Joel Sanchez v. Jeffrey Beard ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 16 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JOEL ELIAS SANCHEZ, No. 15-56369
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.
5:13-cv-01448-MMM-VBK
v.
JEFFREY A. BEARD, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 13, 2018**
Pasadena, California
Before: GOULD and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and AMON,*** District Judge.
Joel Sanchez was convicted in California state court of second-degree murder
for the shooting and killing of Manuel Torres. In this habeas petition, Sanchez
challenges the exclusion of a toxicology report during his murder trial. The
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
toxicology report showed that Torres was under the influence of methamphetamine
and alcohol at the time of the shooting. Without offering any expert testimony to
explain the toxicology results, Sanchez sought to introduce the report to corroborate
his claim of self-defense that he shot a “crazed” and “maniacal” Torres out of fear for
his own life. Sanchez unsuccessfully appealed the trial court’s evidentiary ruling. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2254, and we affirm.
Our review of the state court’s decision denying Sanchez’s appeal is governed
by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). Sanchez argues that the toxicology report constituted “critical” evidence
that directly corroborated his self-defense theory. He claims that the exclusion of the
report violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense, and was
therefore contrary to, and an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.
However, unlike the excluded evidence in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284 (1973), which directly corroborated the defendant’s main defense that a third
party in fact had killed the victim, the toxicology report in this case by itself provided
little support to Sanchez’s theory that he shot Torres in self-defense. Sanchez wanted
the jury to infer and speculate, based solely on the toxicology results, that the amount
of drugs and alcohol in Torres’s body caused Torres to act in an aggressive manner,
justifying Sanchez to shoot Torres out of fear. Yet, Sanchez offered no expert
testimony and no evidence to suggest that it is common knowledge that the combined
effect of methamphetamine and alcohol causes an individual to act aggressively or
2
violently. This is not the type of “critical, corroborative” evidence the Supreme Court
has held leads to a constitutional violation when erroneously excluded. DePetris v.
Kuykendall, 239 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302
and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1967)).
Even assuming the toxicology report constituted relevant defense evidence,
Sanchez still fails to overcome AEDPA deference. The Supreme Court has never held
that evidence excluded on relevancy grounds violates a defendant’s constitutional
rights. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326–27 (2006) (“While the
Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve
no legitimate purpose . . . , we have stated that the Constitution permits judges to
exclude evidence that is repetitive, only marginally relevant or poses an undue risk of
harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues.”) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted; alterations incorporated). Thus, the state appellate court’s decision
to affirm the trial court’s evidentiary ruling “cannot be contrary to or an unreasonable
application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.” Moses v. Payne, 555
F.3d 742, 759 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124–26
(2008)).
AFFIRMED.
3