David Viens v. Stuart Sherman ( 2019 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 16 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DAVID VIENS,                                    No.    17-55286
    Petitioner-Appellant,           D.C. No. 2:15-cv-08593-FFM
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    STUART SHERMAN, Warden,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Frederick F. Mumm, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Submitted August 14, 2019**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: CALLAHAN, CHRISTEN, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
    California state prisoner David Viens appeals the district court’s denial of
    his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction for second
    degree murder after the petition was referred to and denied by a magistrate judge.
    Viens argues that he did not unambiguously consent to the magistrate judge’s
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    jurisdiction, and even if he did, a subsequent Election Regarding Consent to
    Proceed Before a United States Magistrate Judge (“Election Regarding Consent”)
    form attached to another filing served to rescind his consent. We have jurisdiction
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    . We affirm the denial of Viens’s petition.
    1. We review de novo whether a magistrate judge had jurisdiction. Parsons
    v. Ryan, 
    912 F.3d 486
    , 495 (9th Cir. 2018). Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c)(1), a
    magistrate judge can conduct all proceedings and enter an order of judgment in a
    civil matter if all of the parties consent to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction.
    Wilhelm v. Rotman, 
    680 F.3d 1113
    , 1118 (9th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff may consent
    to the jurisdiction by selecting the “consent box” on the court-provided Election
    Regarding Consent form. 
    Id. at 1119
    . Here, Viens placed a bold “XX” in the
    “Yes” box, and a faint, barely visible single “X” in the “No” box. The selection in
    the “Yes” box is clear and distinct, while the selection in the “No” box suggests an
    attempt at some sort of erasure. We are satisfied that Viens voluntarily consented
    to the exercise of the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction. 
    Id.
    Once parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction, the reference to
    the magistrate judge can only be withdrawn “for good cause shown on its own
    motion, or under extraordinary circumstances shown by any party.” § 636(c)(4);
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b)(3). Viens did not file a motion to withdraw consent or
    present any extraordinary circumstances that would warrant such a withdrawal.
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    The fact that Viens later attached a second Election Regarding Consent form, with
    the “No” box checked, to an unrelated filing does not change the analysis. “There
    is no absolute right, in a civil case, to withdraw consent to trial and other
    proceedings before a magistrate judge.” Dixon v. Ylst, 
    990 F.2d 478
    , 480 (9th Cir.
    1993).
    2. In addition to the certified claim, Viens raises an uncertified claim. When
    a habeas petitioner seeks to initiate an appeal, he must obtain a certificate of
    appealability (“COA”) under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c). See Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 478, 480–81 (2000). A petitioner must make “a substantial showing of
    the denial of a constitutional right” in order to obtain a COA. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c)(2). To do so, “the petitioner ‘must demonstrate that the issues are
    debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a
    different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to
    proceed further.’” Lambright v. Stewart, 
    220 F.3d 1022
    , 1025 (9th Cir. 2000)
    (alteration in original) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 
    463 U.S. 880
    , 893 n.4 (1983)).
    Because Viens has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
    right,” we grant a COA.
    Viens argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
    adequately present evidence of Viens’s physical and mental condition at the time
    he gave statements to the police one week after surviving a suicide attempt of
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    jumping off a 60-foot cliff. At a March 1 interview at the hospital, Viens admitted
    to the police that he duct-taped his wife’s hands, feet, and mouth, found her dead
    the next morning, and put her body in a garbage bag and into the dumpster behind
    his restaurant. The statements were repeated in even more depth at the March 15
    interview. The district court denied a motion to suppress these statements and
    denied habeas relief for this ineffective assistance claim. The magistrate judge
    found that there is no reason to believe that any additional evidence would have
    altered the outcome. We agree. Viens confessed virtually the same facts to his
    daughter and confessed to his girlfriend that he killed his wife. Even if counsel’s
    performance was deficient, Viens does not show that excluding the March
    interview statements would have “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
    in the outcome.” Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 694 (1984). We deny
    habeas relief on this claim.
    AFFIRMED.
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