Johnny Lawrence v. J. Castro ( 2019 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       JAN 24 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JOHNNY M. LAWRENCE,                              No.   18-15870
    Plaintiff-Appellant,             D.C. No. 3:18-cv-00091-RCJ-VPC
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    J. CASTRO; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted January 15, 2019**
    Before:      TROTT, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
    Johnny M. Lawrence appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
    dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging excessive force during an arrest.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a dismissal for
    failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Sprewell v. Golden State
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Warriors, 
    266 F.3d 979
    , 988 (9th Cir. 2001). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Lawrence’s excessive force claim
    because the video recording of the incident Lawrence attached to the complaint
    contradicts Lawrence’s allegations made in the complaint that defendants used an
    unreasonable amount of force during his arrest. See Espinosa v. City & Cty. of San
    Francisco, 
    598 F.3d 528
    , 537 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth factors for determining
    whether excessive force was used in arrest); Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988 (court need
    not accept as true allegations that contradict documents or exhibits attached to the
    complaint, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of
    fact, or unreasonable inferences).
    The district court properly dismissed Lawrence’s conspiracy, failure-to-
    protect, and failure-to-train claims because Lawrence failed to allege facts
    sufficient to show a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Flores v. County
    of Los Angeles, 
    758 F.3d 1154
    , 1159 (9th Cir. 2014) (to state a failure-to-train
    claim, plaintiff must show that the official “was deliberately indifferent to the need
    to train subordinates, and the lack of training actually caused the constitutional
    harm or deprivation of rights”); Cunningham v. Gates, 
    229 F.3d 1271
    , 1289 (9th
    Cir. 2000) (“[P]olice officers have a duty to intercede when their fellow officers
    violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen.” (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted)); Giannini v. Real, 
    911 F.2d 354
    , 359 (9th Cir. 1990)
    2                                     18-15870
    (deprivation of federal constitutional rights is a necessary element of the alleged
    conspiracy); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (to avoid
    dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
    state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation omitted)).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lawrence’s Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) motion because Lawrence failed to establish any
    basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 
    5 F.3d 1255
    , 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for
    reconsideration under Rule 60(b)).
    We reject as unsupported by the record Lawrence’s contention that the
    district court judge was biased.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                  18-15870