Shawn Francis v. Steven Hammond , 673 F. App'x 661 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    DEC 14 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SHAWN FRANCIS,                                   No.   15-35374
    Plaintiff-Appellant,               D.C. No. 3:12-cv-06023-RBL
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    STEVEN HAMMOND, M.D., Chief
    Medical Officer, Washington Department
    of Corrections, in his individual and
    official capacities; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted December 8, 2016
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: McKEOWN, TALLMAN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    Shawn Francis appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment
    to the defendants on his Eighth Amendment, state tort negligence, Americans
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Rehabilitation Act claims. We have jurisdiction
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . Reviewing de novo, and viewing the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the non-moving party, see Hamby v. Hammond, 
    821 F.3d 1085
    ,
    1090 (9th Cir. 2016), we affirm.
    1. The district court correctly granted summary judgment on Francis’s
    Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs
    against defendants Warner, Hammond, Kenney, and Smith. A prison official is
    deliberately indifferent “only if the official ‘knows of and disregards an excessive
    risk to inmate health and safety.’” Colwell v. Bannister, 
    763 F.3d 1060
    , 1066 (9th
    Cir. 2014) (quoting Toguchi v. Chung, 
    391 F.3d 1051
    , 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)).
    “Even if a prison official should have been aware of the risk, if he was not, then he
    has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Peralta v.
    Dillard, 
    744 F.3d 1076
    , 1086 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and
    alterations omitted). Francis offered no evidence that Secretary Warner
    participated in his medical decisions or knew about his shoulder injury before
    receiving a letter from plaintiff’s counsel in September 2012. Moreover, Warner is
    not a doctor, and even if Warner had reviewed Francis’s medical records, Francis
    did not show that Warner would have been able to determine whether Francis had a
    serious medical need or what the best course of treatment was. See 
    id.
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    Francis argues that Doctors Hammond, Kenney, and Smith were deliberately
    indifferent to his shoulder injury because they rejected his medical providers’
    recommendations for an orthopedic consultation and an MRI after conservative
    treatment failed. A difference of medical opinion is “insufficient, as a matter of
    law, to establish deliberate indifference.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 
    90 F.3d 330
    , 332
    (9th Cir. 1996). As such, Francis did not meet his burden of showing that the
    course of treatment the doctors chose “was medically unacceptable under the
    circumstances,” or that it was chosen “in conscious disregard of an excessive risk
    to plaintiff’s health.” 
    Id.
     (internal citations omitted).
    2. The district court also correctly dismissed Francis’s Eighth Amendment
    and negligence claims against defendants Wells and Hayes. Neither Wells nor
    Hayes ordered Francis to lift the box and its contents all at once, and Francis had
    time to consider other options before he attempted to lift the box. It was not
    foreseeable that Francis would lift the entire box, and Wells and Hayes did not
    intentionally interfere with Francis’s lifting restriction. Cf. Lopez v. Smith, 
    203 F.3d 1122
    , 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff “can establish deliberate indifference by
    showing that officials intentionally interfered with his medical treatment”).
    3. Finally, Francis contends that the Washington Department of Corrections
    violated the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by denying a
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    reasonable accommodation for storing his legal materials in his cell in a
    confidential manner. Francis bears the burden of demonstrating “‘the existence of
    a reasonable accommodation’ that would enable him to participate in the program,
    service, or activity at issue.” Pierce v. Cty. of Orange, 
    526 F.3d 1190
    , 1217 (9th
    Cir. 2008) (quoting Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 
    166 F.3d 1041
    , 1046 (9th
    Cir. 1999)). We must also consider whether the challenged policy is “reasonably
    related” to the prison’s legitimate penological interests. 
    Id.
    Francis did not show that allowing him to store his legal box on the floor
    would have been consistent with legitimate penological interests. Nor was he
    denied access to his legal materials. At best, he was denied access to the activity of
    storing his legal materials in confidential folders. But Francis never requested
    folders. Thus, he did not show that he was denied a reasonable accommodation.
    Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
    AFFIRMED.
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