Nora Lavery-Petrash v. Catholic Healthcare West ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAY 16 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    NORA LAVERY-PETRASH,                            No.    15-16759
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01520-GEB-
    DAD
    v.
    CATHOLIC HEALTHCARE WEST, AKA                   MEMORANDUM*
    Sierra Nevada Memorial Hospital; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Garland E. Burrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted October 25, 2016**
    Before:      LEAVY, GRABER, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    Nora Lavery-Petrash appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
    judgment in her employment action alleging retaliation and discrimination in
    violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), Title VII, and
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). We have jurisdiction
    under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Cotton v. City of Alameda, 
    812 F.2d 1245
    , 1247 (9th Cir. 1987), and we affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lavery-Petrash’s
    age discrimination claims because Lavery-Petrash failed to raise a genuine dispute
    of material fact as to whether she was discriminated against on the basis of her age.
    See 
    id. at 1248
    (prima facie elements of age discrimination claim under ADEA);
    Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l., Inc., 
    8 P.3d 1089
    , 1113 (Cal. 2000) (prima facie elements of
    age discrimination claim under FEHA).
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lavery-Petrash’s
    sex discrimination claims because Lavery-Petrash failed to raise a genuine dispute
    of material fact as to whether defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for
    not allowing her to perform certain tasks were pretextual. See Villiarimo v. Aloha
    Island Air, Inc., 
    281 F.3d 1054
    , 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth Title VII sex
    discrimination claim and explaining that summary judgment is appropriate where
    defendant did not establish “a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
    employer or . . . that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of
    credence” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Metoyer v.
    Chassman, 
    504 F.3d 919
    , 941 (9th Cir. 2007) (Title VII framework applies to
    FEHA claims).
    2                                   15-16759
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lavery-Petrash’s
    retaliation claims because Lavery-Petrash failed to raise a genuine dispute of
    material fact as to whether defendant’s stated reasons for the adverse actions were
    pretextual. See Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 
    350 F.3d 1061
    , 1065-66, 1070 (9th
    Cir. 2004) (listing elements of a retaliation claim and explaining that circumstantial
    evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial, and that timing alone is
    insufficient to establish pretext); Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 
    116 P.3d 1123
    ,
    1130 (Cal. 2005) (same analysis applies to FEHA retaliation claims).
    Lavery-Petrash’s contentions that the district court did not acknowledge her
    expert witness and should have reopened discovery to allow her expert witness to
    be deposed are unpersuasive.
    Lavery-Petrash’s contentions that the district court delayed her case based
    on issues with her counsel and that this prejudiced Lavery-Petrash are
    unpersuasive.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                      15-16759