United States v. Heron-Salinas ( 2009 )


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  •                     FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No. 08-50276
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                 D.C. No.
    3:07-cr-02872-JM-1
    JUAN HERON-SALINAS,
    OPINION
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Jeffrey T. Miller, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 6, 2009*
    Pasadena, California
    Filed May 20, 2009
    Before: John T. Noonan, Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, and
    Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam Opinion
    *The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
    oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    6019
    UNITED STATES v. HERON-SALINAS             6021
    COUNSEL
    Jennifer L. Coon, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San
    Diego, California, for the defendant-appellant.
    Nicole Acton Jones, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Appellate Sec-
    tion, Criminal Division, San Diego, California, for the
    plaintiff-appellee.
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Juan Heron-Salinas appeals the district court’s denial of his
    motion to dismiss his indictment for attempted entry into the
    United States after deportation, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    . Heron-Salinas claims that his underlying deportation
    was invalid under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (d) because his conviction
    for assault with a firearm under California Penal Code section
    245(a)(2) is not a “crime of violence,” as that term is defined
    in 
    18 U.S.C. § 16
    .
    [1] We have previously held that aiding and abetting
    assault with a deadly weapon in violation of California Penal
    Code section 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence
    under 
    18 U.S.C. § 16
    , and that an alien convicted of that
    crime is an aggravated felon under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(43)(F).
    Ortiz-Magana v. Mukasey, 
    542 F.3d 653
    , 654 (9th Cir. 2008);
    see also Ocampo-Duran v. Ashcroft, 
    254 F.3d 1133
    , 1134-35
    (9th Cir. 2001).
    6022            UNITED STATES v. HERON-SALINAS
    [2] California Penal Code section 245(a)(1) and 245(a)(2)
    proscribe the same conduct, the only difference being the type
    of weapon involved. Today we hold that a conviction for
    assault with a firearm under California Penal Code section
    245(a)(2) is categorically a “crime of violence” and an “ag-
    gravated felony” for immigration purposes.
    Heron-Salinas argues that California Penal Code section
    245 does not contain the requisite mens rea or use of force to
    qualify as a crime of violence under section 16. Heron-Salinas
    is incorrect. Section 16 defines a “crime of violence” as:
    (a) an offense that has as an element the use,
    attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
    against the person or property of another, or
    (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by
    its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
    force against the person or property of another may
    be used in the course of committing the offense.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 16
    . Under a plain reading of the statute, the ele-
    ments of assault with a firearm — an unlawful attempt, cou-
    pled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the
    person of another with a firearm — satisfy the requirements
    of section 16(a) and (b). See 
    Cal. Penal Code §§ 240
    ,
    245(a)(2).
    [3] In California, assault “requires an intentional act and
    actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish that the
    act by its nature will probably and directly result in the appli-
    cation of physical force against another.” People v. Williams,
    
    29 P.3d 197
    , 204 (Cal. 2001). This definition closely tracks
    the language in § 16(b). Attempting to commit a violent
    injury on another person with a firearm “naturally involve[s]
    a person acting in disregard of the risk that physical force
    might be used against another in committing an offense.” Leo-
    UNITED STATES v. HERON-SALINAS             6023
    cal v. Ashcroft, 
    543 U.S. 1
    , 10-11 (2004). The mens rea
    requirement is met.
    Heron-Salinas next argues that section 245 is not a crime
    of violence because, in California, “assault includes an uncon-
    sented touching of the victim,” rather than actual force, as
    required by section 16. People v. Rosen, 
    56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 444
    ,
    454 (Ct. App. 2007). Today we do not address the broader
    question of whether all forms of assault under the California
    Penal Code are crimes of violence. The use of a firearm in the
    commission of the crime is enough to demonstrate that actual
    force was attempted or threatened under section 16(a). Simi-
    larly, one who assaults another by means of a firearm neces-
    sarily disregards the substantial risk that in the course of
    committing the offense he might intentionally use actual
    physical force against the victim under section 16(b).
    [4] Assault with a firearm naturally falls within the cate-
    gory, “crime of violence,” under the “ordinary meaning” of
    that term. See Leocal, 
    543 U.S. at 11
    . Heron-Salinas was con-
    victed of a “crime of violence” under 
    18 U.S.C. § 16
    .
    Accordingly, the conviction is AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-50276

Filed Date: 5/20/2009

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/14/2015