Ray Shorter v. Andrew Saul ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 21 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAY ANTHONY SHORTER, No. 17-35731
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:16-cv-00015-BMM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 20, 2019**
Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
Ray Shorter appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Shorter’s application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We review de novo,
Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 2017), and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reasonably concluded that obesity was
not a severe impairment because no medical evidence showed any functional
limitations associated with obesity. See Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686-87
(9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that an impairment should be found not severe when
substantial evidence shows that the impairment had no more than a minimal effect
on a claimant’s ability to work). Shorter’s contention that the ALJ found major
depressive disorder to be non-severe is not supported by the record.
Because Ms. Lockwood was a Nurse Practitioner and did not work closely
under the supervision of an acceptable medical source, the ALJ was only required
to provide germane reasons to reject her opinions. See Britton v. Colvin, 787 F.3d
1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that nurse practitioners are “other
sources”); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that a
nurse practitioner may be considered an acceptable medical source where she
worked under a physician’s close supervision). The ALJ properly rejected Ms.
Lockwood’s opinions based on inconsistency with objective medical evidence,
including Ms. Lockwood’s own progress notes showing largely unremarkable
mental status examinations and findings of improvement with medication. See
Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112 (including inconsistency with the treatment record as a
germane reason to reject a medical opinion).
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Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. LaRocque’s
June 2015 opinion was inconsistent with the objective medical evidence because it
merely affirmed Ms. Lockwood’s opinion.
The ALJ reasonably gave significant weight to Dr. Golas’s opinion and
translated the medical evidence into specific functional limitations in the residual
functional capacity (RFC). See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174
(9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the ALJ does not reject a medical opinion when the
ALJ reasonably incorporates the opinion into the RFC).
Because Dr. Malayil’s opinion was contradicted by Dr. Kuka and Dr.
Enright’s opinions, the ALJ was required to provide specific and legitimate reasons
to reject it. See Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2006)
(concluding that the ALJ was required to provide specific and legitimate reasons to
reject a medical opinion that was contradicted by the opinion of a non-examining
state agency physician). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that
Dr. Malayil’s opinion was inconsistent with the minimal findings on mental status
examinations. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008)
(explaining that inconsistency with treatment records is a specific and legitimate
reason to reject a medical opinion).
The ALJ properly rejected Mr. Armstrong’s opinion because it was
inadequately supported by clinical findings. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d
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1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the ALJ is not required to accept
medical opinions that are inadequately supported by clinical findings).
Shorter fails to make any argument as to the ALJ’s duty to develop the
record. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 n.2 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“[W]e ordinarily will not consider matters on appeal that are not
specifically and distinctly argued in an appellant’s opening brief” (internal
quotation and citation omitted)).
The ALJ reasonably rejected the GAF scores in the record because they
included multiple non-disability related factors. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d
995, 1002 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that GAF scores include social,
occupational, and school functioning). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
assessment of the remaining medical evidence, including the weights assigned to
the medical opinions. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 (“[T]he ALJ is the final
arbiter with respect to resolving ambiguities in the medical evidence.”).
The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for discounting Shorter’s
testimony, citing inconsistences between Shorter’s reported daily activities and his
alleged symptoms, as well as a lack of supporting medical evidence. See Molina v.
Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012).
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The ALJ properly relied on vocational expert testimony in response to a
hypothetical that included all the limitations that the ALJ assessed in the RFC. See
Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217.
AFFIRMED.
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