United States v. Victor Victorio , 621 F. App'x 422 ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              OCT 23 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 14-50132
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 8:11-cr-00012-DOC-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    VICTOR MARIN VICTORIO,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted October 21, 2015**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: IKUTA and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and SESSIONS,*** District Judge.
    Appellant Victor Victorio was convicted of conspiracy to distribute
    methamphetamine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , following a jury trial before the
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable William K. Sessions III, District Judge for the U.S.
    District Court for the District of Vermont, sitting by designation.
    district court. He appeals his sentence of 292 months of incarceration followed by
    ten years of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and
    we affirm.
    Victorio’s only claim is that the district court erred by relying upon a
    stipulation regarding drug quantity and type at sentencing. Victorio acknowledges
    that his counsel agreed to the stipulation, and that neither he nor his counsel
    objected to the stipulation at any point before the district court. But he argues that
    the district court should have inquired as to whether he personally understood and
    assented to the stipulation because he did not sign it or otherwise affirmatively
    demonstrate assent.
    His argument is foreclosed by United States v. Ferreboeuf, 
    632 F.2d 832
    (9th Cir. 1980). In Ferreboeuf, this court held that “when a stipulation to a crucial
    fact is entered into the record in open court in the presence of the defendant, and is
    agreed to by defendant’s acknowledged counsel, the trial court may reasonably
    assume that the defendant is aware of the content of the stipulation and agrees to it
    through his or her attorney. Unless a criminal defendant indicates objection at the
    time the stipulation is made, he or she is ordinarily bound by such stipulation.” 
    Id. at 836
    . In this case, Victorio does not dispute that the stipulation was (1) entered
    into the record in open court, (2) in his presence, and (3) agreed to by his counsel.
    2
    And he makes no claim that he objected to the stipulation at any point before the
    district court. Ferreboeuf is thus directly on point, and Victorio’s claim fails.
    Victorio’s attempts to get around Ferreboeuf are unpersuasive. Contrary to
    his suggestion, Ferreboeuf was not abrograted by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000). See United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 
    431 F.3d 1212
    , 1219
    (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ferreboeuf with approval post-Apprendi). Apprendi
    broadened the class of disputed facts that must be decided by a jury; it does not
    apply when a defendant waives the right to have a particular fact determined by the
    jury via stipulation. See United States v. Shimoda, 
    334 F.3d 846
    , 849-50 (9th Cir.
    2003); see also United States v. Silva, 
    247 F.3d 1051
    , 1060 (9th Cir. 2001). And
    Victorio’s frequent objections before, during, and after trial do not distinguish the
    facts of this case from Ferreboeuf. To the contrary, Victorio’s general
    disinclination to agree with the government made it all the more reasonable for the
    district court to interpret his silence as agreement with the contents of the drug
    stipulation.
    Even assuming Victorio could distinguish Ferreboeuf, he cannot show that
    any error in this case was “plain.” Among other things, an error must be “clear or
    obvious” in order to be plain. United States v. Castillo-Marin, 
    684 F.3d 914
    , 918
    (9th Cir. 2012). Victorio has not cited a single case, and we have not found one,
    3
    that stands for the proposition that a stipulation as to a crucial fact is invalid if not
    personally signed or agreed to by a criminal defendant. Therefore, any error in this
    case was not plain.
    AFFIRMED.
    4