United States v. Eustorgio Flores , 497 F. App'x 730 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              NOV 02 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 10-10398
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 1:08-cr-00124-OWW-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    EUSTORGIO FLORES,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Oliver W. Wanger, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted October 15, 2012
    San Francisco, California
    Before: B. FLETCHER,** HAWKINS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    Eustorgio Flores (“Flores”) appeals his jury trial conviction on four counts
    related to methamphetamine and cocaine distribution. Flores challenges two of these
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except
    as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Betty Binns Fletcher, Senior Circuit Judge for the Ninth
    Circuit Court of Appeals, fully participated in the case and concurred in the judgment
    prior to her death.
    convictions—attempted distribution of methamphetamine1 (“Count Four”) and
    distribution of methamphetamine near an elementary school2 (“Count Five”)—arguing
    insufficiency of the evidence. He also claims his trial counsel was ineffective for
    failing to preserve his insufficient evidence claim for appeal. Applying de novo
    review,3 we affirm the district court’s denial of Flores’s insufficient evidence claim.
    We also find Flores’s ineffectiveness claim to be meritless.
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational
    trier of fact could have found the essential elements of both counts beyond a
    reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979); see also United
    States v. Nevils, 
    598 F.3d 1158
    , 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
    As to Count Four, attempted distribution of 500 grams or more of a mixture or
    substance containing a methamphetamine or 50 grams or more of methamphetamine,
    the requisite quantity of drugs was proven beyond a reasonable doubt based on the
    1
    
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846.
    2
    
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C) and 860.
    3
    An adequately preserved sufficiency of the evidence claim is reviewed de
    novo. United States v. Sullivan, 
    522 F.3d 967
    , 974 (9th Cir. 2008). Both parties
    concede Flores’s claims should be reviewed de novo despite his trial counsel’s failure
    to renew his Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. See United States v.
    Esquivel-Ortega, 
    484 F.3d 1221
    , 1224–25 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing futility
    exception to the requirement of renewing Rule 29 motion at the close of all evidence
    for the preservation of sufficiency claims on appeal).
    2
    content of intercepted telephone conversations and testimony by Drug Enforcement
    Agency (“DEA”) agents as to the price and quantity of methamphetamine at issue in
    this transaction.4
    Likewise, Count Five, distribution of methamphetamine near an elementary
    school, is supported by sufficient evidence to permit a rational jury to conclude that
    Flores knowingly directed the sale of drugs—and not a pocket-sized scale—from his
    residence, located within 1,000 feet of an elementary school. This evidence includes
    intercepted telephone conversations, surveillance evidence, and testimony of DEA
    agents.5
    4
    The jury was permitted to infer that one pound of crystal methamphetamine,
    more than a sufficient amount of drugs required to sustain the conviction, was
    involved in this transaction based on the DEA-agent testimony as to the price of the
    drugs and meaning of the conversations. See United States v. Rosales, 
    516 F.3d 749
    ,
    755 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that jurors could reasonably infer the amount of drugs
    involved in a transaction based on expert testimony as to the price of drugs and coded
    references to quantity).
    5
    Flores argues on appeal that the likelihood that an alleged buyer picked up
    drugs from the Flores residence was no greater than the likelihood that the buyer
    picked up a pocket-sized scale. The content of the transcripts of recorded
    conversations presented at trial suggests that the item discussed was not a scale. The
    excerpts suggest that the item could be split in two and that the alleged buyer wanted
    to deliver “half” of this item to a man in “Hanford.” The testimony of the DEA
    agents, interpreting these conversations, further supports the inference that Flores
    directed the sale of drugs at his home. The jury was entitled to believe the testimony
    of the DEA agents. This court “cannot second-guess the jury’s credibility
    assessments; rather, under Jackson, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is
    (continued...)
    3
    Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally inappropriate on direct
    appeal. United States v. McKenna, 
    327 F.3d 830
    , 845 (9th Cir. 2003). The record
    here, however, is sufficiently developed with respect to the timing of trial counsel’s
    Rule 29 motion to render this claim appropriate for review. See 
    id.
     (noting that
    ineffective assistance of counsel claims are appropriate for review on direct appeal
    where they are “sufficiently developed to permit review and determination of the
    issue”).
    To prevail on such a claim a defendant must show: (1) counsel’s performance
    was deficient, such that “counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the
    defendant by the Sixth Amendment”; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the
    defense, such that counsel’s “errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a
    fair trial.” Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984). Flores’s claim is
    based on his trial counsel’s failure to timely renew his motion for judgment of
    acquittal or to file a motion for a new trial, which he argues subjected him to a more
    stringent standard of review on appeal. But Flores cannot show prejudice because the
    claim was reviewed de novo. Nor can Flores show prejudice from the district court
    being deprived of a subsequent opportunity to review the sufficiency of the evidence
    5
    (...continued)
    generally beyond the scope of review.” Nevils, 
    598 F.3d at 1170
     (internal quotations
    omitted).
    4
    as it made clear the motion would have been denied in any event because of the
    overwhelming nature of the evidence.
    AFFIRMED.
    5