United States v. Carter ( 2009 )


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  •                       FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                     
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                 No. 05-50303
    v.                                    D.C. No.
    ANDREW LEE CARTER, Jr.,                            CR 02-0904 WJR
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                          No. 05-50321
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                    D.C. No.
    CR 02-1215 WJR
    ANDREW LEE CARTER, Jr.,
    OPINION
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    William J. Rea and Dale S. Fischer, District Judges,
    Presiding*
    Argued and Submitted
    October 25, 2006—Pasadena, California
    Submission Vacated and Deferred October 26, 2006**
    Resubmitted June 25, 2008
    Filed March 30, 2009
    *These cases were reassigned to Judge Fischer on August 9, 2005, due
    to the death of Judge Rea.
    **Submission of this case was vacated and deferred pending the en
    banc court’s decision in United States v. Carty, 
    520 F.3d 984
     (9th Cir.) (en
    banc), cert. denied sub nom. Zavala v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 2491
    (2008).
    3821
    3822                UNITED STATES v. CARTER
    Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Carlos T. Bea, and
    Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judges Tashima and Ikuta;***
    Dissent in Part by Judge Tashima
    ***Judge Ikuta authored Part IV of the Discussion section.
    UNITED STATES v. CARTER               3825
    COUNSEL
    Wayne R. Young, Santa Monica, California, for the
    defendant-appellant.
    Elizabeth R. Yang and Dorothy C. Kim, Assistant United
    States Attorneys, Los Angeles, California, for the plaintiff-
    appellee.
    OPINION
    TASHIMA, Circuit Judge, as to Parts I-III:
    Andrew Carter was indicted for two bank robberies — the
    first on August 1, 2002, in Commerce, California, and the sec-
    ond on August 12, 2002, in Pasadena, California. Carter was
    charged in both indictments with conspiracy to commit a bank
    robbery, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 371
     and 2113; armed
    bank robbery, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2113
    ; and use of a
    3826               UNITED STATES v. CARTER
    firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c). He was convicted by a jury on all counts and was
    sentenced to a 471-month term of imprisonment. Carter
    timely appealed.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a) and
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We affirm both convictions, but we vacate
    the sentence and remand for resentencing. In determining
    Carter’s sentence, the district court failed to make the requi-
    site finding that a firearm was brandished. We therefore
    vacate the sentence and remand for the district court to make
    the requisite findings.
    BACKGROUND
    I.    Factual Background
    A.   August 1, 2002, Commerce Robbery
    The day before the Commerce robbery, Derrick O’Neal
    contacted Carter and several others to ask if they wanted to
    rob a bank. O’Neal and Edward Warren had chosen the bank
    because it was close to the freeway and did not have security
    barriers inside. Carter agreed to rob the bank and agreed to
    meet the following morning. On the morning of the robbery,
    O’Neal, Warren, Eric Washington, Joseph Alexander, and
    Edward Hector met at the home of Warren’s mother. O’Neal
    testified that Carter was a few hours late to the meeting
    because he was trying to get a gun and needed to drop his
    girlfriend off somewhere. They planned each person’s role in
    the robbery and left for the bank. Carter’s role was to “grab
    the money” from the teller because “he was quick.”
    Alexander, Carter, Washington, and Hector entered the
    bank. O’Neal and Warren remained outside as lookouts.
    Washington stayed in the lobby area, Alexander walked
    through the bank to watch the back doors, and Carter and
    Hector went to the teller counter. When Janet Guizar, a finan-
    UNITED STATES v. CARTER                3827
    cial services consultant at the bank, saw the men enter, carry-
    ing empty bags and spreading out through the bank, she
    pressed an alarm. Brenda Lopez, the customer service man-
    ager, asked Carter and Hector if she could help them, and they
    said they wanted to open new accounts. Lopez seated them at
    a desk, and Guizar stated that she would be with them
    momentarily.
    Guizar then went behind the teller counter, told the branch
    manager to call 911, and picked up a phone to call their cor-
    porate security office. Hector and Carter rushed over and told
    her to hang up the phone. Hector jumped over the teller
    counter, pointed his gun at two tellers, and told them to put
    money in his bag. The men left and split up the money, which
    totaled approximately $3,500.
    B.    August 12, 2002, Pasadena Robbery
    O’Neal contacted Carter on August 11, 2002, and told him
    that he and Warren had found another bank to rob and that
    Carter should bring a gun. Carter responded that he would try
    to find a gun. On the morning of the robbery, O’Neal, War-
    ren, Carter, Alexander, and Hector met at Warren’s home.
    They were joined by Larry Washington, Jerry Hughes, Koran
    Allen, and Cedrick Askew, and they discussed each person’s
    role in the robbery.
    When they entered the bank, Hughes displayed his gun,
    jumped on the teller counter, and demanded the keys. A bank
    employee gave Hughes cash from several teller drawers. After
    leaving the bank, the men switched vehicles and stopped to
    split up the money, which totaled approximately $21,000.
    II.    Procedural Background
    A.    Commerce Robbery
    On January 9, 2003, an indictment was filed against Wash-
    ington and Carter, charging them with conspiracy to commit
    3828               UNITED STATES v. CARTER
    bank robbery, armed bank robbery, and brandishing a firearm
    during a crime of violence. O’Neal and Alexander entered
    into plea agreements and testified at both trials. O’Neal
    received a sentence of 105 months, and Alexander was sen-
    tenced to 125 months.
    Carter moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed-
    eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, but the district court
    denied the motion. Carter was convicted on all three counts
    of the indictment.
    B.   Pasadena Robbery
    Carter, O’Neal, Washington, Hughes, Allen, Askew, and
    Alexander were indicted on three counts — conspiracy to
    commit bank robbery, armed bank robbery, and brandishing
    a firearm during a crime of violence. A nine-day jury trial
    commenced on October 14, 2003. On October 15, 2003,
    Hughes and Askew entered guilty pleas, and Washington pled
    guilty the following day. Allen, Carter, and Hector proceeded
    to trial.
    Before opening arguments were made, Carter’s attorney,
    Scott Furstman, informed the court during a sidebar that there
    was a conflict between himself and Carter regarding trial
    strategy. Furstman explained the conflict as follows:
    I have raised to the court that there may be a con-
    flict as developed between Mr. Carter and myself
    with regard to the presentation of certain evidence
    and the strategy to be relied upon. Mr. Carter has
    always been prepared to accept responsibility for
    count one and count two — count two not being an
    armed bank robbery. I have explained to him the ele-
    ments and the fact that he simply can’t plead guilty
    to a count that is not charged. That being the case,
    however, Mr. Carter, for example, in my opening
    statement wanted me to basically admit all elements
    UNITED STATES v. CARTER                      3829
    that would make out the government’s case as to
    count one and count two. I don’t believe that is in
    Mr. Carter’s best interest at this juncture. I told him
    that I would reserve opening statement to see how
    the government’s evidence plays out; and if he
    believes it is in his best evidence [sic] to present to
    the jury an impression that he is guilty of the rob-
    beries, so be it. I don’t think it’s in his best interest.
    I assume there are other issues that do bear on the
    foreseeability aspect with regard to the 924(c) and
    Mr. Carter’s desire and it’s his right to testify, poten-
    tially. Given the prior conviction that Mr. Carter has
    and the fact that he had the prior bank robbery that
    didn’t come in, I do not believe that would be in his
    best interest either. As I say, that’s his constitutional
    right. I can’t prevent him from exercising it. But
    there are some other strategies with regard to poten-
    tial defense evidence that Mr. Carter and I have dis-
    cussed that he may wish me to put forth. Again, I do
    not believe it is in his interest.
    . . . Your Honor, we have been through another
    trial with Mr. Carter. I have appeared before Your
    Honor for a long time on many occasions. I don’t
    think I’ve ever come before Your Honor and said
    that because of this potential conflict and a break-
    down because of this difference in terms of trial
    strategies and the stakes before Mr. Carter are huge.
    Huge. 25 years alone on this one 924(c), so I’m con-
    cerned.
    Tr. of 10/16/03 Hr’g at 7-9. Carter told the court that Furst-
    man “basically said everything I needed to say for the
    record.” Furstman “formally” moved to withdraw, and the
    court then denied the motion with no explanation or inquiry.
    Carter moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed-
    eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, based on the insuffi-
    3830                UNITED STATES v. CARTER
    ciency of the evidence with respect to the § 924(c) charge.
    Furstman argued that Carter did not bring a weapon to the
    meeting, that there were only two weapons used during the
    robbery, and that neither was used “in direct proximity” to
    Carter. He further argued that no weapon was recovered from
    Carter and, in fact, no weapon was ever recovered. The court
    denied the motion. Carter was convicted on all three counts.
    C.   Sentencing
    Carter was sentenced on April 11, 2005 on both robberies.
    Defense counsel, Donald Randolph,1 raised several issues at
    the sentencing hearing and in memoranda filed prior to the
    hearing. First, he asked the court to exercise its discretion
    under United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), to
    impose the statutory minimum sentence of 360 months. He
    cited numerous personal hardships Carter had endured
    throughout his life, such as the lack of a relationship with his
    father, his mother’s inability to provide “basic food, utilities,
    electricity,” Carter’s attempts as a youth to provide for his
    family, and his placement in a group home.
    Randolph further disputed the number of criminal history
    points Carter was assessed. Carter received one point for a
    2000 charge of possession of narcotics that resulted in diver-
    sion. In 2002, Carter was stopped for driving without lights,
    and he lied about his identity to the officer, resulting in one
    point for a charge of giving false information to a peace offi-
    cer, for which he received summary probation. Carter then
    received two additional criminal history points because the
    robberies were committed while his diversion was revoked on
    the narcotics charge and while he was on probation on the
    false information charge, resulting in four points, which estab-
    lished a criminal history category of III.
    1
    On May 14, 2004, the court relieved Furstman and appointed Donald
    Randolph to represent Carter.
    UNITED STATES v. CARTER                 3831
    Randolph argued that the two additional points for being on
    summary probation overstated the seriousness of Carter’s past
    conduct. He therefore asked the court to give Carter only two
    criminal history points, which would result in a criminal his-
    tory category of II. He also argued that the one point given for
    the misdemeanor of giving false information overstated the
    seriousness of Carter’s criminal history and asked the court to
    place him in criminal history category I. He later pointed out
    that Carter’s narcotics offense involved the possession of less
    than one gram of cocaine. Randolph attempted to raise the
    argument that there was no finding that the firearm was bran-
    dished, which he had raised in his briefs, but the court refused
    to allow him to argue the issue.
    After hearing the arguments regarding Carter’s personal
    background, criminal history category, and potential sentence,
    the district court stated that the total guideline range was 471-
    492 months, which was the range calculated by the Presen-
    tence Report. The court sentenced Carter to 60 months on
    each count one conviction, 87 months on each count two con-
    viction, to be served concurrently, and 84 months on count
    three of the Commerce robbery and 300 months on count
    three of the Pasadena robbery, both to be served consecu-
    tively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 471 months.
    DISCUSSION
    I.   Use of a Firearm
    Carter contends that the district court erred in denying his
    motion for judgment of acquittal on the use of a firearm
    count. The denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is
    reviewed de novo. United States v. Allen, 
    425 F.3d 1231
    ,
    1234 (9th Cir. 2005). In reviewing a conviction for suffi-
    ciency of the evidence, we “must determine ‘whether, after
    viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prose-
    cution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
    elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” United
    3832               UNITED STATES v. CARTER
    States v. Sanders, 
    421 F.3d 1044
    , 1049 (9th Cir. 2005) (quot-
    ing United States v. Segura-Gallegos, 
    41 F.3d 1266
    , 1268
    (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original)).
    [1] There is no dispute that Carter himself did not use a
    firearm during the robbery. The question, accordingly, is
    whether it could be “reasonably foreseen as a necessary or
    natural consequence of the unlawful agreement” that one of
    Carter’s coconspirators would use a firearm during the rob-
    bery. Pinkerton v. United States, 
    328 U.S. 640
    , 648 (1946).
    [1] Although Carter is correct that the evidence indicated
    that he was late to the meeting at which the robbery was
    planned, the government need not establish that Carter had
    actual knowledge that guns would be used. Rather, “[t]he
    touchstone is foreseeability.” United States v. Hoskins, 
    282 F.3d 772
    , 776 (9th Cir. 2002). “[I]t is reasonable to infer from
    the nature of the plan — the overtaking of a bank by force and
    intimidation — that guns would be used.” Allen, 
    425 F.3d at 1234
    . “Drawing all inferences in favor of the government,”
    Hoskins, 
    282 F.3d at 777
    , it was foreseeable that a gun would
    be used in the bank robbery. The district court did not err in
    denying Carter’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the use
    of a firearm count.
    II.    Denial of Motion to Withdraw
    [3] Carter’s second contention is that the district court
    abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw
    brought by Furstman. In determining whether an irreconcil-
    able conflict existed between Carter and Furstman, we con-
    sider “(1) the adequacy of the district court’s inquiry; (2) the
    extent of any conflict; and (3) the timeliness of the motion.”
    United States v. McKenna, 
    327 F.3d 830
    , 843 (9th Cir. 2003).
    The district court’s denial of counsel’s motion to withdraw is
    reviewed for an abuse of discretion. LaGrand v. Stewart, 
    133 F.3d 1253
    , 1269 (9th Cir. 1998).
    UNITED STATES v. CARTER                   3833
    [4] The district court denied the motion to withdraw with-
    out explanation. However, the court listened to Furstman’s
    description of the conflict and heard Carter state that he had
    nothing to add. Moreover, the conflict appeared to be based
    on trial strategy. A conflict that is based solely on “disputes
    regarding trial tactics” generally is not the type of conflict that
    warrants substitution of counsel. McKenna, 
    327 F.3d at 844
    .
    The record indicates that the conflict here was not as egre-
    gious as those we have held support granting a motion to sub-
    stitute. See, e.g., United States v. Adelzo-Gonzalez, 
    268 F.3d 772
    , 779 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding an irreconcilable conflict
    where the client recounted “threats made by his attorney”
    against him, and the attorney “expressly called [the client] a
    liar on two separate occasions”); United States v. Moore, 
    159 F.3d 1154
    , 1160 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the attorney “re-
    lated that he was conflicted because Moore had threatened to
    sue him and had physically threatened him,” and Moore
    expressed an inability to communicate and dissatisfaction
    with counsel’s handling of a plea bargain).
    [5] Further, the motion in this case was made on the day
    that opening statements were to be made, which was the third
    day of trial. Although “[t]he fact that the motion was made on
    the eve of trial alone is not dispositive,” Adelzo-Gonzalez, 
    268 F.3d at 780
    , there is no indication that another lawyer was
    ready, and the jury already had been empaneled. In these cir-
    cumstances, the denial of the motion was not an abuse of dis-
    cretion.
    III.   Sentencing: Brandishing a Firearm
    [6] Carter contends the district court erred by sentencing
    Carter to a seven-year mandatory minimum sentence for bran-
    dishing a firearm in the first bank robbery because there was
    no finding that a firearm was “brandished.” Title 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) “provides a three-tier sentencing framework, increas-
    ing the mandatory minimum sentence in correlation to the
    severity of the firearm’s involvement with the crime.” United
    3834                UNITED STATES v. CARTER
    States v. Beaudion, 
    416 F.3d 965
    , 968 (9th Cir. 2005). The
    statute imposes a minimum five-year sentence for “use” of a
    firearm during a crime of violence, and a seven-year mini-
    mum if the firearm is “brandished.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A).
    A firearm is brandished if the district court finds: (1) “the
    open display of the firearm, or knowledge of the firearm’s
    presence by another in some manner” for (2) “the purpose of
    intimidation.” Beaudion, 
    416 F.3d at 968
    . The key difference
    between simple “use” of a firearm and “brandishing” the fire-
    arm is that “use” is not limited to a purpose of intimidation.
    
    Id. at 969
    .
    [7] The record in this case is not clear whether the district
    court found a firearm was brandished, rather than merely used
    by an accomplice. When asked by government counsel
    whether the district court “found by a preponderance of the
    evidence that a firearm was brandished in both robberies,” the
    district court responded, “Yes, a firearm was present.” The
    language used by the district court is ambiguous: by stating,
    “Yes,” the district court may have found a firearm was bran-
    dished, but by stating “a firearm was present,” the district
    court may have instead found a firearm was merely “used”
    rather than brandished. Because it is unclear whether the dis-
    trict court found the firearm was brandished, we must vacate
    the seven-year sentence and remand for re-sentencing on the
    charge of violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c). The trial judge,
    rather than this court, is in a better position to make the deter-
    mination whether the firearm was “used” or “brandished.”
    The trial judge must make this determination and state it
    clearly on the record.
    IKUTA, Circuit Judge, as to Part IV:
    IV
    Sentencing: Booker and 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
     Considerations
    Under the Supreme Court’s guidance in Rita v. United
    States, 
    127 S. Ct. 2456
     (2007) and Ninth Circuit case law, the
    UNITED STATES v. CARTER                 3835
    district court’s explanation of its sentence, although brief, was
    adequate in context. Moreover, under the Supreme Court’s
    guidance in Gall v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
     (2007), the
    district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a
    within-Guidelines sentence.
    A
    After two separate jury trials before the same judge, Carter
    was convicted of two counts of armed bank robbery, two
    counts of conspiracy, and two counts of use of a firearm dur-
    ing a crime of violence. The same district court judge consoli-
    dated sentencing and held a sentencing hearing on April 11,
    2005. Before the hearing, the parties had the opportunity to
    review the Presentence Report (PSR), and both submitted
    objections to the report that were documented in an adden-
    dum.
    The district court commenced the sentencing hearing by
    stating, “I’ve read the presentence report, the addendum to the
    presentence report and all the other things that go with it.”
    The court then solicited comments from Carter’s attorney,
    Donald Randolph, who reiterated the arguments he had made
    in response to the PSR. Randolph noted that Carter lacked
    youthful guidance and that his childhood and young adult-
    hood had been difficult. Randolph also reiterated his argu-
    ment that the PSR over-represented the seriousness of
    Carter’s criminal history. He urged the court to disregard two
    criminal history points (imposed because Carter had been on
    summary probation when the bank robberies had occurred),
    and then “to go one step further” to discount another criminal
    history point (for a misdemeanor charge for failing to provide
    truthful information to a police officer).
    In opposition, the government argued that Carter had been
    given “multiple opportunities . . . to not commit further
    crimes” and that Carter participated in the first bank robbery
    less than one month into his probation. The government
    3836                    UNITED STATES v. CARTER
    asserted that the two points assessed in his criminal history
    category for committing the crimes on probation “are abso-
    lutely warranted in this case, and if the court does not impose
    that point, as the government points out in his papers it’s in
    essence telling the defendant it is okay not to comply with
    prior court orders.” In addition to noting the court’s discretion
    under United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005), the gov-
    ernment addressed the factors the court was required to con-
    sider under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).2 The government asserted
    2
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) provides:
    (a) Factors To Be Considered in Imposing Sentence.— The court
    shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,
    to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this sub-
    section. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be
    imposed, shall consider—
    (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the his-
    tory and characteristics of the defendant;
    (2) the need for the sentence imposed—
    (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
    respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
    offense;
    (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
    (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defen-
    dant; and
    (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
    vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
    treatment in the most effective manner;
    (3) the kinds of sentences available;
    (4) the kinds of sentence and sentencing range established
    for—
    (A) the applicable category of offense committed by the
    applicable category of defendant as set forth in the
    guidelines—
    (i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to
    section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, subject
    to any amendments made to such guidelines by act of
    UNITED STATES v. CARTER                        3837
    that after taking into account the Guidelines, the history and
    characteristics of the defendant, the seriousness of the offense,
    the goals of promoting respect for the law and deterrence, and
    the need to avoid sentencing disparity, a downward departure
    from the Guidelines was not warranted. In discussing these
    factors, the government noted that the court had presided over
    both of Carter’s trials, and so was aware that the crimes Carter
    committed were serious and violent.
    Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have
    yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission
    into amendments under section 994(p) of title 28); and
    (ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in
    effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or
    (B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised
    release, the applicable guidelines or policy statements
    issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section
    994(a)(3) or title 28, United States Code, taking into
    account any amendments made to such guidelines or pol-
    icy statements by act of Congress (regardless of whether
    such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sen-
    tencing commission into amendments issued under section
    994(p) of title 28;
    (5) Any pertinent policy statement—
    (A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to sec-
    tion 994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject to
    any amendments made to such policy statement by act of
    Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have
    yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into
    amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28; and
    (B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect
    on the date the defendant is sentenced.[1]
    (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
    defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
    of similar conduct; and
    (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
    offense.
    3838                UNITED STATES v. CARTER
    After hearing both parties’ arguments, the court asked Car-
    ter if he wished to address the court. Carter declined. The
    court stated: “Well in view of the fact that the Sentencing
    Guidelines are advisory only, I will still use them though in
    considering of the sentence I’m about to impose.” The district
    court then outlined and explained the Guidelines sentencing
    range for the two convictions. In sum, the Guidelines sentenc-
    ing range for all counts was 471 to 492 months. The court
    stated that “[p]ursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act, which
    is advisory,” it would impose a sentence of 471 months, the
    low end of the Guidelines. The court delineated the term of
    supervised release and the conditions of such release.
    Finally, the district court stated, “Now the justification for
    this sentence is as follows.” The court proceeded to explain:
    This 24 year old defendant is before the court for
    sentencing after being convicted by a jury trial for
    armed bank robbery, conspiracy, and the accompa-
    nying 18 U.S.C. 924C count in 2 criminal proceed-
    ings and 2 armed bank robberies.
    The defendant has 3 convictions for disturbing the
    peace, possession of a narcotic controlled substance
    and false information to a peace officer.
    Defendant is subject to a 7 year mandatory sen-
    tence to be served consecutively to the Guideline
    sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 924C and a
    25 year mandatory sentence for a second conviction
    under 18 U.S.C. 924C to be served consecutively to
    the Guideline sentence in the first 18 U.S.C. 924C
    conviction.
    The low end sentence has been recommended and
    ordered as the Guidelines have adequately taken into
    consideration defendant’s actions and criminal his-
    tory.
    UNITED STATES v. CARTER                   3839
    The lengthy sentence is sufficiently punitive and
    hopefully will deter against any further criminal
    activity.
    The maximum term of supervised release will
    allow time for the defendant to maximize his restitu-
    tion payments and to be monitored within the com-
    munity.
    The out-patient drug treatment condition is recom-
    mended because of defendant’s prior drug-related
    conviction.
    The psychological/psychiatric treatment condition
    is also recommended because of the defendant’s
    admitted history of counseling for emotional issues.
    The defendant has 2 minor children.
    After the court imposed the sentence, the government asked:
    And finally with regard to the sentence the court has
    imposed including the Guideline calculations, the
    advisory guidelines calculations and the mandatory
    minimum, has the court found that this sentence is
    reasonable taking into account all the factors and the
    purposes set forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)?
    The court responded, “Yes. I found my sentence to be reason-
    able.”
    B
    Carter argues the record fails to establish that the district
    court exercised its sentencing discretion under Booker
    because the court did not adequately discuss the sentencing
    factors it must consider under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) as they
    applied to Carter, and because the court did not directly
    3840                UNITED STATES v. CARTER
    address Carter’s arguments. As a result, Carter contends, the
    record is insufficient for us to determine whether Carter’s sen-
    tence was reasonable. The Supreme Court’s analysis in Rita,
    
    127 S.Ct. 2456
    , and our decision in United States v. Carty,
    
    520 F.3d 984
     (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom.
    Zavala v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 2491
     (2008), make clear
    that the district court in this case adequately established the
    basis for its sentencing decision.
    [8] When a district court imposes a within-Guidelines sen-
    tence, the explanation of its decision-making process may be
    brief: “[W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines
    to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require
    lengthy explanation.” Rita, 
    127 S. Ct. at 2468
    . In Rita, the
    defendant had argued for a sentence lower than the minimum
    recommended Guidelines sentence on the grounds that his
    health, fear of retaliation, and military record warranted
    leniency beyond what was contemplated by the Guidelines.
    
    Id. at 2469
    . After hearing both Rita’s and the government’s
    arguments, the district court stated that it was “unable to find
    that the [report’s recommended] sentencing guideline range
    . . . is an inappropriate guideline range for that, and under
    3553 . . . the public needs to be protected if it is true, and I
    must accept as true the jury verdict.” 
    Id. at 2462
     (alterations
    in original). When sentencing Rita at the low end of the
    Guidelines range, the district court stated that such a sentence
    was “appropriate.” 
    Id.
    [9] The Supreme Court held that because “[t]he record
    makes clear that the sentencing judge listened to each argu-
    ment” and “considered the supporting evidence,” the district
    court’s statement of reasons for the sentence was “brief but
    legally sufficient.” 
    Id. at 2469
    . The district court had no obli-
    gation to spell out its conclusion that the Guidelines’ range
    was suitable for this sort of case. Rather, “[w]here a matter is
    as conceptually simple as in the case at hand and the record
    makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence
    UNITED STATES v. CARTER                  3841
    and arguments,” the Court did “not believe the law requires
    the judge to write more extensively.” 
    Id.
    We reached a similar conclusion in Carty, where the defen-
    dant argued that the district court committed procedural error
    because it “did not affirmatively state that it considered the
    § 3553(a) factors.” Carty, 
    520 F.3d at 995-96
    . We rejected
    Carty’s arguments for three reasons. First, we stated that “in
    the ordinary case, the Commission’s recommendation of a
    sentencing range will reflect a rough approximation of sen-
    tences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.” Id. at 996
    (citing Kimbrough v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 558
    , 574
    (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, we noted
    that “the judge stated that he reviewed the papers; the papers
    discussed the applicability of § 3553(a) factors; therefore, we
    take it that the judge considered the relevant factors.” Id. (cit-
    ing Rita, 
    127 S. Ct. at 2467
    ). Third, we stated that “sentencing
    took place after Booker, and the parties’ memoranda pro-
    ceeded on the footing that the Guidelines were advisory. The
    district judge gave no indication that he felt bound by the
    Guidelines range or bound to treat the Guidelines sentence as
    presumptively reasonable.” 
    Id.
    [10] The guidance provided by Rita and Carty makes clear
    that the district court adequately explained the sentence
    imposed on Carter. As the Supreme Court has explained, the
    context in which a district court issues a sentence is impor-
    tant. Rita, 
    127 S. Ct. at 2469
    . Here, as in Rita and Carty, the
    district court was familiar with Carter’s crimes, personal situ-
    ation, and both the government’s and Carter’s arguments
    regarding sentencing. The district court judge had presided
    over both of Carter’s trials. At sentencing, the court stated that
    it had read and considered the PSR and the addendum. The
    court also listened to Carter’s request for a reduction of his
    sentence in light of factors relevant under § 3553(a), including
    his lack of youthful guidance, his difficult family history, and
    his argument that his criminal history was over-represented.
    3842                UNITED STATES v. CARTER
    [11] After giving the parties an opportunity to make their
    arguments about what sentence should be imposed on Carter,
    the district court explained both the sentence and the justifica-
    tion for its decision to impose a within-Guidelines sentence.
    In providing this explanation, the district court addressed
    many of the § 3553(a) factors. The court recited the Guide-
    lines recommendation, Carter’s criminal history category, and
    the applicable mandatory statutory sentences. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(3), (a)(4)(A) (court to consider “the kinds of sen-
    tences available” and “the kinds of sentence and the sentenc-
    ing range established for the applicable category of offense
    committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth
    in the guidelines”). The court acknowledged Carter’s convic-
    tions for two armed bank robberies, two counts of conspiracy,
    and two firearm offenses; his three prior convictions; his age;
    his emotional issues and past drugs use; and the fact that he
    had two children and potential child support obligations. See
    
    id.
     § 3553(a)(1) (court to consider the “nature and circum-
    stances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
    the defendant”). The court stated that “the Guidelines have
    adequately taken into consideration defendant’s actions and
    criminal history.” See id. The court explained that “[t]he
    lengthy sentence is sufficiently punitive and hopefully will
    deter against any further criminal activity.” See id.
    § 3553(a)(2)(A), (B) (court to consider the need for the sen-
    tence imposed “to provide just punishment for the offense”
    and “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”). The
    court also noted that the sentence included outpatient drug
    treatment and psychological or psychiatric treatment to
    address Carter’s prior drug use and prior emotional issues. See
    id. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (court to consider the need for the sen-
    tence imposed “to provide the defendant with needed . . .
    medical care, or other correctional treatment”). The court
    stated that “the maximum term of supervised release will
    allow time for the defendant to maximize his restitution pay-
    ments and to be monitored within the community.” See id.
    § 3553(a)(2)(C), (a)(7) (court to consider the need for the sen-
    tence imposed “to protect the public from further crimes of
    UNITED STATES v. CARTER                 3843
    the defendant” and “to provide restitution to any victims of
    the offense”). Finally, the district court affirmed that it was
    choosing not to exercise its discretion to depart from the
    Guidelines based on Carter’s argued over-representation of
    criminal history.
    [12] In context, these statements make clear that the district
    court heard and considered Carter’s arguments, considered the
    § 3553(a) factors, and reached the conclusion that the Guide-
    lines range was suitable to Carter’s case. Under Rita and
    Carty, this is sufficient.
    [13] Carter further argues that the sentence is procedurally
    flawed because the district court did not directly address Car-
    ter’s arguments and give reasons for declining to accept those
    arguments. We rejected this argument in Carty, and the same
    reasoning applies here. In Carty, the defendant argued that he
    merited special leniency because, among other things, he
    “was a breadwinner for his family with no criminal history;
    he stopped drinking as a young man; he had a strong family
    relationship; and he had an underprivileged upbringing and
    diminished capacity to understand fully the world around
    him.” Carty, 
    520 F.3d at 990
    . The district court imposed a
    sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range rather than the
    even lower sentence sought by the defendant. We held that,
    although the district court “gave no explicit reasons” for
    rejecting Carty’s arguments and imposing a within-Guidelines
    sentence, the court had said enough in the context of that case
    given that the district judge had presided over Carty’s trial,
    reviewed the PSR and the parties’ submissions, and listened
    to argument by both parties at the sentencing hearing. Id.; see
    also Rita, 
    127 S. Ct. at 2469
     (holding that there is no proce-
    dural error where a sentencing judge could have “added
    explicitly that he had heard and considered the evidence and
    argument[s]” but the “context and the record [made] clear that
    . . . similar[ ] reasoning underlies the judge’s conclusion.”);
    United States v. Perez-Perez, 
    512 F.3d 514
    , 516-17 (9th Cir.
    2008) (rejecting defendant’s contention of procedural error
    3844               UNITED STATES v. CARTER
    because sentencing judge did not “expressly address [his] spe-
    cific arguments” regarding the seriousness of prior conviction,
    alleged racial profiling, prior drug addiction, and special fam-
    ily circumstances where the record reflected that the judge lis-
    tened to them). These cases confirm that the district court here
    had no obligation to address and resolve each of Carter’s
    arguments on the record.
    The dissent attempts to distinguish these cases on the
    ground that the defendants’ arguments in Rita and Carty were
    straightforward and uncomplicated, and because in Rita, the
    district court asked the defendant numerous questions about
    sentencing issues. These distinctions are unpersuasive. The
    dissent does not explain the nature of the alleged complexity
    in Carter’s argument, and we detect none. Carter merely
    argued that his prior convictions were insufficiently serious to
    merit the criminal history category to which he was assigned,
    and that his underprivileged upbringing constituted a special
    circumstance for which a below-Guidelines sentence was
    warranted. These arguments are frequently made and easily
    understood by a district court. They are no more complex than
    the arguments made by the defendant in Rita regarding the
    special circumstances of his health, fear of retaliation, and
    military record; by the defendant in Carty regarding his his-
    tory and characteristics; or by the defendant in Perez-Perez
    regarding the overstated seriousness of his prior offense,
    alleged racial profiling, prior drug addiction, and special fam-
    ily circumstances. Indeed, Carter’s counsel acknowledged that
    “I am sure the court is very familiar with requests for over-
    designation of criminal categories under circumstances like
    this.”
    [14] Nor was the district court obliged to engage the defen-
    dant in questions or further discussion, because it is clear
    from the context that the defense’s arguments were heard. See
    Carty, 
    520 F.3d at 995
     (holding that the district court said
    enough at sentencing where it indicated it had reviewed the
    PSR and the sentencing memoranda and heard from the
    UNITED STATES v. CARTER                  3845
    defense’s witnesses and counsel). Because the record and
    context make clear that the judge “considered the evidence
    and arguments,” Rita, 
    127 S. Ct. at 2469
    , the district court
    made no procedural error in imposing a within-Guidelines
    sentence.
    C
    Finally, Carter contends he was prejudiced by the district
    court’s failure to consider the § 3553(a) factors because, as a
    result of the district court’s procedural error, his sentence was
    “greater than necessary,” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), to meet the
    purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act. Carter argues that his
    sentence was greater than necessary because it exceeded sen-
    tences for other federal crimes, resulted in unwarranted sen-
    tencing disparities with his co-conspirators, and did not take
    into account his difficult life circumstances. The dissent
    understands this argument as challenging the reasonableness
    of Carter’s sentence and would hold that Carter’s sentence is
    substantively unreasonable. However, none of the issues
    raised by Carter or the dissent makes Carter’s within-
    Guidelines sentence substantively unreasonable, particularly
    in light of the deference we owe to the district court’s sen-
    tencing decisions and the absence of anything out of the ordi-
    nary in Carter’s circumstances.
    We consider the substantive reasonableness of a sentence
    under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall, 
    128 S. Ct. at 597
    .
    The Supreme Court has directed us to give substantial defer-
    ence to the district court’s determination because it is better
    situated than we are to determine an appropriate sentence. As
    the Court explained,
    [T]he sentencing judge is in a superior position to
    find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in
    the individual case. The judge sees and hears the evi-
    dence, makes credibility determinations, has full
    knowledge of the facts and gains insights not con-
    3846                UNITED STATES v. CARTER
    veyed by the record. The sentencing judge has
    access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual
    case and the individual defendant before him than
    the Commission or the appeals court. Moreover, dis-
    trict courts have an institutional advantage over
    appellate courts in making these sorts of determina-
    tions, especially as they see so many more Guide-
    lines sentences than appellate courts do.
    Id. at 597-98 (internal citations, alterations, and quotation
    marks omitted). In light of this institutional advantage, “[t]he
    fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded
    that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to jus-
    tify reversal of the district court.” Id. at 597. We have held
    that “a correctly calculated Guidelines sentence will normally
    not be found unreasonable on appeal.” Carty, 
    520 F.3d at 988
    .
    Although the district court could have exercised its discretion
    to impose a below-Guidelines sentence, the dissent points to
    no unusual circumstances that make it an abuse of discretion
    for the district court not to have done so here.
    [15] None of the issues identified by Carter supports the
    conclusion that the district court abused its discretion in
    imposing the within-Guidelines sentence. First, Carter con-
    tends that his sentence is unreasonable because it was greater
    than sentences that would be imposed for other federal crimes
    such as airplane hijacking, espionage, or the like. To the
    extent Carter is making a challenge under the Equal Protec-
    tion Clause to classifications created by Congress, it is well
    established that any sentencing disparities between federal
    crimes do not create suspect classifications, and are therefore
    subject to rational basis review. See, e.g., United States v.
    Ellsworth, 
    456 F.3d 1146
    , 1149 (9th Cir. 2006); United States
    v. Harding, 
    971 F.2d 410
    , 412 (9th Cir. 1992). Carter was
    convicted of, and sentenced for, two counts each of conspir-
    acy, armed bank robbery, and use of a firearm during a crime
    of violence, all while on probation. Congress could rationally
    decide to penalize recidivists and offenders who have com-
    UNITED STATES v. CARTER                       3847
    mitted multiple crimes more severely than first-time offenders
    and offenders who have committed a single crime. See, e.g.,
    United States v. Ruiz-Chairez, 
    493 F.3d 1089
    , 1092 (9th Cir.
    2007) (“[A]sking whether another crime is inherently more
    dangerous than illegal reentry misses the point. To survive
    rational basis review, the key question is whether the criminal
    reentry [sentence] enhancement bears some rational relation
    to a legitimate government interest or purpose.” (emphasis
    added)); United States v. Clawson, 
    831 F.2d 909
    , 915 (9th
    Cir. 1987) (“[A] statute is not rendered irrational simply
    because Congress knew about other crimes and did not make
    them subject to enhancement. The courts do not substitute
    their views about a statute’s wisdom for those of Congress
    unless the statute is arbitrary.”). Because “[t]he burden falls
    on the party attempting to disprove the existence of a rational
    relationship between a statutory classification and a govern-
    ment objective,” Harding, 
    971 F.2d at 413
    , and because Car-
    ter has not carried this burden, this argument fails.
    [16] Second, Carter claims that the disparity between the
    sentence he received and those received by his co-
    conspirators was unwarranted. This argument fails because
    none of these co-conspirators was similarly situated to Carter.3
    See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales-Perez, 
    472 F.3d 1158
    ,
    1162 (9th Cir. 2007) (analyzing disparate sentence of co-
    defendant under 3553(a)(6) and concluding that the disparity
    was warranted because the co-defendant “was processed
    under a ‘fast-track’ procedure, and was charged with violating
    3
    Carter was convicted of two bank robberies in two separate jury trials.
    Of Carter’s nine co-conspirators, only four (O’Neal, Warren, Alexander
    and Hector) participated in both bank robberies. Of these four, O’Neal and
    Alexander elected to plead guilty to two counts of bank robbery, one count
    of conspiracy, and one count of use of a firearm. They testified against
    Carter at trial and were sentenced to 105 months and 125 months in
    prison, respectively. Warren was charged with being an accessory after the
    fact in one of the robberies, and pleaded guilty. Hector was convicted for
    the Pasadena robbery after a jury trial; however, the government did not
    prosecute him for the Commerce robbery.
    3848               UNITED STATES v. CARTER
    a different statute”); United States v. Monroe, 
    943 F.2d 1007
    ,
    1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding the district court did not err in
    imposing disparate sentences on co-defendants because,
    among other things, the co-defendants were not found guilty
    of the same offenses and thus were not similarly situated);
    United States v. Changa, 
    901 F.2d 741
    , 743-44 (9th Cir.
    1990) (holding the district court was justified in imposing dif-
    ferent sentences on defendants who were convicted of differ-
    ent crimes). Carter himself recognized that one reason for the
    disparity between his sentence and that of two of his co-
    conspirators was due to their decision to cooperate with the
    government. However, a sentencing disparity based on coop-
    eration is not unreasonable. It is settled that so long as there
    is “no indication the defendant has been retaliated against for
    exercising a constitutional right, the government may encour-
    age plea bargains by affording leniency to those who enter
    pleas. Failure to afford leniency to those who have not dem-
    onstrated those attributes on which leniency is based is
    unequivocally . . . constitutionally prop[er].” United States v.
    Narramore, 
    36 F.3d 845
    , 847 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Corbitt
    v. New Jersey, 
    439 U.S. 212
    , 223-24 (1978) (alterations in
    original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, any
    disparities between Carter’s sentence and those of his co-
    conspirators do not make Carter’s sentence substantively
    unreasonable.
    [17] Third, Carter argues that the difficult circumstances of
    his life make his within-Guidelines sentence unreasonable.
    The dissent further notes that Carter’s offenses were minor
    and his criminal history category was increased by minor
    issues. In context, these factors do not make Carter’s sentence
    substantively unreasonable. Carter conspired to commit and
    participated in two armed bank robberies in two weeks. He
    knew that guns would be used, actively helped subdue the
    victims, and shared in the profits. Carter suffered difficulties
    in his life and his prior offenses were non-violent, but nothing
    in these circumstances is so atypical as to put him outside the
    “minerun of roughly similar” cases considered by the Sen-
    UNITED STATES v. CARTER                 3849
    tencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines, nor are
    they “so special as to render [his] overall sentence unreason-
    able.” United States v. Stoterau, 
    524 F.3d 988
    , 1002 (9th Cir.
    2008). Therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion
    in sentencing Carter.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, Carter’s convictions are
    AFFIRMED. The seven-year sentence for brandishing a fire-
    arm is VACATED and REMANDED for the district court to
    determine whether the firearm was brandished for purposes of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A).
    TASHIMA, Circuit Judge, dissenting, in part:
    When we review a sentence, “we first consider whether the
    district court committed significant procedural error, then we
    consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.”
    United States v. Carty, 
    520 F.3d 984
    , 993 (9th Cir.) (en banc),
    cert. denied sub nom. Zavala v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 2491
    (2008). The district court commits “significant procedural
    error” by “failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors” or by
    “failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall v.
    United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , 597 (2007). Carter asked the
    district court to impose a sentence below the range suggested
    by the sentencing guidelines. In his request, he raised “spe-
    cific, nonfrivolous argument[s] tethered to [ ] relevant
    § 3553(a) factor[s].” Carty, 
    520 F.3d at 992
    . Yet, in imposing
    sentence, the court gave no indication that it had heard Car-
    ter’s arguments and imposed sentence with almost no expla-
    nation. I believe that the district court erred in failing to
    address Carter’s arguments, failing adequately to consider the
    § 3553(a) factors, and failing adequately to explain the sen-
    tence that was imposed. I therefore respectfully dissent from
    Part IV of the Discussion section of the majority opinion.
    3850               UNITED STATES v. CARTER
    The majority cites a lengthy passage from the sentencing
    hearing to support its conclusion; however, this passage does
    not reveal that the district court adequately addressed Carter’s
    arguments and the § 3553 factors. It was apparent to govern-
    ment counsel, Assistant U.S. Attorney Elizabeth R. Yang, that
    the court’s explanation was insufficient, as indicated by the
    fact that, even after the court gave the statement quoted by the
    majority, Ms. Yang proceeded to ask the court a series of
    questions designed to address the inadequacy of the court’s
    statement:
    Ms. Yang: And with regard to the court’s denial of
    the downward departure request respecting criminal
    history category, has the court recognized that it has
    discretion to depart on this ground but chooses not
    to exercise that discretion?
    The Court:    You mean the 20 days.
    Ms. Yang: No, the criminal history category, the
    over-representation.
    The Court:    What did you say?
    Ms. Yang: Does the court recognize that it has dis-
    cretion to depart based on over-representation of
    criminal history but chooses not to exercise it’s [sic]
    discretion?
    The Court:    Yes.
    Ms. Yang: And finally with regard to the sentence
    the court has imposed including the guideline calcu-
    lations, the advisory guideline calculations and the
    mandatory minimum, has the court found that this
    sentence is reasonable taking into account all the fac-
    tors and the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553a?
    UNITED STATES v. CARTER                         3851
    The Court:       Yes. I found my sentence to be reason-
    able.
    Tr. of 4/11/05 Sentencing Hr’g at 26-27.
    Carter asked the court to apply the statutory mandatory
    minimum sentence of 360 months — a sentence already many
    times longer than those of his coconspirators.1 He argued that
    his criminal history category was overrepresented. He
    received one criminal history point for a conviction for pos-
    session of narcotics and one criminal history point for a con-
    viction for giving a false identity to a police officer when he
    was stopped for driving without his lights on. He received an
    additional two points because he was on diversion for the nar-
    cotics offense and on probation for the false identity offense
    when he committed the instant offense. Carter asked the court
    to exercise its discretion and impose a below-guidelines sen-
    tence, taking into consideration his difficult childhood, his
    family situation and his young children, and the rehabilitative
    effect of what would be, under the statutory minimum, thirty
    years in prison.
    Rather than addressing any of Carter’s arguments, the court
    applied the guidelines sentence, stating that the guidelines had
    “adequately taken into consideration [Carter’s] actions and
    criminal history,” and that the “lengthy sentence is suffi-
    1
    The bulk of Carter’s sentence was due to the statutory mandatory mini-
    mum twenty-five year sentence for a subsequent conviction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(C). This court has in the past urged Congress to recon-
    sider the “harsh scheme of mandatory minimum sentences” imposed by
    § 924. United States v. Harris, 
    154 F.3d 1082
    , 1085 (9th Cir. 1998); see
    also United States v. Hungerford, 
    465 F.3d 1113
    , 1118-22 (9th Cir. 2006)
    (Reinhardt, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing as “irrational, inhu-
    mane, and absurd” a 159-year sentence imposed on a mentally ill woman
    who had nothing to do with the firearm used in the robberies), cert.
    denied, 
    127 S. Ct. 2249
     (2007). Harris and Hungerford were decided
    under the mandatory sentencing regime; thus, the criticism was aimed at
    Congress’ decision to remove all discretion from the sentencing judge.
    3852               UNITED STATES v. CARTER
    ciently punitive and hopefully will deter against any further
    criminal activity.” This rote recitation of a few of the § 3553
    factors does not begin to constitute “an individualized assess-
    ment based on the facts presented.” Gall, 
    128 S. Ct. at 597
    .
    Moreover, the court’s simple affirmative responses to the
    government’s pointed questions regarding Carter’s arguments
    do not provide a record that “makes clear that the sentencing
    judge listened to each argument.” Rita v. United States, 
    127 S. Ct. 2456
    , 2469 (2007).
    The Supreme Court has instructed that the district court
    “may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable.”
    Gall, 
    128 S. Ct. at 596-97
    ; see also Rita, 
    127 S. Ct. at 2465
    (emphasizing that, in determining the merits of the arguments
    by prosecution and defense that the guidelines sentence
    should not apply, “the sentencing court does not enjoy the
    benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence
    should apply”). Here, however, the district court presumed the
    guideline range was reasonable and failed to make any indi-
    vidualized assessment.
    “The sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy
    the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ argu-
    ments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
    decisionmaking authority.” Rita, 
    127 S. Ct. at 2468
    . Yet, the
    district court did not give any reason for rejecting Carter’s
    arguments regarding his sentence. Unlike cases in which we
    have found that the district court adequately considered the
    defendant’s specific “history and characteristics,” the court
    did not “consider how the sentencing factors apply to [Carter]
    and determine whether an individualized sentence [was] war-
    ranted.” United States v. Plouffe, 
    445 F.3d 1126
    , 1131 (9th
    Cir. 2006); see, e.g., United States v. Stoterau, 
    524 F.3d 988
    ,
    999-1000 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the district court ade-
    quately “considered the evidence and arguments of the defen-
    dant” where the district court referred to numerous
    subsections of § 3553(a), and, “at various points in the sen-
    tencing hearing, the district court explicitly noted that it had
    UNITED STATES v. CARTER                         3853
    considered [the defendant’s] arguments”), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 957
     (2009).
    I echo the concern that such deferential review has made
    appellate review of sentencing “an empty formality.” Gall,
    
    128 S. Ct. at 607
     (Alito, J., dissenting); see also United States
    v. Autery, 
    2009 WL 349801
    , at *12 (9th Cir. 2009) (Tashima,
    J., dissenting); United States v. Ruff, 
    535 F.3d 999
    , 1005 (9th
    Cir. 2008) (Gould, J., dissenting) (in the context of reviewing
    a sentence for substantive reasonableness, stating that the
    abuse of discretion standard for reviewing sentencing deci-
    sions “is not a rubber stamp of all sentencing decision made
    by a district judge”).2 Carter’s prior offenses were minor and
    nonviolent, and his criminal history category was increased
    significantly based solely on his being on probation for the
    misdemeanor of giving false information when stopped for
    driving without his lights on.3 The 471-month sentence Carter
    received was much longer than the sentences received by the
    other participants in the robberies.4 The district court’s com-
    2
    Gall, Autery, and Ruff involved review of the reasonableness of a sen-
    tence, rather than the consideration of whether the district court committed
    procedural error.
    3
    The harsh sentence and the district court’s failure to acknowledge Car-
    ter’s arguments stand in stark contrast to Ruff, in which a white collar
    criminal who embezzled more than half a million dollars from his
    employer received a sentence of one day of imprisonment, a sentence well
    below the guideline recommendation. The district court in Ruff relied,
    among other factors, on the defendant’s age and “his mental, financial and
    gambling problems.” Ruff, 
    535 F.3d at 1006
     (Gould, J., dissenting). Carter
    surely raised personal problems at least as compelling as the defendant in
    Ruff. I agree with Judge Gould that we “ought to consider why it is that
    such light sentences are all too frequently handed out by district courts for
    white collar crimes.” 
    Id.
    4
    One of the § 3553(a) factors is “the need to avoid unwarranted sen-
    tence disparities. . . .” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(6). The evidence indicates that
    O’Neal and Warren planned and recruited the participants for both rob-
    beries; O’Neal cooperated, and Warren pled, and they received sentences
    of 105 months and 41 months, respectively. The record also indicates that
    Edward Hector participated in both robberies, but, for unknown reasons,
    3854                  UNITED STATES v. CARTER
    plete failure to acknowledge Carter’s arguments, and, based
    on its exchange with Ms. Yang, its failure even to have heard
    the arguments, do not “communicate[ ] that the parties’ argu-
    ments have been heard, and that a reasoned decision has been
    made.” Carty, 
    520 F.3d at 992
    . Section 3553 requires the
    court to state “the reasons for its imposition of the particular
    sentence,” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (c), because “[c]onfidence in a
    judge’s use of reason underlies the public’s trust in the judi-
    cial institution,” Rita, 
    127 S. Ct. at 2468
    . In my mind, the
    majority’s reliance on the district court’s cursory explanation
    for the harsh sentence imposed does not constitute “meaning-
    ful appellate review.” Carty, 
    520 F.3d at 992
    .
    It is true that “when a defendant’s arguments are straight-
    forward and uncomplicated, the district court does not abuse
    its discretion when it listens to the defendant’s arguments and
    then ‘simply [finds those] circumstances insufficient to war-
    rant a sentence lower than the Guidelines range.’ ” Stoterau,
    
    524 F.3d at 999
     (quoting Carty, 
    520 F.3d at 995
    ) (alteration
    in original). However, the arguments regarding Carter’s crim-
    inal history are not straightforward and uncomplicated. More-
    over, in Rita, from which this principle is taken, the district
    court asked numerous questions about all of the sentencing
    issues raised by the parties before giving its “brief but legally
    sufficient” statement of reasons for the sentence it imposed.
    Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2469; see Joint Appendix, Vol. I, at 48-91,
    Rita v. United States, 
    127 S. Ct. 2456
     (2007) (No. 06-5754)
    (transcript of sentencing hearing); cf. United States v. Perez-
    Perez, 
    512 F.3d 514
    , 516-17 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding the sen-
    tence reasonable where the district court expressly cited the
    defendant’s extensive criminal history and the need for deter-
    was charged in only one; he went to trial and received a sentence of 240
    months. The other participants received sentences ranging from 125
    months to 137 months. The only participant who received a sentence
    remotely close to Carter’s was Koran Allen, who received a 319-month
    sentence, but Allen was a career offender with a long criminal history,
    including several violent offenses.
    UNITED STATES v. CARTER                  3855
    rence and “actively questioned and engaged the defense” dur-
    ing sentencing). Here, by contrast, the court did not
    acknowledge or address the arguments raised by Carter at all.
    The nature of Carter’s prior offenses, the length of his sen-
    tence, and the district court’s failure to address any of the spe-
    cific arguments raised by Carter, coupled with the minimal
    consideration of the § 3553(a) factors as applied to Carter,
    lead me to conclude that not only did the district court commit
    procedural error by failing adequately to consider the
    § 3553(a) factors, failing to make an individualized determi-
    nation, and failing to consider the arguments raised by Carter,
    but that the sentence is not reasonable. For these reasons, I
    respectfully dissent from Part IV and the majority’s conclu-
    sion that Carter’s sentence was reasonable.