Amarjeet Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 551 F. App'x 365 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             JAN 02 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    AMARJEET SINGH,                                  No. 09-73511
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A097-102-374
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted November 8, 2013
    San Francisco, California
    Before: NOONAN and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and LYNN, District Judge.**
    Amarjeet Singh (“Singh”), a native and citizen of India, petitions for review
    of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming an immigration
    judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Barbara M. G. Lynn, District Judge for the U.S.
    District Court for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
    protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction
    under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
     and deny the petition.
    The BIA found that Singh testified credibly and that he established past
    persecution attributable to his affiliation with a Sikh political organization. The
    BIA nevertheless concluded that Singh was not eligible for asylum because the
    government had rebutted the presumption of a well-founded fear of future
    persecution by introducing evidence of changed country conditions in India. The
    factual findings underlying the agency’s denial of relief are reviewed under the
    substantial evidence standard. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 
    536 F.3d 1012
    , 1015
    (9th Cir. 2008).
    Singh contends that the BIA erred in finding that the presumption of future
    persecution against him was rebutted by changed country conditions. In order to
    find changed conditions, the BIA was required to identify specific improvements
    in India’s conditions occurring after Singh’s persecution and link those
    improvements to Singh and his ability to return. See Rios v. Ashcroft, 
    287 F.3d 895
    , 901 (9th Cir. 2002). The rebuttal evidence indicates that the Sikh militant
    movement is no longer active in the Punjab region and that any residual problems
    of custodial abuse involve high profile Sikh leaders. For low profile individuals,
    such as Singh, the evidence supports the finding that human rights abuses and
    -2-
    militant violence against Sikhs have abated significantly throughout India, and that
    the country’s government has acknowledged and condemned such actions.
    The BIA identified that Singh had suffered localized problems with the
    police more than 10 years ago, that he no longer practiced the visible elements of
    the Sikh religion, that Sikhs now live in considerable numbers outside of the
    Punjab, and that Singh had testified that any harassment of his family was linked to
    the motive of taking money from his family by the police. Based on this evidence,
    the BIA undertook the requisite individualized analysis and substantial evidence
    supports the finding that Singh would not be subject to persecution if he returned
    to India.
    Because Singh has failed to establish that he is eligible for asylum, it follows
    that he is unable to meet the more demanding evidentiary burden required for
    withholding of removal. See Halaim v. INS, 
    358 F.3d 1128
    , 1132 (9th Cir. 2004).
    Finally, to obtain CAT relief, a petitioner must prove that it is more likely
    than not that he would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.
    
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (c)(2). Singh has produced no evidence to compel a finding that
    he would be tortured regardless of where in India he might return or that he would
    be unable to live safely anywhere in India. Together with the evidence of changed
    conditions in India, the record does not compel the conclusion that it is more likely
    -3-
    than not that Singh would be tortured if he is removed to India. See Nuru v.
    Gonzales, 
    404 F.3d 1207
    , 1217-19 (9th Cir. 2005).
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
    -4-
    FILED
    Singh v. Holder, No. 09-73511                                                  JAN 02 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    WATFORD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:                                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    I don’t think the government successfully rebutted Mr. Singh’s presumption
    of a well-founded fear of future persecution by proving changed country
    conditions. The police continue to harass Mr. Singh’s family, which demonstrates
    that conditions haven’t “changed sufficiently so as to overcome that presumption.”
    Rios v. Ashcroft, 
    287 F.3d 895
    , 901 (9th Cir. 2002). The majority describes the
    continued harassment as “linked to the motive of taking money,” Maj. op. at 3, but
    the record suggests that’s only partly true. Mr. Singh credibly testified that the
    police are motivated “at least in part” by the officers’ belief that he’s associated
    with the militant group Babbar Khalsa. See Borja v. INS, 
    175 F.3d 732
    , 736 (9th
    Cir. 1999) (en banc). The majority also notes that “any residual problems of
    custodial abuse involve high profile Sikh leaders.” Maj. op. at 2. But Mr. Singh
    has been arrested before and clearly remains of interest to the police, so he’s still at
    risk even as a low-profile militant.