Christensen v. Owcp ( 2009 )


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  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BRUCE W. CHRISTENSEN,                 
    Petitioner,
    No. 07-70247
    v.
    OWCP No.
    DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS                BRB 03-0302
    COMPENSATION PROGRAMS;                    District of Oregon,
    STEVEDORING SERVICES OF AMERICA;                Portland
    HOMEPORT INSURANCE CO.,
    Respondents.
    
    AREL PRICE,                           
    Petitioner,
    No. 07-70297
    v.
    OWCP No.
    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR;                  BRB 01-0632
    STEVEDORING SERVICES OF AMERICA;          District of Oregon,
    HOMEPORT INSURANCE CO.; EAGLE                   Portland
    PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Respondents.
    
    DAVID VAN SKIKE,                      
    Petitioner,
    No. 07-73886
    v.
    BRB Nos.
    DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS
    COMPENSATION PROGRAMS; CENEX                   06-0904
    07-0118
    HARVEST STATES COOPERATIVE;               District of Oregon,
    LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE                     Portland
    CORP.,
    Respondents.
    
    10757
    10758             CHRISTENSEN v. DIRECTOR, OWCP
    REX DYER,                                         No. 07-73549
    Petitioner,
    OWCP No.
    v.
    CENEX HARVEST      STATES                             07-0164
    District of Oregon,
    COOPERATIVE; DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF                       Portland
    WORKERS COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,
    ORDER
    Respondents.
    
    Filed August 10, 2009
    Before: William A. Fletcher and Raymond C. Fisher,
    Circuit Judges, and John M. Roll, Chief District Judge.*
    ORDER
    The above-captioned cases are consolidated for the purpose
    of resolving the opposed motions for appellate attorney’s fees
    pending in each case.
    In these appeals, petitioners Bruce Christensen, Arel Price,
    David Van Skike and Rex Dyer challenged the attorney’s fees
    awarded to them under 
    33 U.S.C. § 928
    (a) after they were
    successful in obtaining benefits from their employers under
    the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
    (“LHWCA”), 
    33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
    . In a series of published
    opinions, we held, inter alia, that the methodology employed
    by the Benefits Review Board and other agency decision
    makers in determining the reasonable hourly rate for attor-
    ney’s fees under the LHWCA was flawed, we vacated the fee
    awards, and we remanded for further proceedings to deter-
    *The Honorable John M. Roll, United States District Judge for the Dis-
    trict of Arizona, sitting by designation.
    CHRISTENSEN v. DIRECTOR, OWCP              10759
    mine the reasonable hourly rate. See Dyer v. Cenex Harvest
    States Co-op., 
    563 F.3d 1044
     (9th Cir. 2009); Christensen v.
    Stevedoring Servs. of Amer., 
    557 F.3d 1049
     (9th Cir. 2009);
    Van Skike v. Dir., OWCP, 
    557 F.3d 1041
     (9th Cir. 2009).
    Charles Robinowitz represented petitioners throughout the
    administrative proceedings and prepared the briefs in each of
    these appeals. Joshua T. Gillelan II argued the cases before
    us. Petitioners now seek attorney’s fees under 
    33 U.S.C. § 928
    (a) for the time their attorneys spent on the appeals.
    Robinowitz and Gillelan submitted separate attorney’s fees
    applications for each appeal. For the reasons stated below, we
    grant the applications for appellate attorney’s fees and refer
    the determination of an appropriate amount of fees to the
    court’s special master, Appellate Commissioner Peter L.
    Shaw, see 9th Cir. R. 39-1.9.
    1. We reject respondents’ contention that Gillelan’s fee
    requests in Van Skike, Christensen and Price were untimely.
    All three cases had been consolidated for oral argument, but
    only Christensen and Price had been consolidated as a single
    appeal. Gillelan timely submitted a single fee request for Van
    Skike, Christensen and Price, which the clerk struck, because
    Gillelan needed to submit a separate fee request for Van
    Skike. We conclude that Gillelan’s subsequent filings correct-
    ing this technical error relate back to the date of the initial,
    stricken filing and are therefore timely.
    2. We reject respondents’ argument that Gillelan’s fee
    requests should be denied because he has not submitted evi-
    dence demonstrating petitioners authorized his representation.
    
    33 U.S.C. § 928
    (a) authorizes an award of “a reasonable attor-
    ney’s fee against the employer or carrier in an amount
    approved by the . . . court.” The implementing regulation,
    entitled “Fees for services,” provides that “[a]ny person seek-
    ing a fee for services performed on behalf of a claimant with
    respect to claims filed under the Act shall make application
    therefor to the district director, administrative law judge,
    10760          CHRISTENSEN v. DIRECTOR, OWCP
    Board, or court, as the case may be, before whom the services
    were performed.” 
    20 C.F.R. § 702.132
    (a) (emphases added).
    Gillelan provided services for petitioners and has applied to
    us for appellate fees, so he has complied with the plain terms
    of these provisions.
    
    20 C.F.R. § 702.131
    (a), which is entitled “Representation
    of parties in interest,” provides that “[c]laimants, employers
    and insurance carriers may be represented in any proceeding
    under the Act by an attorney or other person previously autho-
    rized in writing by such claimant, employer or carrier to so
    act.” Respondents did not object to Gillelan’s notice of
    appearance or suggest prior to oral argument that he had
    failed to comply with § 702.131(a). Even if an attorney’s enti-
    tlement to fees under § 702.132(a) is implicitly dependent on
    compliance with § 702.131(a), respondents have waived any
    objection they might have as to whether Gillelan was autho-
    rized to represent claimants under § 702.131(a). At this point,
    there is no doubt Gillelan did represent petitioners’ interests
    in these appeals, which is the only precondition that
    § 702.132(a) establishes for recovering attorney’s fees.
    Because respondents waived any objection under
    § 702.131(a), we express no opinion whether an attorney may
    recover attorney’s fees if the employer timely objects under
    § 702.131(a) and the attorney then fails to provide documen-
    tation that the claimant authorized the representation.
    3. We disagree with respondents’ contention that the fee
    requests in each appeal are premature because petitioners
    have not established their entitlement to an hourly rate higher
    than what the agency awarded below. Respondents reason
    that petitioners have not necessarily prevailed in these
    appeals, because they might receive the same hourly rate on
    remand. This argument overlooks that petitioners’ primary
    argument in Christensen/Price and Van Skike, and one of peti-
    tioner’s two main arguments in Dyer, was that the agency was
    artificially depressing the reasonable hourly rate for the
    LHWCA bar by relying exclusively on past LHWCA fee
    CHRISTENSEN v. DIRECTOR, OWCP              10761
    awards and refusing to look at market evidence when deter-
    mining a reasonable hourly rate. Petitioners unquestionably
    prevailed on this issue, because we invalidated the agency’s
    methodology. On remand, the agency decision makers will
    evaluate petitioners’ requested hourly rate based on market
    considerations rather than past LHWCA fee awards, which is
    the primary relief petitioners sought in these appeals. See
    Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health
    & Human Res., 
    532 U.S. 598
    , 603 (2001) (holding “a ‘pre-
    vailing party’ is one who has been awarded some relief by the
    court”). Because petitioners prevailed in these appeals,
    regardless of whether the agency increases the reasonable
    hourly rate on remand, their applications for appellate attor-
    ney’s fees are not premature.
    Richardson v. Continental Grain Co., 
    336 F.3d 1103
     (9th
    Cir. 2003), upon which respondents rely, is inapposite. The
    issue in that case was whether the LHWCA’s fee-shifting pro-
    vision, § 928(a), had been triggered, so our opinion focused
    only on whether petitioner had successfully prosecuted his
    claim for benefits under the LHWCA. See id. at 1105-06.
    Here, it is undisputed that petitioners successfully prosecuted
    their underlying claims for benefits, so their entitlement to
    employer-paid attorney’s fees under § 928(a) is already set-
    tled.
    4. The determination of an appropriate amount of attor-
    ney’s fees is referred to the court’s special master, Appellate
    Commissioner Peter L. Shaw, who shall conduct whatever
    proceedings he deems appropriate, and who shall have author-
    ity to enter an order awarding fees. See 9th Cir. R. 39-1.9. The
    order is subject to reconsideration by the panel. See id.
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