Beltran v. Santa Clara County ( 2008 )


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  •                  FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LORI BELTRAN; ROBERT BELTRAN;         
    COBY BELTRAN, by and through his
    Guardian Ad Litem Lori Beltran,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    SANTA CLARA COUNTY; MELISSA                 No. 05-16976
    SUAREZ, individually and as an
    employee of the County of Santa              D.C. No.
    CV-03-03767-RMW
    Clara; JENNIFER HUBBS,
    OPINION
    individually and as an employee
    of the County of Santa Clara;
    EMILY TJHIN, individually and as
    an employee of the County of
    Santa Clara,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Ronald M. Whyte, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    December 12, 2007—Pasadena, California
    Filed January 24, 2008
    Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Stephen Reinhardt,
    Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Michael Daly Hawkins,
    Kim McLane Wardlaw, William A. Fletcher,
    Ronald M. Gould, Richard A. Paez, Marsha S. Berzon,
    Richard R. Clifton and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam Opinion
    1201
    BELTRAN v. SANTA CLARA                1203
    COUNSEL
    Robert R. Powell and Dennis R. Ingols, The Law Offices of
    Robert R. Powell, San Jose, California, for the plaintiffs-
    appellants.
    Melissa R. Kiniyalocts, Deputy County Counsel, and Ann
    Miller-Ravel, County Counsel, Santa Clara County, San Jose,
    California, for the defendants-appellees.
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    1. Melissa Suarez, a social worker for Santa Clara County’s
    child protective services, investigated whether Lori Beltran
    was abusing her son, Coby. After this investigation, Suarez’s
    supervisor Emily Tjhin filed a child dependency petition,
    which Tjhin signed under penalty of perjury. This petition
    included a three-page statement of facts describing the find-
    ings of Suarez’s investigation. Suarez also filed a separate
    custody petition, which she signed under penalty of perjury.
    The custody petition attached and incorporated by reference
    the three-page statement of facts from the dependency peti-
    tion.
    1204                BELTRAN v. SANTA CLARA
    The dependency petition was denied, Coby was returned to
    his parents, and the Beltrans sued Suarez and Tjhin under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , charging constitutional violations in removing
    Coby from the Beltrans’ custody and attempting to place him
    under the supervision of the state. Specifically, the Beltrans
    claimed that Suarez and Tjhin fabricated much of the infor-
    mation in the three-page statement of facts. Relying on Doe
    v. Lebbos, 
    348 F.3d 820
    , 825-26 (9th Cir. 2003), the district
    court held that Suarez and Tjhin had absolute immunity for
    their actions connected to signing and filing the dependency
    and custody petitions—including the alleged fabrication of
    evidence and false statements. It therefore dismissed plain-
    tiffs’ claims that were based on the allegedly false petition
    statements. The district court eventually granted summary
    judgment to the defendants on the remainder of plaintiffs’
    claims, but those issues are not before us, as plaintiffs appeal
    only the dismissal of claims based on absolute immunity.
    [1] 2. Parties to section 1983 suits are generally entitled
    only to immunities that existed at common law. Imbler v.
    Pachtman, 
    424 U.S. 409
    , 417-18 (1976). We have therefore
    “granted state actors absolute immunity only for those func-
    tions that were critical to the judicial process itself,” such as
    “ ‘initiating a prosecution.’ ” Miller v. Gammie, 
    335 F.3d 889
    ,
    896 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Imbler, 
    424 U.S. at 431
    ). It follows that social workers have absolute immunity
    when they make “discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial decisions
    to institute court dependency proceedings to take custody
    away from parents.” Id. at 898. But they are not entitled to
    absolute immunity from claims that they fabricated evidence
    during an investigation or made false statements in a depen-
    dency petition affidavit that they signed under penalty of per-
    jury, because such actions aren’t similar to discretionary
    decisions about whether to prosecute. A prosecutor doesn’t
    have absolute immunity if he fabricates evidence during a
    preliminary investigation, before he could properly claim to
    be acting as an advocate, see Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 
    509 U.S. 259
    , 275 (1993), or makes false statements in a sworn
    BELTRAN v. SANTA CLARA                  1205
    affidavit in support of an application for an arrest warrant, see
    Kalina v. Fletcher, 
    522 U.S. 118
    , 129-30 (1997). Further-
    more, as prosecutors and others investigating criminal matters
    have no absolute immunity for their investigatory conduct, a
    fortiori, social workers conducting investigations have no
    such immunity. See 
    id. at 126
    .
    [2] The district court’s error is perfectly understandable, as
    it relied on our incorrect ruling in Doe v. Lebbos, which we
    overrule today. We reverse the district court’s ruling that
    defendants are entitled to absolute immunity and remand for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.