Kofi Obeng-Amponsah v. Randall Naiman , 677 F. App'x 425 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 22 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KOFI OBENG-AMPONSAH, No. 14-56593
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:14-cv-00635-GHK-
PJW
v.
RANDALL D. NAIMAN, an individual; et MEMORANDUM*
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. King, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 14, 2017**
Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
Kofi Obeng-Amponsah appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging foreclosure related claims. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, plaintiff’s
request for oral argument set forth in the opening brief is denied.
Feldman doctrine. Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010).
We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed plaintiff’s action as barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it is a “forbidden de facto appeal” of state court
decisions, and raises issues “inextricably intertwined” with those decisions. See
Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A federal district court dealing
with a suit that is, in part, a forbidden de facto appeal from a judicial decision of a
state court must refuse to hear the forbidden appeal. As part of that refusal, it must
also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’
with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.”); see also
Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman
doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim because alleged legal injuries arose from the “state
court’s purportedly erroneous judgment” and the relief he sought “would require
the district court to determine that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus
void”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to
amend his complaint because the jurisdictional defect could not be cured by
amendment. See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th
2 14-56593
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he court need not extend the general rule that parties are allowed to
amend their pleadings if amendment would be an exercise in futility” (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v.
Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff’s requests set forth in his opening brief and pending requests for
judicial notice are denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 14-56593