Allen v. Calderon ( 2005 )


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  •                     FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ERNEST LEE ALLEN,                               No. 02-16917
    Petitioner-Appellant,                 D.C. No.
    v.                               CV-01-05994-
    ART CALDERON,                                     OWW/DLB
    Respondent-Appellee.
             OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Oliver W. Wanger, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    December 9, 2004—San Francisco, California
    Filed May 3, 2005
    Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Robert E. Cowen,* and
    Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Cowen
    *The Honorable Robert E. Cowen, Senior United States Circuit Judge
    for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
    4807
    4810                      ALLEN v. CALDERON
    COUNSEL
    David M. Porter, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Sacra-
    mento, California, for the appellant.
    Justain P. Riley, Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento, Cali-
    fornia, for the appellee.
    OPINION
    COWEN, Circuit Judge:
    Ernest Lee Allen appeals the district court’s order dismiss-
    ing his petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28
    U.S.C. § 2254 for failure to prosecute. Specifically, Allen
    asserts that the district court erred in not considering the evi-
    dence of his incompetence before dismissing the petition.1 We
    have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1291 and 2253 and
    will reverse and remand for further proceedings.
    The circumstances of Allen’s conviction have no bearing
    on this appeal. Proceeding pro se, Allen filed a federal habeas
    corpus petition claiming that his sentence constituted cruel
    and unusual punishment. The petition was unsigned. The dis-
    trict court issued an order requiring Allen to submit an
    amendment within thirty days, which included his signature.
    Two weeks later, Allen filed an amended petition which con-
    tained a photocopy, rather than an original, of his signature,
    and added two additional claims for ineffective assistance of
    counsel.
    The district court sua sponte issued an order to show cause
    why the petition should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust
    the new claims. The order also reiterated the court’s demand
    1
    Allen’s second and third certified issues for appeal are foreclosed by
    Pliler v. Ford, 
    524 U.S. 225
    , 
    124 S. Ct. 2441
    , 2445-46 (2004).
    ALLEN v. CALDERON                     4811
    that Allen submit an amendment bearing an original signa-
    ture. The order warned that “failure to comply . . . may result
    in a recommendation that the action be dismissed . . . .” (E.R.,
    Tab 2 at 4).
    Approximately one month later, Allen filed a motion for an
    extension of time to answer the order to show cause on the
    grounds that he does not have adequate access to the courts,
    is mentally impaired, and does not know how to respond to
    the order. The motion included his own sworn declaration and
    a sworn declaration of another inmate, Charles Johnson. Each
    declaration explains that Allen is mentally ill and does not
    understand the district court’s orders. Allen also attached a
    letter from the prison psychiatrist whose care he is under
    while placed in the Enhanced Outpatient Program at the
    prison. This letter states that Allen is diagnosed with Chronic
    Undifferentiated Schizophrenia and is taking two psy-
    chotropic medications.
    The district court extended the time for Allen to respond to
    the order to show cause. However, Allen did not timely
    respond and a Report and Recommendation was issued sug-
    gesting that the action be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
    Approximately two weeks later, Allen filed a motion for
    appointment of counsel explaining that he suffers from a “de-
    bilitating mental illness that requires a course of treatment
    that includes the use of various psychotropic medications. His
    mental condition and the side-effects associated with the pre-
    scribed medications, severely [hinder] his ability to compre-
    hend or correctly respond to the determinations and Orders
    made by the Court.” (E.R., Tab 5 at 3). The district court
    denied this motion.
    Allen filed objections to the Report and Recommendation,
    asserting that the court erred by failing to consider his extenu-
    ating circumstances, specifically his mental illness and limited
    access to the law library. Despite these objections, the district
    court dismissed the petition. This appeal followed.
    4812                      ALLEN v. CALDERON
    We review de novo a district court’s order denying a peti-
    tion for writ of habeas corpus. See Laws v. LaMarque, 
    351 F.3d 919
    , 922 (9th Cir. 2003). Findings of fact made by the
    district court relevant to the dismissal of the habeas petition
    are reviewed for clear error. See Bonin v. Calderon, 
    59 F.3d 815
    , 823 (9th Cir. 1995). However, we review for abuse of
    discretion a district court’s order dismissing an action for lack
    of prosecution or failure to comply with a court order. See
    Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 
    138 F.3d 393
    , 398 (9th Cir.
    1998); see also Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 
    191 F.3d 983
    (9th
    Cir. 1999).
    [1] Allen asserts that the district court erred in dismissing
    his petition for failure to prosecute without evaluating his
    assertions of incompetence.2 As evidence of his incompe-
    tence, Allen submitted his own sworn declaration and that of
    another inmate. Each declaration explains that Allen is men-
    tally ill and does not understand the court’s instructions. As
    further support, Allen included a letter from the prison psychi-
    atrist, dated April 8, 2002, which stated that Allen is under his
    care, diagnosed with Chronic Undifferentiated Schizophrenia,
    and is taking two psychotropic medications. Neither the
    Report and Recommendation nor the subsequent district court
    order adopting it mention the evidence of incompetence.
    [2] Additionally, there is no reason other than his mental
    illness why Allen could not have sent an original signature
    and pleaded that he did exhaust his state court remedies, espe-
    cially given the fact that he had exhausted all of his claims.
    The allegations in Allen’s motion for an extension of time and
    his motion for appointment of counsel, together with the
    2
    Although not specified in the order, the dismissal was with prejudice
    because under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41, dismissals for failure to prosecute are
    deemed adjudications on the merits, unless otherwise specified. Further,
    despite Allen’s argument to the contrary, we will interpret the order as a
    dismissal for failure to prosecute (as stated in the order), rather than a
    summary dismissal or a dismissal for failure to comply with the court’s
    order.
    ALLEN v. CALDERON                     4813
    admissible evidence Allen offered in support of these
    motions, establish that he suffers from a mental illness, the
    mental illness prevents him from being able to understand and
    respond to the court’s order, and he was still suffering from
    the illness during the relevant time period. Because the allega-
    tions are unrebutted, the district court was required to take
    them as true in deciding whether to dismiss the petition. Laws
    v. LaMarque, 
    351 F.3d 919
    , 922 (9th Cir. 2003); Roberts v.
    Corrothers, 
    812 F.3d 1173
    , 1177 (9th Cir. 1998).
    [3] Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c), courts are required to
    “appoint a guardian ad litem for an . . . incompetent person
    not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such
    other order as it deems proper for the protection of the . . .
    incompetent person.” 
    Id. This Rule
    applies to habeas petition-
    ers as it does to other civil litigants. Rule 11 of the Rules Gov-
    erning Habeas Corpus Cases provides that the Federal Rules
    of Civil Procedure may be applied to habeas petitions to the
    extent they are not inconsistent with the habeas rules.
    [4] In a non-habeas civil action, this Court held that if an
    “incompetent person is unrepresented, the court should not
    enter a judgment which operates as a judgment on the merits
    without complying with Rule 17(c).” Krain v. Smallwood,
    
    880 F.2d 1119
    , 1121 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). This
    Court further reasoned that when a substantial question exists
    regarding the mental competence of a party proceeding pro se,
    the proper procedure is for the district court to conduct a hear-
    ing to determine competence, so a guardian ad litem can be
    appointed, if necessary. See 
    id. [5] The
    State argues that we should refrain from applying
    the Krain reasoning to habeas proceedings as this would
    create a per se rule of counsel for mentally incompetent peti-
    tioners. This argument is meritless. We do not hold that a
    petitioner should be appointed counsel for habeas proceed-
    ings. We merely rule that counsel should be appointed for the
    limited purpose of representing the petitioner at the compe-
    4814                  ALLEN v. CALDERON
    tency hearing as required by Rule 8 of the Rules Governing
    Section 2254 Cases, should the district court determine it
    advisable. Rule 8(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254
    Cases (“If an evidentiary hearing is required the judge shall
    appoint counsel for a petitioner who qualifies for the appoint-
    ment of counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) [public defend-
    er].”).
    Similarly, the State’s other reason for distinguishing Krain
    —that here the court dismissed for failure to prosecute
    whereas in Krain the court dismissed for failure to comply
    with the court order—merely notes a distinction without a dif-
    ference. The State fails to point out, and we have not found,
    any reason to adopt different rules regarding competency
    determinations for these two types of dismissals.
    [6] A party proceeding pro se in a civil lawsuit is entitled
    to a competency determination when substantial evidence of
    incompetence is presented. Although the case at bar has a
    slightly different procedural posture than Krain, its basic prin-
    ciple is applicable here: Where a party’s incompetence in fact
    caused him to fail to prosecute or meet a filing deadline, the
    action should not be dismissed on such grounds.
    [7] Here, there was sufficient evidence of incompetence at
    least to require the district court to make a competency deter-
    mination. Although the evidence of incompetence may not
    have been artfully presented, the district court must construe
    pro se habeas filings liberally. See Maleng v. Cook, 
    490 U.S. 488
    (1989). The State sets forth possible reasons the district
    court may have found there was insufficient evidence of
    incompetence (i.e., finding that the declarations were not
    credible or determining there was no nexus between Allen’s
    schizophrenia and associated medications and his inability to
    understand instructions). However, the explanations provided
    are mere speculation. We cannot determine whether the dis-
    trict court abused its discretion based on such conjecture.
    ALLEN v. CALDERON                    4815
    [8] Because there was sufficient evidence of Allen’s incom-
    petence, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing
    the petition for failure to prosecute without first holding a
    competency hearing or otherwise considering his claim. We
    therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal order and
    remand for further factual development. On remand, the dis-
    trict court should conduct a competency hearing to determine
    whether Allen is competent under an appropriate standard for
    habeas petitioners. If the district court determines that Allen
    is incompetent, it has discretion to appoint a guardian ad litem
    or enter such other order it deems proper to protect Allen’s
    interests.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.