Raymond Pierson, III v. Sutter Health ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 24 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAYMOND HAMEL PIERSON III, pro se, No. 21-15220
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:20-cv-00124-TLN-KJN
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SUTTER HEALTH; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 17, 2022**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Raymond Hamel Pierson III appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment in his action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of the
temporary suspension of his hospital admitting privileges. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Pierson’s request for oral
argument, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Puri v. Khalsa, 844 F.3d 1152,
1157 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.
Because Pierson fails to raise a meaningful challenge to the district court’s
dismissal of his claims against Sutter Health, any such challenge is waived. See
Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e
will not consider any claims that were not actually argued in appellant’s opening
brief.”); Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1993) (issues not
supported by argument in pro se appellant’s opening brief are waived).
The district court properly dismissed Pierson’s claims against the unserved
defendants. See Silverton v. Dep’t of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir.
1981) (“A District Court may properly on its own motion dismiss an action as to
defendants who have not moved to dismiss where such defendants are in a position
similar to that of moving defendants or where claims against such defendants are
integrally related.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pierson leave to
amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of
review and stating that leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be
futile). Contrary to Pierson’s contention, Pierson is not entitled to amend as a
matter of course because more than 21 days have passed since Pierson was served
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with Sutter’s motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pierson’s motion for
post-judgment relief because Pierson failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.
2001) (setting forth standard of review and discussing factors for granting a motion
for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pierson’s request
for electronic filing privileges. See E.D. Cal. R. 133(b) (explaining electronic
filing rules and exceptions); Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir.
2007) (setting forth standard of review and stating that “[b]road deference is given
to a district court’s interpretation of its local rules”).
Contrary to Pierson’s contention, Pierson was properly served with the
motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C) (service by mail at a person’s
last known address is “complete upon mailing”); S. Cal. Darts Ass’n v. Zaffina,
762 F.3d 921, 928 (9th Cir. 2014) (service is not necessarily deficient “even if it is
assumed that, for some reason, the motion was not ultimately conveyed to” the
intended recipient).
We reject as meritless Pierson’s contention that service was invalid under
California’s Code of Civil Procedure and that the district court failed to construe
his pro se filings liberally.
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We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Pierson’s requests for sanctions and declaratory relief, set forth in the
opening and reply briefs, are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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