New Cingular Wireless Services v. Richard McCormick , 373 F. App'x 707 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              APR 05 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    In the Matter of: WIRE COMM                      No. 08-17061
    WIRELESS, INC.,
    D.C. No. 2:07-cv-02213-MCE
    Debtor.
    MEMORANDUM *
    NEW CINGULAR WIRELESS
    SERVICES, INC.,
    Appellant,
    v.
    RICHARD MCCORMICK; SHIRLEY
    MCCORMICK; TIMOTHY
    MCCORMICK; RENEE MCCORMICK,
    Appellees,
    and
    MICHAEL F. BURKART,
    Trustee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Morrison C. England, District Judge, Presiding
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Argued and Submitted November 4, 2009
    San Francisco, California
    Before: B. FLETCHER, CANBY, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
    In October 2007, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California
    issued an order granting approval of a compromise between the Trustee for
    now-defunct Wire Comm Wireless, Inc. (“Wire Comm”), and Wire Comm’s
    principal shareholders Timothy, Renee, Richard, and Shirley McCormick
    (“McCormicks”). As part of the compromise, the Trustee agreed to dismiss a
    state-court action New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc. (“New Cingular”) had
    brought against the McCormicks, in which the state court had substituted the
    Trustee as plaintiff. New Cingular appealed the bankruptcy court’s order
    approving the compromise to the District Court for the Eastern District of
    California, arguing that the bankruptcy court had failed to provide adequate factual
    support for its approval of the compromise. The district court affirmed. New
    Cingular now appeals.
    Because the order at issue determined and affected the substantive rights of
    the parties, it was, for purposes of appeal, a final order. J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgmt.,
    Inc. v. U.S. Tr. (In re Martech USA, Inc.), 
    188 B.R. 847
    , 849 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
    1995). We have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a final order pursuant to
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    28 U.S.C. § 158
    (d). In an appeal from an order affirming the decision of a
    bankruptcy court, “our role is essentially the same as that of the district court, and
    we are, in essence, reviewing the final order of the bankruptcy court.” Martin v.
    Kane (In re A&C Props.), 
    784 F.2d 1377
    , 1380 (9th Cir. 1986). “We review the
    bankruptcy court’s findings of fact under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard and its
    conclusions of law de novo.” 
    Id.
     Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not
    disturb an order granting or denying approval of a compromise. United States v.
    Alaska Nat’l Bank of N. (In re Walsh Constr., Inc.), 
    669 F.2d 1325
    , 1328 (9th Cir.
    1982).
    In considering the proposed compromise, the bankruptcy court found that
    one factor weighed most heavily in favor of granting approval, namely, that New
    Cingular so lacked confidence in the supposedly meritorious state-court claims that
    it repeatedly declined offers to purchase the action at a one-dollar premium. The
    only explanation New Cingular gives for its obvious lack of interest is its “belie[f]
    [that] the bankruptcy court should, and would, reject the compromise.”
    Appellant’s Op. Br. 40. Unfortunately for New Cingular, this explanation
    overlooks the reality that the purpose of a compromise is, among other things, “to
    avoid the expenses and burdens associated with litigating sharply contested and
    dubious claims.” In re A&C Props., 
    784 F.2d at
    1380–81. We think it safe to
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    assume that New Cingular, like the Trustee, regarded the state-court claims as
    “sharply contested and dubious” and, therefore, less valuable to the estate, in
    monetary terms, than the proposed compromise.
    The foremost obligation of a bankruptcy trustee is to “proceed in settling [an
    estate’s] accounts on whatever grounds he, in his informed discretion, believes will
    net the maximum return for the creditors.” LeBlanc v. Salem (In re Mailman
    Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp.), 
    212 F.3d 632
    , 635 (1st Cir. 2000). In view of that
    obligation, a bankruptcy court enjoys great latitude in approving a proposed
    compromise, and a fruitful settlement is always favored over needless litigation. In
    re A&C Props., 
    784 F.2d at
    1381–82. Here, the record shows that the bankruptcy
    court, in judging the merits of the proposed compromise, carefully considered the
    requisite factors, see 
    id. at 1381
    , and provided ample factual support for its
    conclusions. “[A]s long as the bankruptcy court amply considered the various
    factors that determined the reasonableness of the compromise, the court’s decision
    must be affirmed.” 
    Id.
     The order of the bankruptcy court is, therefore,
    AFFIRMED
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