiner, 
    522 U.S. at 142-43
    .
    1
    Transwestern did not contest the admissibility of Chalmers’s opinion
    regarding the fair market value of the permanent pipeline and temporary
    construction easements; thus, the district found those opinions admissible.
    -3-
    II
    Given the exclusion of expert witness testimony, the district court did not err
    in granting summary judgment. See Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 
    134 F.3d 1418
    , 1423
    (9th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate in a condemnation case where
    there is no disputed issue of material fact. See Etalook v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 
    831 F.2d 1440
    , 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1987).
    AFFIRMED.
    -4-