Montazer v. S M Stoller, Inc. , 363 F. App'x 460 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             JAN 25 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    PARVIZ MONTAZER,                                No. 08-15070
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 07-CV-00563-JCM
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    SM STOLLER, INC.; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted January 11, 2010 **
    Before:     BEEZER, TROTT, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    Parviz Montazer appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
    with prejudice his action alleging federal employment discrimination and state law
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    GT/Research
    tort claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
    novo, BNSF Ry. Co. v. O’Dea, 
    572 F.3d 785
    , 787 (9th Cir. 2009), and we affirm in
    part, vacate in part, and remand.
    The district court did not err in dismissing the federal employment
    discrimination claims because Montazer failed to allege facts showing that any
    remaining defendant was his employer. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc.,
    P.C. v. Wells, 
    538 U.S. 440
    , 445 (2003) (explaining that for purposes of federal
    statutory law “conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-
    law agency doctrine” is the relevant test in determining whether plaintiff is an
    “employee” of defendant); 
    id. at 450
    (explaining that an “employer” is able to “hire
    and fire employees”).
    Dismissal of these claims should have been on the merits for failure to state
    a claim, rather than for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the pleadings do not
    indicate that the federal claims were necessarily “implausible.” See Cook v. Peter
    Kiewit Sons Co., 
    775 F.2d 1030
    , 1035 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Under the substantiality
    doctrine, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when the question
    presented is too insubstantial to consider. The claim must be so insubstantial,
    implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court or otherwise completely
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    devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy within the jurisdiction of the
    District Court[.]”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    A dismissal of the federal claims on the merits would have allowed the
    district court to exercise its discretion to adjudicate the state law claims. But
    having dismissed the federal claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the
    district court should not have adjudicated the state law claims. See Herman Family
    Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 
    254 F.3d 802
    , 806 (9th Cir. 2001) (“If the district
    court dismisses all federal claims on the merits, it has discretion under § 1367(c) to
    adjudicate the remaining claims; if the court dismisses for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction, it has no discretion and must dismiss all claims.”).
    After dismissal of federal claims on the merits, the preferable course of
    action is dismissal of the remaining claims without prejudice. Les Shockley
    Racing, Inc. v. Nat’l Hot Rod Ass’n, 
    884 F.2d 504
    , 509 (9th Cir. 1989) (“When . . .
    the court dismisses the federal claim[s] leaving only state claims for resolution, the
    court should decline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them without
    prejudice.”).
    We do not consider issues that Montazer did not develop in his opening
    brief. See Pierce v. Multnomah County, 
    76 F.3d 1032
    , 1037 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1996).
    Montazer’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
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    We grant the pending motions concerning Montazer’s reply briefs, filed on
    May 16, 2008 and May 30, 2008.
    The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
    In summary, we affirm dismissal with prejudice of the federal claims for
    failure to state a claim, vacate dismissal of the state law claims with prejudice, and
    remand for further proceedings on the state law claims.
    AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
    GT/Research                                4                                    08-15070