Zabasky v. American International Group, Inc. , 517 F. App'x 572 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               APR 24 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JOHN T. ZABASKY, an individual, )            No. 11-57111
    )
    Plaintiff – Appellant,    )            D.C. No. 2:11-cv-03806-GW-RZ
    )
    v.                        )            MEMORANDUM*
    )
    AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL          )
    GROUP, INC., a Delaware         )
    corporation; AMERICAN HOME      )
    ASSURANCE CO., a New York       )
    corporation; LOS ANGELES        )
    COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS )
    OFFICE, a Public Entity,        )
    )
    Defendants – Appellees.   )
    )
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 10, 2013**
    Pasadena, California
    Before:      FERNANDEZ, RAWLINSON, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral
    argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    John T. Zabasky appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims against
    American International Group, Inc. and American Home Assurance Co. (hereafter
    collectively AIG) for malicious prosecution, and his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     claims
    against the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office (DAO). We affirm.
    (1)      Zabasky contends that the district court erred when it granted AIG’s
    motion to dismiss pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP law. See 
    Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16
    . We disagree. Because in this diversity action we must apply
    California’s anti-SLAPP law,1 which covers Zabasky’s claim for malicious
    prosecution,2 he was required to “‘demonstrate[] a probability of prevailing on the
    claim.’”3 He did not. The evidence he presented4 did not suffice to set out a prima
    1
    Price v. Stossel, 
    620 F.3d 992
    , 999 (9th Cir. 2010).
    2
    Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 
    31 Cal. 4th 728
    , 734–35, 
    74 P.3d 737
    ,
    741, 
    3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636
    , 641 (2003); Johnson v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 
    204 Cal. App. 4th 1097
    , 1104–05, 
    139 Cal. Rptr. 3d 396
    , 402–03 (2012); Dickens v.
    Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 
    117 Cal. App. 4th 705
    , 714, 
    11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 877
    , 882–83 (2004).
    3
    Jarrow, 
    31 Cal. 4th at 733
    , 
    74 P.3d at 740
    , 
    3 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 639
    .
    4
    See HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co., 
    118 Cal. App. 4th 204
    , 212, 
    12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 786
    , 791–92 (2004).
    2
    facie case5 that AIG supplied false information to the authorities,6 or that it lacked
    probable cause when it made a report,7 or that it acted with malice.8 In short,
    AIG’s anti-SLAPP motion was properly granted.
    (2)      Zabasky next contends that the district court erred when it granted
    judgment on the pleadings9 to the DAO; we, again, disagree. In prosecuting
    Zabasky, the DAO was acting as a State of California office and was immune
    under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Weiner v.
    San Diego County, 
    210 F.3d 1025
    , 1031 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Beentjes v.
    Placer Cnty. Air Pollution Control Dist., 
    397 F.3d 775
    , 777 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus,
    5
    See Price, 
    620 F.3d at 1000
    .
    6
    See Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles,
    12 Cal. 3d 710
    , 720, 
    527 P.2d 865
    ,
    871, 
    117 Cal. Rptr. 241
    , 247 (1974). AIG gave information to the California
    Department of Insurance and to the DAO.
    7
    See Johnson, 204 Cal. App. 4th at 1105–06, 139 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 404
    (probable cause is satisfied if the actions of the defendant were objectively
    reasonable); Ecker v. Raging Waters Grp., Inc., 
    87 Cal. App. 4th 1320
    , 1330, 
    105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 320
    , 326 (2001) (same).
    8
    See Downey Venture v. LMI Ins. Co., 
    66 Cal. App. 4th 478
    , 494, 
    78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142
    , 150–51 (1998). We note, by the way, that AIG was under a state
    imposed duty to report suspected fraud. See 
    Cal. Ins. Code § 1877.3
    ; Fremont
    Comp. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 
    44 Cal. App. 4th 867
    , 874, 
    52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 211
    ,
    216 (1996).
    9
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
    3
    Zabasky’s action against the DAO was properly dismissed.10
    AFFIRMED.
    10
    Zabasky now claims that he should have been granted leave to amend to
    spell out a claim for injunctive relief against the DAO. Suffice it to say that he
    never requested that relief in the district court. We decline to consider the issue for
    the first time on appeal. See Alaska v. United States, 
    201 F.3d 1154
    , 1163–64 (9th
    Cir. 2000); Smith v. Marsh, 
    194 F.3d 1045
    , 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
    4