Dwayne Eichler v. Sherbin , 520 F. App'x 560 ( 2013 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 22 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DWAYNE EICHLER, No. 12-15882
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:04-cv-01108-GEB-
JFM
v.
SHERBIN, CDC Officer; et al., MEMORANDUM *
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Garland E. Burrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 14, 2013 **
Before: LEAVY, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Dwayne Eichler appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference to safety, state law claims, and violations of the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”). We have jurisdiction under 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir.
2001). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Eichler’s
deliberate indifference claim because the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity, as their conduct did not violate a right that was clearly established at the
time of the alleged violation. See Bull v. City & County of San Francisco, 595
F.3d 964, 971, 1002-03 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (a government official is entitled
to qualified immunity unless the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party
asserting the injury, show that the official violated a right and the right was
“clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation; the key inquiry for
determining the latter is whether a reasonable person could have believed his
actions lawful at the time they were undertaken).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Eichler’s
negligence claim because Eichler failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether the officers were the proximate cause of any injury. See Mendoza v.
City of Los Angeles., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 525, 528, 530 (Ct. App. 1998) (setting out
elements of negligence claim under California law and explaining that proximate
cause “limits the defendant’s liability to those foreseeable consequences that the
defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in producing”).
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The district court properly granted summary judgment on Eichler’s
EMTALA claim because Eichler failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether defendants failed to provide him with appropriate medical screening
or stabilizing treatment. See Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 415
(9th Cir. 1991) (discussing requirements for EMTALA claim).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Eichler’s medical
malpractice claim against defendant Mercy Hospital of Folsom because Eichler
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether this defendant failed
to meet the standard of care. See Gami v. Mullikin Med. Ctr., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819,
823 (Ct. App. 1993) (setting out elements of medical malpractice claim under
California law).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Eichler’s medical malpractice claim against
defendant Nugent. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7
(1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before
trial, the balance of factors to be considered . . . will point toward declining to
exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”); Tritchler v. County of
Lake, 358 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2004) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Eichler’s motion to
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compel responses to interrogatories by non-parties. See Preminger v. Peake, 552
F.3d 757, 768 n.10 (9th Cir. 2008) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion); Dart
Indus. Co. v. Westwood Chem. Co., 649 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1980) (limitations
on discovery “may be broader when a nonparty is the target of discovery”).
AFFIRMED.
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