Kohn Law Group v. Auto Parts Manufacturing Ms , 787 F.3d 1237 ( 2015 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    KOHN LAW GROUP, INC., a                          No. 13-55023
    California corporation,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,             D.C. No.
    2:12-cv-08063-
    v.                           MWF-MRW
    AUTO PARTS MANUFACTURING
    MISSISSIPPI, INC., a Mississippi                   OPINION
    corporation,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    February 6, 2015—Pasadena, California
    Filed June 4, 2015
    Before: Michael J. Melloy,* Jay S. Bybee,
    and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Melloy
    *
    The Honorable Michael J. Melloy, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.
    Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    2      KOHN LAW GROUP V. AUTO PARTS MFG. MISS.
    SUMMARY**
    First-To-File Rule
    The panel affirmed the district court’s order staying
    proceedings under the first-to-file rule in an action brought by
    Kohn Law Group, Inc., under § 9607(a)(3) of the California
    Commercial Code alleging it was entitled to payments Auto
    Parts Manufacturing Mississippi, Inc., owed to a third party.
    The first-to-file rule allows a district court to stay
    proceedings if a similar case with substantially similar issues
    and parties was previously filed in another district court.
    The panel held that a Mississippi interpleader action was
    a previously filed lawsuit involving substantially similar
    parties and issues where the Mississippi action was filed first,
    the present case involved substantially similar issues as the
    Mississippi action, and the present case involved the issue to
    be determined in the Mississippi action. The panel concluded
    that the district court did not abuse its discretion by staying
    the present action under the first-to-file rule.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    KOHN LAW GROUP V. AUTO PARTS MFG. MISS.                3
    COUNSEL
    Robert Kohn (argued), Kohn Law Group, Santa Monica,
    California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Michael Matthias (argued) and Gabriel Drucker, Baker &
    Hostetler, Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee.
    OPINION
    MELLOY, Circuit Judge:
    Kohn Law Group, Inc. (Kohn Law) sued Auto Parts
    Manufacturing Mississippi, Inc. (APMM) under § 9607(a)(3)
    of the California Commercial Code, alleging Kohn Law was
    entitled to payments APMM owed to a third party. The
    Central District of California stayed the proceedings, finding
    the question presented was already being litigated by the
    same or related parties in Mississippi. For the reasons stated
    below, we affirm.
    I
    APMM hired Noatex Corporation (Noatex) as a general
    contractor to construct an auto parts manufacturing facility in
    Guntown, Mississippi. Noatex hired King Construction of
    Houston, L.L.C. (King Construction) as a subcontractor.
    After construction began, Noatex alleged APMM owed
    Noatex for goods and services provided under their contract.
    Noatex also questioned the validity and the amount of
    invoices King Construction submitted for its construction
    work under the subcontract.
    4      KOHN LAW GROUP V. AUTO PARTS MFG. MISS.
    King Construction filed a “Stop Notice” pursuant to
    Mississippi Code § 85–7–181 (repealed 2014) (Stop Notice
    Statute). The Stop Notice Statute allows a subcontractor to
    bind funds a project owner owes to a general contractor.
    King Construction sought to bind funds APMM owed to
    Noatex. The Stop Notice also informed APMM that Noatex
    allegedly owed King Construction $260,410.15 (the disputed
    funds). Noatex then filed a declaratory action against King
    Construction in the Northern District of Mississippi,
    challenging the constitutionality of the Stop Notice Statute.
    Without deciding the parties’ rights to the disputed funds, the
    Northern District of Mississippi found the Stop Notice Statute
    unconstitutional. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.1
    Kohn Law represented Noatex in the Stop Notice
    litigation. To pay for legal fees, Noatex granted Kohn Law
    a contractual lien on its receivables. Kohn Law asserts the
    lien covers funds APMM allegedly owes Noatex.
    Because it was worried about multiple, inconsistent
    judgments relating to the disputed funds, APMM filed an
    interpleader action in Mississippi state court on November
    15, 2011. APMM listed Noatex and King Construction as
    parties. Noatex removed the lawsuit to the Northern District
    of Mississippi on December 5, 2011. On April 12, 2012, the
    Northern District of Mississippi remanded the case back to
    the Mississippi state court. Once APMM became aware of
    Kohn Law’s lien, APMM filed a motion to amend the
    interpleader complaint to add Kohn Law as a party. On
    December 5, 2012, the Northern District of Mississippi
    placed the case back on its docket, holding that it had erred
    1
    Noatex Corp. v. King Constr. of Hous., L.L.C., 
    732 F.3d 479
    , 487 (5th
    Cir. 2013).
    KOHN LAW GROUP V. AUTO PARTS MFG. MISS.                          5
    by remanding the case because APMM could have filed the
    case in federal court.
    Meanwhile, on September 18, 2012, Kohn Law filed the
    present action against APMM in the Central District of
    California pursuant to California Commercial Code
    § 9607(a)(3).2 Section 9607(a)(3) permits a secured party
    (Kohn Law) to enforce obligations of a debtor (APMM) on
    behalf of the holder of the debt (Noatex). APMM moved to
    dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative, stay the
    proceedings.
    On December 11, 2012, the Central District of California
    stayed the lawsuit, holding that the Colorado River3 doctrine
    and the first-to-file rule warranted a stay. The district court
    stated Kohn Law was asking the Central District of California
    “to short-circuit the ongoing Mississippi interpleader action
    as to this $260,410.15 and award the funds to Kohn.” It
    further noted that to “proceed with this action only would
    multiply lawsuits, increase costs and prolong a final
    determination.” Kohn Law appeals.
    II
    The first-to-file rule allows a district court to stay
    proceedings if a similar case with substantially similar issues
    2
    Section 9607(a)(3) states “a secured party may . . . [e]nforce the
    obligations of an account debtor or other person obligated on collateral
    and exercise the rights of the debtor with respect to the obligation of the
    account debtor or other person obligated on collateral to make payment or
    otherwise render performance to the debtor.”
    3
    Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 
    424 U.S. 800
    (1976).
    6       KOHN LAW GROUP V. AUTO PARTS MFG. MISS.
    and parties was previously filed in another district court. We
    review a decision to stay proceedings under the first-to-file
    rule for an abuse of discretion. Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v.
    Medtronic, Inc., 
    678 F.2d 93
    , 95 (9th Cir. 1982).
    The first-to-file rule is intended to “serve[] the purpose of
    promoting efficiency well and should not be disregarded
    lightly.” Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prods., Inc., 
    946 F.2d 622
    ,
    625 (9th Cir. 1991) (alteration in original) (quoting Church of
    Scientology v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 
    611 F.2d 738
    , 750 (9th
    Cir. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). When
    applying the first-to-file rule, courts should be driven to
    maximize “economy, consistency, and comity.” Cadle Co. v.
    Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 
    174 F.3d 599
    , 604 (5th Cir.
    1999). The first-to-file rule may be applied “when a
    complaint involving the same parties and issues has already
    been filed in another district.” Alltrade, 
    946 F.2d at 625
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a court
    analyzes three factors: chronology of the lawsuits, similarity
    of the parties, and similarity of the issues.4 See 
    id.
    Ordinarily, we start by analyzing which lawsuit was filed
    first. But we need not analyze this issue here because Kohn
    Law does not argue that the present case was filed first. And,
    as asserted by APMM, both the Mississippi state court
    4
    Kohn Law argues that we should apply a different legal framework
    “[w]hen reviewing an order staying or dismissing a second action.” Kohn
    Law asks us to apply the same four factors that govern claim preclusion.
    Kohn Law relies on Adams v. California Department of Health Services,
    
    487 F.3d 684
     (9th Cir. 2007), abrogated in part by Taylor v. Sturgell,
    
    553 U.S. 880
    , 904 (2008), to support its argument. In Adams, the Ninth
    Circuit addressed a situation where a plaintiff filed a second, duplicative
    action after a dismissal of her first action in the same court. 
    Id.
     at 687–88.
    Adams did not consider or discuss the first-to-file rule.
    KOHN LAW GROUP V. AUTO PARTS MFG. MISS.                  7
    complaint (November 15, 2011) and the removal to Northern
    District of Mississippi (December 5, 2011) were filed before
    the present case was filed in the Central District of California
    (September 18, 2012). Because the parties do not dispute that
    the Mississippi interpleader action was filed first, we assume
    this requirement is met.
    Regarding similarity of the parties, courts have held that
    the first-to-file rule does not require exact identity of the
    parties. See Save Power Ltd. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 
    121 F.3d 947
    , 951 (5th Cir. 1997); Herer v. Ah Ha Publ’g, LLC, 
    927 F. Supp. 2d 1080
    , 1089 (D. Or. 2013); Intersearch Worldwide,
    Ltd. v. Intersearch Grp., Inc., 
    544 F. Supp. 2d 949
    , 959 n.6
    (N.D. Cal. 2008). Rather, the first-to-file rule requires only
    substantial similarity of parties. See Harris Cnty., Tex. v.
    CarMax Auto Superstores Inc., 
    177 F.3d 306
    , 319 (5th Cir.
    1999); Adoma v. Univ. of Phx., Inc., 
    711 F. Supp. 2d 1142
    ,
    1147 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Inherent.com v. Martindale-
    Hubbell, 
    420 F. Supp. 2d 1093
    , 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2006)); see
    generally Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 
    678 F.2d 93
    , 95 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that the first-to-file rule should
    not be applied “mechanically”).
    Kohn Law argues that the parties are not substantially
    similar here because a defendant in the Mississippi
    interpleader action—King Construction—is not named in the
    present action. We disagree. In Alltrade, Inc., 
    946 F.2d at
    624 & n.3, 629, we affirmed a district court’s decision not to
    hear a second-filed case under the first-to-file rule even
    though the first-filed case contained a defendant not named
    in the second case. A contrary holding could allow a party
    such as Kohn Law to skirt the first-to-file rule merely by
    omitting one party from a second lawsuit. We conclude that
    the omission of King Construction from the present action
    8     KOHN LAW GROUP V. AUTO PARTS MFG. MISS.
    does not defeat application of the first-to-file rule. Our
    conclusion avoids awarding such gamesmanship and is
    consistent with the policy of the first-to-file rule, which is to
    maximize judicial economy, consistency, and comity. See
    Cadle Co., 
    174 F.3d at 604
    .
    The issues in both cases also need not be identical, only
    substantially similar. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co. v. Sweet Little Mex.
    Corp., 
    665 F.3d 671
    , 677–78 (5th Cir. 2011); Adoma, 
    711 F. Supp. 2d at 1148
    ; Inherent.com, 
    420 F. Supp. 2d at 1097
    . To
    determine whether two suits involve substantially similar
    issues, we look at whether there is “substantial overlap”
    between the two suits. See Harris Cnty., 
    177 F.3d at 319
    .
    Noatex and APMM are already in litigation in Mississippi
    over the same funds Kohn Law seeks in this case. Because
    Kohn Law stands in the shoes of Noatex, APMM’s defenses
    in the present case against Kohn Law would, at the least,
    substantially overlap with the issues in the Mississippi
    interpleader action. The question Kohn Law asks the Central
    District of California to resolve is at the “heart” of the
    Mississippi interpleader action—whether Noatex is entitled
    to the $260,410.15. If Noatex does not recover funds in the
    Mississippi interpleader action, Kohn Law will likely have no
    claim to those funds. And, if Noatex does recover funds in
    the Mississippi interpleader action, Kohn Law will likely
    recover funds. Not only does the present case involve
    substantially similar issues as the Mississippi interpleader
    action, the present case involves the issue to be determined in
    the Mississippi interpleader action.
    Because the Mississippi interpleader action is a
    previously filed lawsuit involving substantially similar parties
    KOHN LAW GROUP V. AUTO PARTS MFG. MISS.                       9
    and issues, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
    entering the stay.
    Finally, we note that the parties have filed motions: to
    supplement the record; to file supplemental briefs; and for the
    Court to take judicial notice of developments in the
    proceedings in the Mississippi state court, the Northern
    District of Mississippi, and the Fifth Circuit. These motions
    are denied. “It is rarely appropriate for an appellate court to
    take judicial notice of facts that were not before the district
    court.” Flick v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
    205 F.3d 386
    , 392
    n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). Neither party has demonstrated
    “extraordinary” circumstances required to supplement the
    record on appeal. See Lowry v. Barnhart, 
    329 F.3d 1019
    ,
    1024 (9th Cir. 2003).5
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    Because we conclude that the district court could properly stay the
    action under the first-to-file rule, we need not address whether the
    Colorado River doctrine also justified a stay in this case.