Lynn Hust v. State of Wyoming , 372 F. App'x 708 ( 2010 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAR 26 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
LYNN ANN HUST, No. 09-35102
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:08-cv-05501-RBL
v.
MEMORANDUM *
STATE OF WYOMING; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 28, 2009**
San Francisco, California
Before: BEEZER, HALL and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant Lynn Ann Hust (“Hust”) appeals pro se the district
court’s dismissal of her suit in favor of thirty-one defendants-appellees. The
district court dismissed the suit on several grounds, including the court’s refusal to
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
interfere in an ongoing state criminal prosecution, Hust’s failure to comply with
Wyoming and Washington tort claim filing statutes and Hust’s failure to comply
with the applicable statute of limitations.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The facts of this case are known to the parties. We do not repeat them here.
I
We review “a judgment dismissing a case on the pleadings de novo.”
Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586, 591 (9th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Dunlap v. Credit Prot. Ass’n, L.P., 419 F.3d 1011, 1012 n.1
(9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)). We may affirm on any ground supported by the
record, even if it was not relied upon by the district court. Forest Guardians v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003).
We review a district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims for an abuse of discretion. In re Digimarc Corp.
Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1233 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008).
II
The district court dismissed Hust’s civil rights claims pursuant to Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Under Heck, a § 1983 action seeking damages
for unconstitutional conviction or confinement cannot be pursued unless the
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underlying criminal case has been dismissed or reversed in favor of the criminal
defendant. Heck, 512 U.S. at 484–86, 489.
Here, the district court properly dismissed Hust’s civil rights claims because
Hust did not even show that she had been to trial following her arrest, much less
that the criminal proceedings against her were dismissed or otherwise resolved in
her favor. Hust’s civil rights claims were premature, and Hust fails to raise any
legal argument on appeal as to how the district court erred in its analysis.1
III
The district court properly dismissed all of Hust’s tortious claims against
Wyoming, Washington and the agencies, departments, municipalities and
employees of those states because Hust failed to comply with the applicable state
tort claim filing statutes.
In Wyoming, a litigant must file a written tort claim with the state of
Wyoming before the litigant can file a complaint alleging tortious conduct by the
state of Wyoming, Wyoming agencies or Wyoming employees acting within their
1
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007)
does not change our analysis here. Wallace provides that an exception to the Heck
rule exists when “legal process” has not been initiated. See id. at 389–90.
Here, the district court correctly concluded that Hust was arrested pursuant
to legal process—she was arrested pursuant to a warrant, unlike the plaintiff in
Wallace—and Wallace, therefore, does not provide an exception to the general
Heck bar of her § 1983 false arrest claim.
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official duties. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113. Washington has enacted a similar
statute. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.92.110.
Here, Hust’s complaint does not even allege, much less prove, that she
complied with these statutes. Moreover, she did not object or reply when the states
and state defendants moved to dismiss on this ground. And the record provides no
indication that Hust complied with the statutes in either state.
IV
The district court also properly dismissed with prejudice Hust’s claims
against the various media defendants because Hust’s claim is barred by the two
year statute of limitations for defamation suits. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.100.
Hust filed her instant complaint on August 13, 2008, more than two years after the
allegedly defamatory articles were published.
V
The district court dismissed Hust’s remaining state law claims by declining
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. On appeal, Hust does not object
to the district court’s decision not to accept supplemental jurisdiction. Absent any
argument to the contrary, the district court acted within its discretion by dismissing
Hust’s remaining state law claims.
AFFIRMED.
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