United States v. Daane , 475 F.3d 1114 ( 2007 )


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  •                  FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                  No. 05-50282
    Plaintiff-Appellee,           D.C. No.
    v.                        CR-01-01155-DDP-
    WILLIAM DWIGHT DAANE,                            02
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                  No. 05-50283
    Plaintiff-Appellee,           D.C. No.
    v.                        CR-01-01155-DDP-
    TERE THOMPSON DAANE,                             03
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                  No. 05-50295
    Plaintiff-Appellee,           D.C. No.
    v.                        CR-01-01155-DDP-
    GLENN HURST TRENT, JR.,                          01
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                  No. 05-50309
    Plaintiff-Appellee,           D.C. No.
    v.                        CR-01-01155-DDP-
    RICHARD ERIC MILLER,                             06
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    1195
    1196              UNITED STATES v. DAANE
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                  No. 05-50346
    Plaintiff-Appellee,           D.C. No.
    v.                        CR-01-01155-DDP-
    JOHN WILLIAM ARN, aka John Arn,                  04
    Defendant-Appellant.
           OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    June 7, 2006—Pasadena, California
    Filed February 1, 2007
    Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, and
    Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Rawlinson
    1198                  UNITED STATES v. DAANE
    COUNSEL
    Donald W. MacPherson, Glendale, Arizona, for appellants
    William and Tere Daane.
    Jeff Price, Santa Monica, California, for appellant Glenn
    Trent.
    Stephen M. Lathrop, Rolling Hills Estates, California, for
    appellant Richard Miller.
    Karen L. Landau, Oakland, California, for appellant John
    Arn.
    Jerry A. Behnke, Assistant United States Attorney, Riverside,
    California, for appellee United States.
    OPINION
    RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:
    Appellants William and Tere Daane (collectively the
    Daanes), Glenn Trent (Trent), Richard Miller (Miller), and
    John Arn (Arn) appeal their convictions for conspiracy and
    attempted extortion. Because we conclude that the district
    court committed no error when it rejected the appellants’
    proffered “claim of right” instruction, we affirm the convic-
    tions.1
    I.       Overview
    Appellants were indicted for conspiracy and attempted
    interference with commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951
    (the Hobbs Act), and traveling in interstate commerce for the
    1
    Appellants raised other issues, which are addressed in a memorandum
    disposition filed contemporaneously with this opinion.
    UNITED STATES v. DAANE                      1199
    purpose of extortion. The indictment alleged, inter alia, that
    appellants traveled to Riverside, California from outside the
    state in order to “assault, restrain and abduct Leslie Darwin
    Murdock (Murdock) and force him to transfer money inter-
    state from Murdock’s bank accounts to accounts controlled by
    the defendants and others.” The indictment also alleged that
    William Daane knowingly possessed a firearm in furtherance
    of crimes of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). At
    the conclusion of appellants’ first trial, the district court
    granted their motion for a new trial because of juror miscon-
    duct.
    One of the appellants’ co-defendants, Mark Stich (Stich),
    pled guilty and testified at appellants’ second trial.
    II.    Background
    A.    The Ponzi Scheme and Recovery Efforts
    Murdock pled guilty in a separate case to three counts of
    mail fraud. Although Murdock guaranteed a five percent
    weekly return to investors, his investment plan was in reality
    a Ponzi scheme.2 Approximately 950 individuals invested in
    Murdock’s business, including the appellants. The total loss
    to these investors was approximately $20 to $40 million.
    Murdock had his first personal meeting with the Daanes
    and Miller in a hotel in Las Vegas. They discussed “opportu-
    nities to continue [Murdock’s] program offshore.” A couple
    of weeks after the Las Vegas meeting, Murdock met with
    Tere Daane and Arn in Temecula, California, where they dis-
    cussed expansion of the scheme.
    Shortly thereafter, Murdock met with Stich. Stich “made a
    2
    A Ponzi scheme pays investors with money received from later partici-
    pants.
    1200               UNITED STATES v. DAANE
    demand on his return of his principal.” Murdock finally
    agreed in writing to repay Stich.
    After the meeting with Stich, Murdock traveled to Las
    Vegas to meet with the Daanes. Murdock met the Daanes and
    Arn at a restaurant in the Orleans Casino. They had a cordial
    conversation and the Daanes invited Murdock to their house
    for further discussions. At the Daanes’ residence, the Daanes
    and Arn presented Murdock with documents entitled “What
    We Know” and “What We Can Do For Leslie D. Murdock.”
    The “What We Know” document contained information
    allegedly related to Murdock’s finances and Ponzi scheme.
    For example, it stated that Murdock had an active accounts
    investment total of $10,000,000; Murdock made 3,900 wire
    transfers through seventeen banks; and Murdock was being
    investigated by the FBI and Treasury Department for money
    laundering and bad checks.
    The “What We Can Do For Leslie D. Murdock” document
    referred to the creation of an offshore business structure;
    assistance in securing a second citizenship and passport for
    Murdock; the ability to “make LDM [Murdock] an invisible
    investor” and to “get LM [Murdock] of [sic] the federal
    income tax system.”
    During the discussions, Murdock, Tere Daane, and Arn
    moved into the kitchen. When Miller and Trent entered the
    kitchen, Trent moved toward Murdock and stated, “You don’t
    know who I am, do you.” Trent surprised Murdock since nei-
    ther Tere Daane nor Arn had told him that other people would
    be joining them. Trent immediately demanded the return of
    $75,000 from Murdock and threatened Murdock that they
    “were going to the desert until [Trent] was satisfied.”
    After Tere Daane and Arn intervened to keep the peace,
    Murdock agreed to take Trent back to Riverside. Arn volun-
    teered to go instead, and Murdock agreed to sign a promise
    UNITED STATES v. DAANE                 1201
    to repay Trent $78,000. Arn was to stay with Murdock to
    “provide upkeep and transfer particulars up to the payment of
    said funds.” Arn was also supposed to work on obtaining
    reimbursement for a list of individuals provided by Tere
    Daane. The total amount of reimbursement to these individu-
    als approximated one million dollars.
    During their drive to California, Murdock and Arn con-
    versed about the events at the Daanes’ residence. Arn told
    Murdock that Arn was nervous because there was a gun in the
    back of Trent’s shorts.
    Murdock took Arn back to Las Vegas after approximately
    two weeks in Riverside. Although Murdock assured Arn that
    he was going to proceed with their plan to restructure the
    investment program, Murdock later called Arn and informed
    him that Murdock was going to declare bankruptcy.
    B.   The Trip To Pasadena
    On September 20, 2001, Stich, the Daanes, Arn, Miller, and
    Trent met in Trent’s hotel room. Trent stated that he did not
    care “if they found Mr. Murdock buried in the sand.” They
    discussed going to Pasadena the next day, and Trent sug-
    gested that they “should take Murdock somewhere.” Trent
    also mentioned, “Mr. Murdock’s a big man. I’m going to need
    some help with him because of his size . . .” William Daane
    and Miller agreed to help with Murdock, but Stich refused.
    Arn stated that “he had an uncle that had a hotel in the desert
    where Mr. Murdock could be taken.” Trent suggested that
    they “band-tie” Murdock’s hands, “duct tape his feet, put him
    in a car, and take him out to the desert.” Tere Daane also
    stated that she had a fax machine and wiring instructions for
    transferring funds to an international account. There was no
    discussion of firearms at this meeting.
    The following morning, Stich, Miller, Arn, Trent, and the
    Daanes prepared to go to Pasadena. When Stich was placing
    1202                  UNITED STATES v. DAANE
    his bags into William Daane’s Suzuki, he saw draw ties3 and
    duct tape. Stich had also purchased two pairs of gloves and
    duct tape. Stich rode with William Daane to Pasadena. Arn
    and Tere Daane were in a white Cherokee, with Miller and
    Trent in a blue Ford Taurus rental car. After locating Mur-
    dock’s car in a Staples parking lot, William Daane told Stich
    to place the ties and duct tape into Trent’s blue rental car.
    After Stich spotted Murdock running down the street, Wil-
    liam Daane used a two-way radio and stated, “The rabbit’s on
    the run.” Tere Daane also had a two-way radio, and she
    repeated that “[t]he rabbit is on the run.” William Daane then
    moved his car to a parking lot where Tere Daane and Arn
    were waiting in the white Cherokee. In the parking lot, Wil-
    liam Daane retrieved a plastic box from the Cherokee’s cargo
    area. William Daane returned to his car, placed the plastic box
    on Stich’s lap, and confirmed that it contained a gun. After-
    wards, William Daane and Stich drove to the Staples parking
    lot. When they arrived, Stich saw Murdock get into his car.
    Trent ran up to Murdock’s car and held the door open. As
    Trent tried to pull Murdock from his car, a struggle ensued
    and police officers were called.
    Stich slid the box containing the gun underneath the driv-
    er’s seat of the Suzuki. As Stich was walking away from the
    incident, William Daane told him to “hide the gun,” but Stich
    had already placed it underneath the seat. After they were
    arrested, William Daane told Stich that “he was going to tell
    the police that the guns were for a hunting trip.”
    C.    The Pasadena Investigation
    Officer Howlett responded to the incident at the Staples
    parking lot. Initially, Trent, Miller, and William Daane denied
    that an altercation had occurred. They also denied having any
    3
    The terms “draw ties” and “flex ties” are used interchangeably in this
    opinion to refer to plastic ties found at the scene of the altercation.
    UNITED STATES v. DAANE                 1203
    of Murdock’s property. Officer Howlett asked three or four
    times for them to return Murdock’s telephone and keys. After
    being threatened with arrest for robbery, Trent and William
    Daane returned the items to Murdock.
    Miller permitted Officer Howlett to search the blue rental
    car. She noticed a two-way radio on the center console; a pair
    of gloves; a full roll of duct tape in the passenger’s seat; and
    plastic flex ties on the passenger floorboard. Miller admitted
    that he had used the two-way radio in the car “to communi-
    cate with his friends.”
    After Officer Howlett approached Tere Daane, who was in
    the white Cherokee, Tere handed the officer “some papers
    that had names and dollar amounts written on them.” The
    documents were affidavits made out to Murdock and signed
    by different individuals. Officer Howlett also observed a fax
    machine in Tere Daane’s vehicle.
    Officer Howlett retrieved an e-mail document from Tere
    Daane providing information on how to transfer one million
    dollars by wire.
    Tere Daane told Officer   Howlett, “she and the group of
    people had invested money    with [Murdock], and that he had
    not been paying them, and    he had been avoiding them, and
    they had to hunt him down    like a rabbit.”
    Officer Alaniz also searched the white Jeep Cherokee, find-
    ing a .50 caliber handgun, a smaller caliber handgun, a radio
    battery charger, binoculars, a glass cutter, and clothing. The
    smaller handgun was found inside of a backpack in a holster,
    “with the lettering D-A-A-N-E written on it.”
    When Officer Peinado arrived, he noticed an unoccupied
    gray Suzuki with its headlights on and engine running. He
    entered the Suzuki and turned the engine off. When he
    searched the vehicle, he found a loaded .44 magnum handgun
    1204                   UNITED STATES v. DAANE
    in a black, plastic container underneath the driver’s seat, and
    “a 380 caliber semiautomatic pistol” in the Suzuki’s front
    console. The latter firearm was in a holster inside of a plastic
    bag.
    In an interview with Officer Peinado, William Daane stated
    that “he had no idea” why the .380 caliber firearm was on the
    front console. He explained that the duct tape,4 flex ties, and
    gloves in the car were for hunting, and that “he forgot he left
    guns in the car . . . .”
    During an interview with Special Agent Roberts of the FBI,
    William Daane admitted that “he wanted to scare Les Mur-
    dock.” William Daane also stated that, during the altercation,
    he warned Murdock “to settle down or he would have to hurt
    him.” Daane denied any knowledge of how the flex ties
    “came to Pasadena.”
    William Daane gave Agent Roberts two different explana-
    tions for the presence of the firearms. He told Agent Roberts
    that he had packed them for an upcoming hunting trip, but had
    not packed any other supplies for the trip. He also told Agent
    Roberts “that the firearms were in his car because he had been
    busy and had forgotten to unpack his car because he had been
    shooting either the weekend, or perhaps two weekends,
    prior[.]”
    Trent informed Agent Roberts that “he was the passenger
    in the blue Ford Taurus . . . and he was watching Mr. Mur-
    dock’s car — trying to spot Mr. Murdock come back to the
    car.” Trent stated that he approached Murdock and “tried to
    grab the phone out of Mr. Murdock’s hand because he did not
    want Mr. Murdock to make a telephone call” and that he
    “began pulling Murdock from the car.”
    4
    This duct tape was not the same as the tape Stich put in the rental car.
    UNITED STATES v. DAANE                 1205
    With respect to the flex ties, Trent stated that he had seen
    the flex ties in the back seat of the Ford Taurus, but “didn’t
    know how they got there.” Trent also recounted that he
    moved the flex ties “from the back seat area to the front seat
    area so that if Mr. Murdock saw them he would not be
    scared.”
    Officer Finney searched a suitcase taken from the white
    Cherokee. Inside the suitcase, she found checks payable to
    Arn that were drawn on Murdock’s account. She also found
    a passport in Arn’s name and a spreadsheet listing amounts
    Murdock owed to numerous individuals, including appellants.
    The total amount listed on the spreadsheet was $1,750,330.27.
    D.    Jury Verdicts
    The Daanes, Arn and Trent were convicted of conspiracy
    and attempted interference with commerce by threats and vio-
    lence. Miller was convicted only on the conspiracy charge.
    Appellants filed timely notices of appeal.
    III.   Standards of Review
    “We review the district court’s determination that a factual
    foundation does not exist to support a jury instruction pro-
    posed by the defense for an abuse of discretion.” United
    States v. Castellanos-Garcia, 
    270 F.3d 773
    , 775 (9th Cir.
    2001) (citations omitted). “A court commits reversible error
    when it fails to instruct the jury as to a defense theory if the
    theory finds some basis in the record and is supported by
    law.” United States v. Shortt Accountancy Corp., 
    785 F.2d 1448
    , 1455 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
    IV.    Discussion
    Relying on United States v. Enmons, 
    410 U.S. 396
    (1973),
    and Scheidler v. National Organization For Women, 
    537 U.S. 393
    (2003), appellants argue that the district court erred when
    1206                UNITED STATES v. DAANE
    it rejected their proffered “claim of right” instruction. In par-
    ticular, appellants assert that they had a rightful claim to the
    funds in Murdock’s possession and therefore their actions
    were not “wrongful” as required for extortion.
    [1] However, neither Enmons nor Scheidler supports appel-
    lants’ claim of right instruction. In Enmons, the Supreme
    Court specifically addressed “whether the Hobbs Act pro-
    scribes violence committed during a lawful strike for the pur-
    pose of inducing an employer’s agreement to legitimate
    collective-bargaining demands.” 
    Enmons, 410 U.S. at 399
    .
    The Supreme Court observed that “[t]he legislative frame-
    work of the Hobbs Act . . . makes it clear that the Act does
    not apply to the use of force to achieve legitimate labor ends.”
    
    Id. at 401.
    However, “when the objectives of the picketing
    changed from legitimate labor ends to personal payoffs, then
    the actions became extortionate.” 
    Id. at 406
    n.16. Enmons,
    with its specific focus on labor disputes, undermines appel-
    lants’ contention that a similar claim of right defense was
    applicable in their case. Tellingly, this court has previously
    declined to extend Enmons beyond the context of a labor dis-
    pute. See United States v. Thordarson, 
    646 F.2d 1323
    , 1326-
    27 (9th Cir. 1981) (“There is no basis in the [Supreme]
    Court’s decision or its underlying rationale for the creation of
    an ‘Enmons doctrine’ of immunity applicable to all federal
    criminal statutes. We read Enmons as holding only that the
    use of violence to secure legitimate collective bargaining
    objectives is beyond the reach of the Hobbs Act.”).
    [2] Other circuits have reached the same conclusion. In
    United States v. Zappola, 
    677 F.2d 264
    (2d Cir. 1982), the
    Second Circuit opined that a claim of right defense is unwar-
    ranted in cases involving the use of force. The Second Circuit
    distinguished Enmons as limited to cases involving legitimate
    labor strikes. 
    Id. at 269.
    The Second Circuit clarified that:
    [B]y adopting the states’ statutory law of extortion,
    Congress meant to punish as extortion any effort to
    UNITED STATES v. DAANE                      1207
    obtain property by inherently wrongful means, such
    as force or threats of force . . . , regardless of the
    defendant’s claim of right to the property. . . . We
    agree with the other circuits that have addressed this
    issue that Enmons merely carved out a labor excep-
    tion to the traditional law of extortion codified in the
    Hobbs Act.
    
    Id. at 268-69
    (citations omitted).
    [3] Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Cas-
    tor, 
    937 F.2d 293
    (7th Cir. 1991), held that the district court
    properly rejected the defendants’ proffered instruction
    because, “[w]hatever the contours of [the claim of right]
    defense may be, they do not reach extortions based on threats
    of physical violence outside the labor context. [Y]ou cannot
    beat someone up to collect a debt, even if you believe he owes
    it to you.” 
    Id. at 299
    (citation omitted).
    Additionally, those decisions establishing a claim of right
    defense in cases involving threat of economic harm are inap-
    posite. In United States v. Sturm, 
    870 F.2d 769
    (1st Cir.
    1989), the First Circuit held:
    Although it may be appropriate not to recognize a
    claim of right defense in extortion cases based on the
    wrongful use of force or violence, different consider-
    ations apply in the context of extortion based on eco-
    nomic fear. Whereas the use of actual or threatened
    force or violence to obtain property is inherently
    wrongful, there is nothing inherently wrongful about
    the use of economic fear to obtain property.
    
    Id. at 772-73
    (citations omitted). Because this case involves
    the use of physical violence, not the threat of economic harm,
    the rationale of Sturm does not apply.
    Scheidler is similarly inapposite. In Scheidler, the Supreme
    Court considered whether anti-abortion protesters, who
    1208                UNITED STATES v. DAANE
    obstructed access to abortion clinics, “committed extortion
    within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.” 
    Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 397
    , 399. In holding that the protesters did not commit extor-
    tion, the Court focused on the fact that the protesters obtained
    no property from those whose access to abortion clinics was
    restricted. 
    Id. at 397.
    In contrast, in this case, appellants
    attempted to take money from Murdock.
    The Supreme Court’s recent consideration of Scheidler in
    no way strengthens appellants’ argument. In Scheidler v.
    National Organization For Women, 
    126 S. Ct. 1264
    , 1270
    (2006), the Supreme Court held that “physical violence unre-
    lated to robbery or extortion falls outside the scope of the
    Hobbs Act.” 
    Id. “Congress did
    not intend to create a free-
    standing physical violence offense in the Hobbs Act. It did
    intend to forbid acts or threats of physical violence in further-
    ance of a plan or purpose to engage in what the statute refers
    to as robbery or extortion (and related attempts or conspira-
    cies).” 
    Id. at 1274.
    [4] The record in this case undeniably reveals that appel-
    lants used physical violence in their attempt to force Murdock
    to transfer funds to them. Scheidler therefore does not fore-
    close appellants’ conviction.
    [5] Although Arn, Tere Daane, Trent, Stich, and Miller
    invested only $375,062 with Murdock, they intended to force
    Murdock to transfer over $1,700,000. At a minimum, appel-
    lants failed to demonstrate that they had a legal right to funds
    in excess of those invested. Accordingly, any “claim of right”
    instruction was properly rejected by the district court.
    V.     Conclusion
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
    appellants’ proffered “claim of right” instruction, because
    such an instruction was not supported by the law or the facts.
    AFFIRMED.