Lausd v. D.N. ( 2019 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    APR 23 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    D. N., by and through Christine Truong,          No. 18-55913
    parent; CHRISTINE TRUONG,
    D.C. No. 2:18-cv-01582-AB-AFM
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL
    DISTRICT; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    v.
    DIANE B. WEISSBURG,
    Counter-Defendant-
    Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Andre Birotte, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted April 8, 2019
    Pasadena, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Before: PAEZ and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN,** Judge.
    Christine Truong and her counsel Diane Weissburg (collectively,
    “Appellants”) appeal the district court’s denial of their motion to strike Appellee
    Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”)’s counterclaim alleging
    Appellants recorded its confidential communications in violation of California law.
    See 
    Cal. Penal Code § 632
    . We affirm.
    Appellants moved to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, which
    permits a court to strike claims arising out of activity in furtherance of a
    defendant’s right of petition or free speech. See 
    Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16
    . To
    succeed, Appellants must show the activity underlying LAUSD’s cause of action
    fell within one of the four categories of activity protected under the statute. See 
    id.
    § 425.16(e); Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 
    52 P.3d 685
    , 693 (Cal.
    2002). The first three categories protect “written or oral statement[s].” Civ. Proc.
    § 425.16(e)(1)-(3). The fourth category covers “other conduct” in furtherance of
    the right of petition or free speech but contains a “limitation” that the conduct be
    “in connection with a public issue” or an “issue of public interest.” Briggs v. Eden
    Council for Hope & Opportunity, 
    969 P.2d 564
    , 571 (Cal. 1999); see also Old
    **
    The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States Court
    of International Trade, sitting by designation.
    2
    Republic Constr. Program Grp. v. Boccardo Law Firm, Inc., 
    179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 129
    , 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (“[O]nly one of the four categories of protected
    activity covers [noncommunicative] conduct . . . .” (alteration original) (citation
    omitted)).
    Here, the act underlying LAUSD’s counterclaim was the noncommunicative
    act of recording, not any subsequent publication or use of that recording. See
    Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc., 
    1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 536
    , 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
    (“A section 632 violation is committed the moment a confidential communication
    is secretly recorded regardless of whether it is subsequently disclosed.”). As
    recording a conversation does not involve making an oral or written statement,
    Appellants must therefore show their recording fell within this fourth category of
    conduct in connection with a public issue.
    Assuming the recording furthered Truong’s right of petition, it did not relate
    to a matter of public interest. The California Supreme Court has identified three
    nonexclusive categories of conduct that satisfy this requirement: 1) conduct
    concerning “a person or entity in the public eye”; 2) “conduct that could directly
    affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants”; and 3) conduct
    involving “a topic of widespread, public interest.” Rand Res., LLC v. City of
    Carson, 
    433 P.3d 899
    , 907 (Cal. 2019) (quoting Rivero v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty.,
    3
    & Mun. Emps., 
    130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81
    , 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)). The recording did
    not fit within any of these three categories as it contained typical lunch talk among
    coworkers with scattered statements that Appellants contend are relevant to
    establishing LAUSD employees inappropriately predetermined Truong’s son
    (D.N.) had autism. The recorded individuals are not in the public eye, nor does the
    fact that these individuals worked for a publicly funded institution transform the
    recorded conversation into a matter of public interest. See Rivero, 
    130 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 90
    . Nothing said in the recording affects a large number of people. D.N.’s
    educational plan is not the subject of widespread, public interest. Unlike other
    cases involving surreptitious recordings intended to gather news or expose
    wrongdoing to the public, Appellants have not provided any evidence that the
    recording would affect, or be of interest to, anyone outside of the current litigation.
    See, e.g., Safari Club Int’l v. Rudolph, 
    862 F.3d 1113
    , 1122 (9th Cir. 2017);
    Lieberman, 
    1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 541
    . Because Appellants have failed to make a
    threshold showing that the recording relates to a public issue, we need not decide
    whether LAUSD demonstrated a reasonable probability of prevailing on its
    counterclaim. See Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. v. Pearl St., LLC, 
    135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 903
    , 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
    AFFIRMED.
    4